TRADER PARTICIPATION IN THE
GOVERNANCE OF MARKETS IN
JOHANNESBURG

THE CASES OF BREE AND MIDRAND MARKETS

By

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A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. In fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Urban Studies.

Johannesburg, 2017
DECLARATION

I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for Master of Urban Studies to the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any degree or examination to any other university.

..........................................................

(Signature of candidate)

........day of.............................year.........
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ABSTRACT

Urban governance in many cities of the global South is subject to two dynamics. The first is a process of neoliberalisation, consisting inter alia of an emphasis on business principles to manage public assets; the quest for cost recovery; and forms of privatisation or delegation of management of specific spaces or services. The second is a process of democratisation, where participatory planning and governance, decentralisation and the quest for locally-adapted and responsive solutions to urban issues, are characterising public discourses. The management of markets as profit-making spaces of trade often occupying public spaces and considered a key function of cities is the site of such dynamics. All the stakeholders involved in market governance need to sustain themselves and their institutions through revenues or income. Terms such as participation and empowerment can become a rhetoric used to mask revenue objectives and co-opt traders into meeting them. Through the case studies of Midrand and Bree markets in the City of Johannesburg, the research argues that traders are participating in market governance, through representative collectives, without clarity over what they are participating in. They have been convinced to participate by other stakeholders that have their own potential interests. It is argued that in a sector where traders are struggling to survive an ambitious drive should be welcomed but that the overwhelming focus on economic empowerment is a matter of concern. There is also a need for the development of political capabilities. Within such a context there is potential to see the entanglements between neoliberalisation and participation enhance the democratisation of market governance.

Key Words: Participation, Governance, Market Committee, Cooperative, Trader Organisation, Neoliberalisation, Invented and Invited Spaces, Governmentality, Management Model
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</thead>
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<td>CoJ</td>
<td>City of Johannesburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUBES</td>
<td>Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DED</td>
<td>Department of Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoT</td>
<td>Department of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMPD</td>
<td>Johannesburg Metropolitan Police</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Johannesburg Property Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFMA</td>
<td>Municipal Finance Management Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Municipal owned Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Metropolitan Trading Company</td>
</tr>
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<td>PTO</td>
<td>Public Transport Operator</td>
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<td>SAITF</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Public marketplaces around the globe are arenas of political struggle where actors fight for access to and control over space, resources and political allegiance” (Prag, 2010: 65).

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Urban governance in many cities of the global South is subject to two dynamic processes. The first is a process of neoliberalisation, consisting inter alia of an emphasis on business principles to manage public assets; quest for cost recovery; and forms of privatisation or delegation of governance of specific spaces or services. The second is a process of democratisation, where participatory planning and governance, decentralisation and the quest for locally-adapted and responsive solutions to urban issues, are characterising public discourses.

The management of markets, as profit-making spaces of trade often occupying public spaces and considered a key function of cities, is the site of such dynamics. All the stakeholders involved in market governance need to sustain themselves and their institutions through revenues or income. Given the neoliberal context within which many of these markets are located, the need for revenue is even more pronounced. Terms such as participation and empowerment can become a rhetoric used to mask revenue objectives and co-opt traders into meeting these. As a result, the lines between participation and neoliberalisation become entangled and blurry. While neoliberalisation promotes participation, towards decreasing the role of the state it may also be instrumentalised to shift responsibility to participants and meet revenue objectives. On the other hand, trader participation in the management
of ‘their’ market also corresponds to a very strong claim, coming from traders themselves. We cannot discard too quickly the democratic and participatory dimension of this claim.

In Johannesburg, since the late 1990s the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is no longer directly managing markets. Specific MoEs Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) and currently Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) have been appointed to perform that task. The management of market, however, has also involved, in unclear and under-researched forms, the participation of traders through their collectives. Currently in markets in Johannesburg, one can identify four types of trader collectives involved in market governance. The dynamics within each of these collectives differ and there is strong influence from the regional collective among the four. These collectives are also connected to the recent demands for management positions in markets. Their demands, in fact, have contributed to a possible power shift in market governance. Through case studies of Midrand and Bree markets in the City of Johannesburg, the research argues that traders are participating in market governance, through representative collectives, without clarity over what they are participating in. They have been convinced to participate by other stakeholders that have their own potential interests. It is argued that in a sector where traders are struggling to survive an ambitious drive should be welcomed but that the overwhelming focus on economic empowerment is a matter of concern. There is also a need for the development of political capabilities. Within such a context there is potential to see the entanglements between neoliberalisation and participation augment the democratisation of market governance.

1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Since its restructuring along New Public Management principles in the late 1990s- early 2000s, the City of Johannesburg appoints external entities (termed Municipal Owned Entities (MoEs)) for the management of market functions. These functions include cleaning, security, maintenance and general management. New Public Management in South Africa arguably forms part of the neoliberalisation of urban governance. The neoliberalism framework favours cost cutting, increased efficiency in management systems and administrative performance (Heller, 2001). When externalising management functions to MoEs, these were expected to operate at a profit for the relevant department to meet their targets.

In 1999, the MTC was established as a MoE for the management of markets in the City of Johannesburg. The MTC reported at the time directly to the Department of Economic Development (DED) (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). The MTC failed to meet its mandate as a self-sustainable entity, due, in particular to a lack of profit (Shisaka Management Development Services 2004 cited in Bénit-Gbaffou,
As a result, the governing body was theoretically dissolved and subsumed under the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC). Today, the JPC is the governing body in charge of the management of markets. Currently, at market, micro-level, management consists generally of a JPC market manager operating in conjunction with an elected market committee. Some trader cooperatives and trader organisations would, however, like to play a more active role in market management (Jackson, Kgomo, Mohloboli, Mhlongo and Bénit-Gbaffou, 2014). This is especially evident in Bree, Baragwanath, Midrand and Yeoville markets (ibid.). Traders have mobilised themselves to the extent that the DED and JPC are reconceptualising their approach to market management.

1.3. RESEARCH RATIONALE

Whilst the governance of street trading has attracted a lot of research attention, as it was a contested terrain in Johannesburg, little had been done on market management in Johannesburg. Bénit-Gbaffou explains:

“There are many gaps that further research would need to address. It would be useful to broaden the literature review on market management; explore the nature, benefits and limitations of street traders cooperatives; deepen understanding of City of Johannesburg’s policies and practices, in order to learn from successes and mistakes…” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015: 14)

The state, private sector, trader organisations, trader committees, cooperatives and traders are the main role-players within these markets. As discussed, there is growing pressure from trader organisations on the state to appoint them for market management functions (Jackson et al., 2014). The City of Johannesburg does place management of functions such as cleaning, maintenance and security out on tender. Traders in markets have already started forming cooperatives that enable them to tender bid for these management functions (ibid.).

Traders participate in market governance through four collectives. A trader collective is defined as a group of traders who share membership or affiliations to the collective through shared interests. Each of these collective agencies has different internal dynamics at play. The first collective is the market committees currently working in conjunction with the JPC management. These committees are elected through voting systems although the credibility thereof is questionable. In 2010, Bakwa, Motloung, and Khanyile (2010) conducted research on market governance in Yeoville. The study found that although the relevant market committee was elected through voting systems, no privacy was provided when traders casted their votes. The study further found that the market committee had limited power. Bakwa, et al. (2010: 18) state that “[w]hen analysing the power structure of the market
we found that it does not give the committee and traders direct influence on decisions made by either the manager or the MTC”.

The second collective is trader organisations with the objective to represent the interests of traders. Trader organisations are often critiqued for by authorities and various NGO’s for “lacking continuity, legitimacy, representativeness and strategic vision” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016: 4). Despite such critiques, trader organisations are central to trader mobilisation and provide traders with much-needed guidance and support when confronting authorities (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). Within these organisations, leaders are often self-appointed due to election constraints. More recent trader collectives are represented by volunteer groups and cooperatives. The third collective, volunteer groups, was initiated as a result of traders’ mobilisation efforts. These collectives have taken over cleaning and security functions in the hope of being rewarded should management positions be awarded to cooperatives. Cooperatives, as the fourth collective, were established with the objective of tendering for market management functions. Within cooperatives, membership is voluntary but at a financial cost. Cooperatives and volunteering groups co-exist in the markets and there is often overlap in membership between the collectives. These dynamics provided a sound rationale to investigate the participation of traders in market governance.

1.4. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH

The objective of the research is to understand the participatory practices of traders in market governance. In line with the work of Cornwall (2008), the research seeks to explore who is participating, in what they are participating and for what reason. The objective is further to investigate the broader governance framework (understood as the nature of stakeholders involved, their relationship and their respective roles and functions) in which market governance takes place and the power dynamics that it represents. One of the main objectives is, therefore, to analyse the complex articulation of stakeholders and their relationships.

It is further important to investigate what is regarded as participation within markets. Are traders satisfied with being awarded maintenance, cleaning or security management functions, or do they desire to step into the overall management positions? As a result, whose interests are being served? The research will also explore if traders form part of any decision-making processes. The research aims to identify what forms market governance might take on under the process of neoliberalisation and the democratisation of urban governance. Based on international experience and relevant case studies, the research will seek to contribute to a body of literature on sustainable market governance for traders.
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION

The research questions put forward will be used to guide and centre the research. The main research question is the following:

*How do traders participate in the governance of markets in Johannesburg (Midrand and Bree markets)?*

In support of the main question posed, the following sub-questions will be considered:

- *How is the market currently managed and who are the stakeholders involved in the governance of the markets?*
- *Who do the different trader collectives represent and how are they structured?*
- *To what extent are trader collectives making a difference in the governance of markets, and what is at stake in their intervention?*
- *What and whose interests prevail in the governance of markets?*
- *How is further trader participation (through market committees and cooperatives) framed and envisaged in existing or draft regulatory documents?*

1.6. CHAPTER OUTLINE

The reader is first introduced to the politics of the research in chapter two. This is done to contextualise the research in an intricate and politically sensitive environment. As part of chapter two, the methodological approach to the research is described to highlight the obstacles that had to be navigated as well as the limitations they resulted in.

Chapter three comprises of a literature review based on three theoretical threads relevant to the research. The first thread reflects on the manner in which participation is intended to lead to a form of democratisation. Criticism as well as debates in support of participation are critically assessed. The second thread elucidates the complexities and entanglements of participation within a process of neoliberalisation. The third is on market governance through a reflection on markets in the global South. Consideration is especially given to the manner in which traders participate in market governance and the functions trader collectives perform. This thread further places the synergies between participation and neoliberalisation within a battle for power through revenues in markets.

The stakeholders as well as the functioning of Bree and Midrand markets are introduced in chapter four. It is revealed that traders participate in market governance through trader organisations, market committees, cooperatives as well as groups of volunteers. The DED is the regulatory department
overseeing markets while the JPC is the appointed management agent. The relations between these stakeholders have created a context in which a number of market governance functions are governed in an informal manner. Although descriptive in nature, chapter four provides a sound foundation for the conceptual analysis found in chapter five and six.

Chapter five analyses the invited and invented spaces through which traders participate in market governance. A failure of the former has resulted in traders resorting to the invented spaces of participation. There are, however, still an overlap between these spaces. The South African Informal Trading Forum (SAITF), as the trader organisation active in the markets, has to a large extent been the driving force behind trader mobilisation. The effect of trader mobilisation as well as the interests of those involved are further analysed in the chapter. It is argued that there are cases of both civic and neoliberal governmentality present between SAITF, the market committees and traders.

Much of the dynamics of the chapters described above are located in a context where possible reforms to market management are on the table. This has partly been as a result of traders’ demands for managerial positions and therefore concerns them directly. Their empowerment is also the rhetoric through which the different stakeholders involved could be masking their own interests. Chapter six presents the information available on the different management models proposed. It examines the manner in which empowerment is envisioned as well as the risk and opportunities connected to each approach.

Chapter seven applies Cornwall’s (2008: 281) “clarity through specificity” approach to provide a concluding analysis of trader participation in market governance in Johannesburg. The conclusion firstly reflects on who participates and who is excluded; secondly on what traders are participating in; and thirdly the reason for participating. It is argued that traders are participating in market governance, through representative collectives, without clarity over what they are participating in. They have been convinced to participate by other stakeholders that have their own potential interests. It is argued that in a sector where traders are struggling to survive an ambitious drive should be welcomed but that the overwhelming focus on economic empowerment is a matter of concern. The proposed new management approaches have the potential to either entrench or bridge existing divides. Regulatory oversight, transparency and the development of political capabilities will, however, be crucial to achieve the former.
CHAPTER 2
ENTERING BREE AND MIDRAND MARKETS: THE POLITICS OF RESEARCH

2.1. INTRODUCTION

During the fieldwork, there was an instance when my fieldwork assistant turned to me and said: "I have passed these markets so many times in my life, I would never have thought that their internal dynamics could be this complicated" (Fieldwork Assistant, 2016). Conducting research in such intricate and politically sensitive environments required careful navigation to avoid not only a negative impact on my research but also putting participants at risk. Without divulging the context of the subsequent chapters, this chapter describes the chosen methodology as well as the politics and difficulties I had to navigate to be able to reveal the narrative of the two markets. As the section discloses, the main limitations caused by the politics of the research is that Bree market could not be investigated to the same depth as Midrand market. To enable an overview of the methodological approach taken, a brief introduction to the basic market configurations, the relevant stakeholders and possible governance reforms are first provided. This enables the reader to develop a better understanding of the politics of the research described further on in the chapter. The remaining chapters unpack the internal dynamics and composition of the different institutions and collectives as well as their mobilisation in further detail.
2.2. MAPPING THE CONTEXT

Market governance represents a complex system of stakeholders and discourses. One of the primary objectives of the research is to uncover the complex articulation of stakeholders and their relationships. There have also been recent demands for reforms across markets that contributed to the contextual dynamics in which the research was located.

2.2.1. MARKET ESTABLISHMENT AND CONFIGURATIONS

The processes of establishing Bree and Midrand markets have some similarities. Midrand market was officially established in 2006 and Bree market in 2002 (Bree committee, interview 2016; MCM1, interview 2016). Prior to the allocation of stalls in the markets, the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) conducted surveys of all the traders active in the areas’ streets (MCM1, interview 2016). After a series of negotiations, stalls were allocated to traders as the property of the City of Johannesburg Department of Economic Development (DED) (ibid.). Both markets were built to serve as taxi ranks and market areas, in line with the policy of the time. Map 2.1 illustrates the location of both markets within Johannesburg.

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1 The following abbreviations were used to source the different stakeholders interviewed:

- DED - Department of Economic Development officials
- JPC - Johannesburg Property Company officials
- MTC – Metropolitan Trading Company officials
- SAITF – South Africa Informal Trading Forum members
- MCM – Market Committee Members
- MT – Market Traders

It was further numerically shown if the stakeholder was, for example, the first or second interviewed. An example is MCM1 which indicates that it was the first market committee member interviewed. Although some stakeholders were engaged on more than one occasion, only one code was applied to them as individuals. The dates of such multiple engagements are provided in the Reference list. There were two interviews that took place in a group format; one was with the Bree market committee and the second with a group of volunteers in the market. The latter is indicated as BV1 (interview 2016).
Map 2.1: Midrand and Bree market’s location in Johannesburg
Daniel (2016), layers sourced from CSIR and SANSA Data (2010)

The DED (2016) manages trading in the city according to seven regions. The two markets are located in Region A (Midrand market) and Region F (Bree market) which contains 8% and 24% of trading activities in the city respectively (ibid.). The two markets under review differ considerably in size. Where Bree market accommodates more than 400 traders, Midrand market only currently has 89 active traders (MCM1&3, interviews 2016).
Bree market is located within a multi-story taxi rank facility located over two blocks. Map 2.2 provides the location of the two components of Bree market.

Map 2.2: Bree market location
*Daniel (2017), based on Google Maps*

Gwigwi Mrwebi Street borders Bree market to the north and Lilian Ngoyi Street to the south. Lilian Ngoyi Street was previously known as Bree Street from which the market area derived its name of Bree market. The market is also known as Metro Mall among users and traders. To the west and east, the market is bordered by Ntemi Piliso Street and Simmonds Street respectively. Sauer Street cuts the facility in two parts from north to south.

Midrand market also operates over multiple stories. Map 2.3 illustrates the site of Midrand market.
Map 2.3: Midrand market location

Daniel (2017), based on Google Maps

From the map above it can be seen that Midrand market is located on one of the main transport routes in Midrand, namely Old Pretoria Road. South Street, Market Street and Moritz Street constitute the remaining borders. Chapter four provides a detailed layout map of Midrand market. As this chapter explains further on, it was not possible to draw similar maps for Bree market.

2.2.2. GOVERNANCE STAKEHOLDERS

The governance stakeholders active in Bree and Midrand markets can be divided according to public authorities responsible for markets, the trader collectives representing traders and private service providers. For the purposes of the research, a trader collective is defined as a group of traders who share membership or affiliations to the collective through shared interests. Diagram 2.1 illustrates the institutions and collectives the governance structures of markets encapsulates.
The public entities responsible for markets are the Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), DED and the Johannesburg Department of Transport (DoT). Since its restructuring along New Public Management principles in the late 1990s-early 2000s, the City of Johannesburg appoints external entities (termed Municipal Owned Entities (MoEs)) for the management of market functions. These functions include cleaning, security, maintenance and general management. In 1999, the MTC was established as a MoE for the management of markets in the City of Johannesburg. The MTC failed to meet its mandate as a self-sustainable entity, partly due to a lack of profit (Shisaka Management Development Services 2004 cited in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). As a result, the governing body was theoretically dissolved and subsumed under the JPC. Since 2014, the JPC is the governing body in charge of the management of markets. Both the JPC and prior MTC report directly to the DED, as the department overseeing informal business activity and infrastructure development (DED1, interview 2016). The DED works interdependently with the DoT in the management of the markets as dual function facilities – covering both trade and taxi activities (ibid.). The JPC has a market manager and in some instances property specialists physically present in the markets (JPC1, interview 2016). In the
past, private service providers have been appointed by the JPC to conduct functions such as cleaning and security (ibid.). Recent demands from traders, for management functions across the markets have, however, seen an altercation in such appointments. These dynamics are briefly explained in this chapter and further elaborated on in chapter five.

The first trader collective through which traders participate in market governance represents a broader regional organisation, the South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF). SAITF represents traders from across the metropole and is currently the trader organisation that is the most present in both markets (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). The second collective, the Market Committees, are affiliated with SAITF and consult them on issues in the markets (Bree committee, interview 2016; MCM1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). Together with cooperatives and groups of volunteers, the Market Committees are one of the three collectives where membership is limited to traders in the markets.

Both the Midrand and Bree market committees were elected with the establishment of the two markets (MCM1&3, interviews 2016). The market committees are the main collective through which trader’s participation in the markets takes place. It is the collective recognised as representatives of traders by both the DED and JPC (Johannesburg Property Company, undated). Originally trader participation would have been limited to that of committees as representatives of traders.

Recent reforms and demands of management functions have however expanded the number of collectives through which traders participate in market governance. Trader cooperatives and volunteer groups were established as a result. Volunteering groups represent traders who have taken over cleaning and security functions voluntarily. Cooperatives enable traders to tender for management functions within the markets. It is, however, important to note that there is much overlap between the membership of these collectives. The latter two are also less active than the market committees with regards to trader participation. The committees are therefore the main point of analysis throughout the research.

### 2.2.3. MARKET REFORMS

Market governance was at the time of the research impacted by possible reforms relating to the development of new management models. These processes are the result of different forms of trader mobilisation (described in chapter five). In their 2014/15 Integrated Annual Report, the JPC states that:

“With regard to the broader trading activities within the jurisdiction of the CoJ [City of Johannesburg], there is growing dissent amongst facility users who are intent on self-managing. This has been an issue where the services (cleaning and security) have been taken over by JPC at four facilities – Metro Mall, Baragwanath, Midrand and Yeoville. JPC chose not to engage and cause further dissent but focused
rather on finding a long-term solution to the management of trading facilities. (Johannesburg Property Company, 2015b: 31)"

These functions have been taken over informally and through trader mobilisation. The motivations for such mobilisations are described below:

“This [taking over cleaning and security] was done because the JPC kept on extending the contracts of existing private service providers without opening up the opportunity for traders to take on the positions. We decided to block the service providers from coming into the markets. We have developed a system of volunteering to ensure the functions are still carried out. This is also a way to prove to the municipality that we are capable of management. Some traders have been volunteering since 2014” (MCM3, interview 2016).

Chapter five discloses in more detail how such mobilisation efforts contributed to the failure in the funding model of the markets. Combined with other contributing factors, market governance was, as a result, subject to contestation in the approach to market management. The DED, JPC and DoT were at the time of the research working together towards the development of a new management model (DED1, interview 2016). The implications of these changing dynamics for the research is that it was conducted at a time of great uncertainty for many stakeholders. Chapter five also explains how the position of the market committees came into question during the time of the fieldwork. Market managers similarly felt threatened that traders could take over their positions. These uncertainties led to various antagonistic relations across the markets. These relations were also reflected in the relations between authorities and SAITF as the latter was mobilising traders against the JPC and DED. Such antagonistic relations and uncertainties contributed to the politics of the research. There were several counter accusations made throughout the research and participants were cautious as to whom else I engaged. The research had to at all times be carefully navigated to not come across as siding with any particular party.

2.3. METHODOLOGY

The research was based on an inductive approach to research the governance dynamics of two markets. The two markets were chosen based on the fact that the relevant market committees have started taking over management functions informally (as reported by SAITF leaders, in Jackson et al. 2014). Given the politics of the research, there was a risk of being rejected from one, or even both, of the markets. Access to at least one market was considered crucial to the research. The decision was thus made to decrease the risk through including two markets in the study. Focusing on one instead of two markets further created the opportunity to analyse to which effect management functions are being taken over. The comparative approach is therefore not as such focused on retrieving similarities
or differences. It was rather on developing a broader understanding (beyond the specificities of one single case study) of market governance in the City of Johannesburg, as this has been identified as an under-researched area (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015).

### 2.3.1. ENTRY STRATEGY

It was necessary to enter both markets through an acknowledgement of those in power positions. I was in a very fortunate position to be working within existing trader networks set up through Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies (CUBES). Within CUBES there is a tradition of research support to trader organisations. This also entails the communication of ‘translated’ research results to traders and other platforms. At the initial stages of the research, I met with a member of SAITF who said that he would enquire for me which markets would be willing to participate in the research (SAITF2, interview 2016). He came back to me indicating that the Bree and Midrand market committees were willing to participate in the research (ibid.). The market committees were therefore taken as the first point of entry into the markets. The second step was to contact the JPC officials in both markets. In order to protect their identities, the details regarding these engagements cannot be divulged. It can, nonetheless, be said that the approach differed in the two markets influenced by the size, physical layout as well as level of tension between stakeholders.

The approach from here on was to first collect general information regarding the functioning and spatial configuration of the markets. This gave the relevant committees and JPC officials time to get to know me and get acquainted with my research process. As time progressed, I could move to questions more sensitive in nature. Engagements with the authorities as well as SAITF took place according to normal interview procedures. Contact was made; the research was introduced to the relevant stakeholders and meetings were set up accordingly. There was, however, difficulty in securing a meeting with DED officials. These dynamics are explored below as one of the obstacles that had to be navigated as part of the research.

Throughout the fieldwork, I informed interested participants that they could have access to the research results. The intended benefit for participants was that the research would provide them with insights into the management dynamics of different markets. The rationale, which was presented to management and leader committees, was that of practical research to develop a better understanding of market governance and participation. Little research has been done on this topic, and the findings will contribute to a body of literature that could assist in developing future market governance approaches. A feedback session in the form of a presentation was suggested to the DED, SAITF and market committees. They indicated that such feedback would be appreciated. SAITF, in particular,
explained that they often assist students in their research but that these students do not give them feedback once their research is completed. Upon completion of the research, I will follow up with these stakeholders if they are still interested in such feedback and make the necessary arrangements.

2.3.2. METHODS OF ENQUIRY

The empirical research and information collection consisted of three components; qualitative interviews, observation and existing documentation. The qualitative interviews consisted of descriptive, historical and casual questions (Mouton, 2001). Apart from the DoT, members or representatives of each of the stakeholders identified above were interviewed. As the taxi industry was not the core focus of the research, as well as the time available to conduct the study, the decision was made not to engage the DoT.

The interviews with the various stakeholders comprised of formal and informal discussions. For the formal discussions, interview guidelines were prepared. On request to the JPC CEO, a senior JPC official located in their head office, was identified to grant me an interview. This interview provided me with insights into the JPC’s approach to market management despite some gaps and limitations. Additional to this official, one of the market managers was also interviewed. Unfortunately, due to the challenges experienced during the fieldwork both market managers were not accessible. The General Secretary of SAITF was not only one of the key formal interviews conducted, he also arranged for me to observe a meeting between SAITF and the market committees. After a challenging process described below, the DED’s Deputy Director of Informal Trading, was interviewed as a representative of the department. This interview was pivotal to understanding the position of the DED as a powerful entity with regulatory oversight. An additional engagement took place with the former MTC CEO. He was not available to meet in person but made time to complete an electronic copy of a questionnaire. This particular engagement provided a synopsis of the reason why the MTC was integrated into the JPC and the failures of prior market management models.

During the fieldwork, a total of forty interviews were conducted. Thirty-three of these interviews were conducted with twenty-one different stakeholders within the markets. Some stakeholders were interviewed more than once. I would normally arrange to visit a market for a morning, leaving the afternoon open if I needed more time. I visited Bree market on seven occasions, but the stakeholders I wanted to engage were not always available. The fieldwork in Midrand market also comprised of seven visits. These site visits would on average last between two and five hours. In addition to the interviews conducted within the markets, I conducted eight interviews with stakeholders located outside of the market such as the DED, JPC and SAITF.
Market committee members in different positions, were formally and informally engaged. Interviews with market traders and volunteers took place on a more informal basis. It is, however, important to note that based on the overlap in membership between these collectives it was often found that an interview with a committee member would at the same time constitute as an interview with a cooperative and volunteer member.

A coding system was subsequently developed. The decision was made to simplify such a system across the different types of stakeholders to ensure anonymity. The reference list provides the number of engagements according to dates in the list of interviews. The decision was similarly made to exclude reference to a particular market in the coding system. Reference to the specific interview site is furthermore excluded from the bibliography.

For the interview component of the research, a fieldwork assistant was, at times, used to assist with translation. The fieldwork assistant was referred to me by his previous employer and to ensure neutrality was in no way associated with any of the stakeholders. I requested his assistance after my first few visits to both markets. I could sufficiently converse with most of the committee members in English but realised I could miss out on valuable information without the assistance of someone who could translate for me. I was particularly concerned about when I would start engaging traders. We met and agreed on a rate depending on whether we spend half a day or a full day in one of the markets. The assistant accompanied me to the market on five occasions and would not engage in any questioning. When needed, he would translate the interview between the relevant participant and myself.

The research further relied on direct observations and existing documentation (Yin, 1994; Sarantakos, 2005). Direct observations were made at three meetings further described in the subsequent section and chapters. The physical layout and functioning of the market were also directly observed. I enquired into obtaining minutes of previous meetings at numerous instances, but none were provided. Due to the limited time in Bree market, as well as its size, observations regarding the functioning and physical layout of the market could not be made to the same extent as Midrand market. The research discloses how limited documentation could be obtained during the research. A JPC official attributed this lack of documentation to the merger between the JPC and MTC as well as the new reforms under way (JPC1, interview 2016). The lack of documentation included Terms of Reference for the appointment of Market Committees, tender documents, market layouts, lease agreements as well as conditions that users of the facility enter into with JPC. With regards to documentation on the proposed management models, the DED and JPC clearly stated that their model was still in the conceptual phases and not yet formulated. After various requests, SAITF provided me
with a copy of their model, during the final stages of the research. The SAITF General Secretary indicated that the model could be used and quoted but should not be distributed (SAITF1, interview 2017). He explained that DED may want to use the model to get other organisations to challenge it (ibid.).

2.3.3. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the research, it was necessary to take cognisance of the fact that there were sensitive and complex processes at play. The research committed to not influence difficult processes at work, respect the anonymity of respondents, formulate constructive critical analysis, provide recommendations that are not harmful to people, institutions or processes. The objective was rather to contribute to a better understanding and outcomes. Given such an objective, the aim was to have a balanced view of complex processes and dynamics which requires listening to and understanding (as much as possible) all stakeholders engaged in it.

To guarantee anonymity, I ensured that only I could identify the responses of individuals who wished to remain anonymous. This is especially relevant given the planned feedback sessions. The majority of participants did, however, not request their identity to be kept anonymous. The decision was nonetheless made to develop a coding system to protect the identity of the market stakeholders. The politics of the research is of such a sensitive nature that there is no guarantee that the information cannot be used against participants in future. As there are only two markets involved, it is quite difficult to achieve a real level of anonymity – a high level of scrutiny in this respect was exerted on what could and what could not be included directly in the research report.

2.3.4. OBSTACLES AND NAVIGATION

In the initial stages of the fieldwork, one of the main obstacles encountered was the difficulty in securing the participation of some of the stakeholders. This was especially with regards to the regulatory department, the DED. During the interview with the JPC, the official explained that the majority of information I required was only retrievable from DED Deputy Director of Informal Trading (JPC1, interview 2016). The reasons given for this was that the proposed new management model was still in a conceptual phase and that:

"They [JPC] have no documentation available, and hence they are going out on the new process. They have no old MTC documents on markets. The guy who was behind that is no longer there. They need to come up with a new system" (JPC1, interview 2016).

The Deputy Director for Informal Trading, on the other hand, indicated that:
“JPC has lease agreements, house rules, conditions that users of the facility enter into with JPC as a landlord of those facilities that governs the relationship” (DED1, interview 2016).

The JPC could not provide any such documentation which clearly shows a lack of formalisation and attention to market management or an unwillingness to share information.

I requested a meeting to introduce the research and arrange further engagements with the DED as early as May 2016. Having received no answer, the fieldwork commenced in July 2016. As previously discussed, a turning point, however, came during a general meeting I was invited to by a committee member in Bree market. The meeting was held in September 2016. Box 2.1 describes the DED Deputy Director for Informal Trading’s reaction to my presence at the meeting.

Box 2.1: Observations and experience at a meeting between traders and the DED

When I arrived in Bree market, the meeting, to which I was invited by a market committee member, had already started. The Deputy Director for Informal Trading was chairing the meeting. After I entered the hall, filled with approximately 300 traders, the chairperson straight away asked me what I was doing there (in front of everyone present). I went and introduced myself upon which he asked who had invited me. I communicated that it was a market committee member and that I had also been emailing him for a meeting. He said that he would have to ask traders if they minded my presence which I indicated I understood.

He then continued the meeting saying that traders must put their hands up when they have an issue. He further stated that the meeting was only intended for Bree market traders. Traders were not supposed to invite traders from other markets (although I noticed that committee members from other markets were attending). He then turned the attention to my case. He first asked who had invited me. Upon being questioned by the chairperson, the particular committee member looked comfortable in the response he gave although I could not understand it. From there onwards the chairperson switched from English. Although I could not understand everything that was said it was clear that the chairperson told the traders that I would write everything that they would be saying. At one point, he indicated in English that I had requested a meeting with him but that he has not yet agreed to it. Two traders and the manager had their hands up to object to my presence. The market committee member who invited me then came to tell me that maybe traders would not be comfortable with me there. I said that I understand this and am willing to be excused. The Deputy Director said to me personally that we (him and I) would take the right procedures going forward and that I must also contact the market manager. He explained that this was an operational meeting only for traders. There was lots of infighting and things that would be discussed, and traders did not want me to write this down.

(Notes from fieldwork taken at a meeting between the DED, JPC and Bree market traders on 14 September 2016)

Not long after the incident at Bree market, the Deputy Director agreed to the interview. This was after contacting him for five months and an incident where my supervisor had to intervene and negotiate with him. Before the interview, he requested that the interview guidelines, as well as my research proposal, be sent to him. During the interview, it became apparent that the research was being conducted at a very sensitive time. SAITF was launching a court case against the CoJ for damage caused to traders during Operation Clean Sweep in 2013. The Deputy Director and his colleagues, as a result,
needed to be sensitive to any issues that could lead to litigation. There were also initial suspicions regarding the intentions of my due to previous research assistance CUBES provided to SAIITF and other organisations. After sending the Deputy Director my proposal and with the assistance of my supervisor, he was assured that I was operating independently although connected to CUBES.

The interview had to be conducted with care as I was explicitly instructed by the Deputy Director that I must keep to the agreed questions. There was one stage during the interview when discussing tender documents that I received the following response:

"Where do you get that? You like sourcing information from the streets. What tender? What results? Who are your sources? That is wrong. Who is your source, now I am suspicious?" (DED, interview 2016).

Such a response is ironic given the fact that the Deputy Director only granted me an interview at the end of my fieldwork after a tedious process of negotiation, waiting, evidence of good faith, framing and reframing of research questions. If government officials are not willing to assist researchers, they have no opportunity to correct, rectify or balance information obtained from other sources. It is therefore to their advantage to engage researchers and provide a balanced view of issues.

After my interview with the Deputy Director, his attitude towards the research was, however, altered. He was willing to assist me and put me in contact with stakeholders within the taxi industry and DoT. He further wanted me to accompany him to meetings in both markets where he would introduce me to the traders and instruct them to cooperate with me. What made this proposal uncomfortable to me is the manner in which he had dismissed me from the market previously. This was also the day after I had concluded my research in Midrand market - in which the committee and traders had been extremely cooperative and accommodating throughout the fieldwork. I felt that the market committees might feel betrayed if I suddenly came along with a DED official, and it was not clear what the intention of the Deputy Director was in displaying my presence together with him in the market. His intention could have been to support the research, and if this is the case, it is unfortunate that there was no response to my requests at an earlier stage – the fieldwork was also reaching its end.

This incident at Bree market did, nonetheless, place my legitimacy and trust relations among the traders into jeopardy. In Midrand market, at the time, I had already established a good relationship with the committee and they were therefore not affected by the incident. If anything, they were even more accommodating afterwards. A committee member humoristically asked whether it was me or the Deputy Director that had secrets. Other comments made were the following:
“He [Deputy Director] told us that he does not want Marie in the market, she is going to get me arrested” (MCM6, interview 2016).

“He [Deputy Director] does not want you there because there are big secrets. There are things like drugs and forgery in the market” (MCM7, interview 2016).

These statements were taken as accusations but did assist in placing the situation in perspective. The position of the Midrand market committee was at this stage more secure than that of Bree’s. The incident at the Bree market had the result that I lost the support of the market committee. All the contacts I had built prior to the incident avoided any meeting with me afterwards.

I then took the decision to withdraw from Bree market. There were ethical issues to consider, and I could not jeopardise anyone’s position. The research was thus not conducted to a corresponding level across the two markets. What this process, however, divulged is that the politics within the markets were of a very sensitive nature and that I had to take great care not to jeopardise any participant or the study. Additional to this I also had to take caution not to be instrumentalised by the stakeholders involved.

2.3.5. LIMITATIONS

During the research, several limitations became evident. As demonstrated in the previous section, a fundamental limitation was the resistance experienced in Bree market that resulted in my withdrawal from the market. Another major limitation was the limited participation of traders additional to the trader collectives. In Bree market, it was partly due to a lack of time. In Midrand market, there could be different reasons such as fear of participation and a general lack of interest, but the principal contributing factor was the constant presence of the market committee. The committee could be selective as to whom we engaged with while their presence limited what participant could divulge. This situation was quite paradoxical. Without the presence of the committee, traders were unwilling to participate. Their presence, on their other hand, limited the extent to which traders could speak openly of issues. Box 2.2 describes an experience when the market was visited without the company of the market committee.

**Box 2.2: Observations of general meeting procedures**

The arrangement was initially to have a general meeting and introduce the study to all the traders in Midrand market. This meeting got cancelled for the second time. The chairperson indicated that we should still visit the market to speak to other traders. When we [fieldwork assistant and I] arrived at the market, we could not find any of the committee members. I then decided to take the opportunity and talk to traders randomly since I was starting to get concerned that I would not get the voice of the traders without the influence of the committee. It was also an ideal situation since I was accompanied by the fieldwork assistant. The response from the engagements was however very weak. Two ladies straight away said they were not interested and
another lady just disappeared. It was also the first time I did not feel completely safe in the market. The protection and familiarity of the committee make the market more accessible to me.

(Notes were taken during a visit to Midrand market on 24 August 2016)

There could be various reasons such as intimidation or lack of interest why these traders did not want to participate. The incident did, however, prove that the assistance of the market committee is required to access traders.

The lack of a critical discourse from the side of traders can also partly be ascribed to the overlap between committee and cooperative members. Even the volunteers interviewed were connected to the other collectives. It was thus difficult to access a trader outside of these collectives and discern if there was, in fact, a criticism towards the current governance of markets. This is especially relevant given the demands for management functions by the market committees and SAITF. What further contributes to the lack of critical discourses is that both committees were affiliated to SAITF.

Another limitation is the discrepancies in the answers provided by different stakeholders. It became apparent that these discrepancies were in many instances, the result of uncertainties regarding stakeholders’ positions. The contradictory nature of some answers did at times make it difficult to determine certain facts such as the number of committee members. There were instances where language barriers also became an obstacle. This was mostly when I was invited to sit in meetings in which I did not have the opportunity to arrange for translating assistance. Although efforts were made to translate the main points in such engagements, much was regrettably lost in translation. It was clear that the collective chairpersons were selective in what they translated to me.

As previously indicated, the lack of documentation furthermore became a limitation. Whether this was in fact due to the integration of MTC into the JPC or rather a case of irregularities and non-existence is not known. The JPC could not provide me with any supporting documentation on market management in Johannesburg. Some of the main regulatory documents and house rules were provided by the DED. The research was conducted at a time when the DED and JPC were in the process of developing their conceptual model for market management. As chapter six explains, no document could, in this respect, be obtained. The timing of the research should, nonetheless, not be considered as a limitation but rather as an opportunity for further research. A time limitation would rather be that further engagements with stakeholders such as the DoT and taxi industry (as proposed by the DED) could not take place. This would have provided a more balanced view of the management model the DED is proposing. Unfortunately, this was only indicated towards the end of the fieldwork and was therefore impossible for me to explore.
2.4. CONCLUSION

Markets are spaces that bring together a wide range of stakeholders. These stakeholders can be divided into three categories representing authorities, private sector service providers and trader collectives. In the absence of response from authorities, market committees were used as the entry point into the markets. A balanced view was nonetheless still retrieved as engagements with the JPC, MTC and DED took place during a later stage of the fieldwork. The research was conducted at a time where governance reforms were on the table. There are strong demands, from traders, for management functions across the markets. These demands place the position of those who are currently in a power position in markets, at risk. As the research progressed, it became apparent that these uncertainties result in counter accusations and even antagonistic relations in the markets. Each stakeholder needs to protect its own interests. Bree market, in fact, became a case where the position of those participating in the research could be jeopardised by the process. The decision was therefore made to withdraw from the market prior to completion of the research fieldwork. The context in which the research was located had sensitive processes at play which entailed the delegation and regulation of power. The research was as a result committed to providing a balanced view of the processes and dynamics unfolding.
CHAPTER 3
A LITERATURE PERSPECTIVE:
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE UNDER NEOLIBERALISM

“There is a great deal to be learned about power and authority by studying how subjects and spaces come to be “inside” the project of citizenship” (Roy, 2009: 161).

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Participation holds the potential to deepen democracy through active and informed citizenry. Trader participation in market governance is, however, a process entangled in the objectives of neoliberalisation. Neoliberalisation promotes privatisation, partnerships and therefore forms of participation - towards decreasing the role of the state. On the other hand, neoliberalisation holds an economic rationality of cost recovery and financial autonomy that pervades market management. Within this context, it is often the case that participation is instrumentalised to shift responsibility from the state to participants; participation can then also be reduced to assign duties to participants such as meeting revenue objectives. Despite such critiques, Williams (2004) argues that the democratisation element of participation can be preserved if it promotes the development of political capabilities. This literature review places market governance in the global South within such debates to understand the processes relevant to the research.
This chapter is based on three literature threads. The first thread reflects on the manner in which participation is intended to lead to a form of democratisation. Criticism, as well as debates in support of participation, are analysed. The second literature thread analyses the process of neoliberalisation and reflects on its entanglements with participation. It reveals how neoliberalisation is conducive for civic governmentality. This section, furthermore, identifies argument that neoliberalisation should be considered as an ongoing process that holds the potential to deepen democracy. The third literature thread enters markets in the global South to reveal the stakeholders as well as processes involved. It illustrates that much of the current discourses and processes found in markets are shaped by a need for funding or revenue. Revenue, thus, represents the battle for power in which participation is located.

### 3.2. PARTICIPATION IN URBAN GOVERNANCE: A QUESTION OF DEEPENING DEMOCRACY

Within the concept of “urban governance”, there is a move beyond the state as the sole stakeholder. Decisions are rather the results of influences, alliances, conflicts and contestations between a variety of stakeholders. Le Galès who wrote extensively on the conceptualisation of governance defines urban governance as follows:

“Governance is the capacity to integrate and give form to local interests, organizations and social groups and, on the other hand, the capacity to represent them outside, to develop more or less unified strategies towards the market, the state, other cities and other levels of government” (Le Galès, 1995: 90, cited in Le Galès, 1998).

Governance, therefore, encapsulates the ability of civil society to enter the power struggles in which they are located. This conceptual definition of governance is paralleled with the normative definition of the World Bank. The term was developed in response to a need for institutional reform in Sub-Saharan countries. The objective is to reduce the weight of the state and give more power and recognition to non-state actors (Maldonado, 2010). During the inception phase of governance discourses, it became apparent that any form of governance will be reliant on a participatory approach which further resulted in the development of the concept “good governance” (ibid.). Good governance, therefore, promulgates participation as an intrinsic factor of governance.

Participation is viewed as a form of democratisation in its ability to promote active and informed citizenry. It is a process through which the state can become subject to public scrutiny and existing power structures can be challenged (Williams, 2004). Arnstein (1969) provided one of the earliest, valuable overviews of participation. Through her ladder of participation, she emphasises that participation should lead to citizen power in which mutual learning and decision-making are
encouraged (ibid.). Such views are, however, considered as normative and the ability of participation to deepen democracy has been the subject of various academic debates.

Williams summarises the critiques against participation according to three main debates:

“Participatory development today stands accused of three interrelated failings: of emphasising personal reform over political struggle, of obscuring local power differences by uncritically celebrating ‘the community’, and of using a language of emancipation to incorporate marginalised populations of the Global South within an unreconstructed project of capitalist modernisation” (Williams, 2004: 558).

When assessing these debates, it is relevant to access how they relate to different concepts of empowerment through participation. Regarding the first debate on personal reforms, Miraftab (2004b: 239) takes a strong position through his concept of “the disempowering work of empowerment”. The author explains the following:

“In its contemporary formulation by development and government agencies, however, empowerment, or participatory methodology, seems to have been hauled full circle, for use as a benign promise of the experts’ participatory packaged development projects, to be bestowed by experts on the disadvantaged communities. Participation and empowerment are treated as independent of the structures of oppression, and simply processes by which programs foster individuals’ sense of worth and esteem. This individualization inherently de-politicizes the notion of empowerment, often reducing it to individual economic gain and access to resources, and leaving the status quo unchallenged” (Miraftab, 2004b: 242).

Given such a statement, the question that becomes essential for this research is whether the participation and empowerment envisioned in markets will lead to an improvement in the fundamental causes of the traders’ current positions? Or will it, on the other hand, entail only financial gain and a type of individualisation? This is by no means to delegitimise economic benefits but rather acknowledging that empowerment reaches beyond only financial gains.

The second critique Williams (2004) identifies, relates to the way the community is seen as homogenous. Arnstein (1969), for example, neglects to identify the various sub-groups and divisions between and within participating groups. Within markets, traders are not participating as a homogenous group. Among traders there are certain collectives and groupings that are more active and vocal than others. This further raises the question of whether citizen control is the ultimate form of governance. Citizen control can also lead to a coercive governance system with domination from undemocratic groups. The third debate relates strongly to the entanglements between participation and the process of neoliberalisation. The following section elaborates on how citizens can be co-opted into participatory practices to meet broader cost-cutting objectives.
Given these critiques of participation, the question needs to be asked if it is possible to enhance or protect the democratisation potential of participation? Cornwall (2008: 281) advocates for an expansion in the approach to participation processes through what she refers to as “clarity through specificity”. Such an approach demands questions on three determining factors. The first is defining exactly what people are participating in (ibid.). The second is for what reason, while the third identifies, who will be involved and who will be excluded (ibid.). The author believes that such a distinction would assist in distinguishing if participation is, in fact, giving “control that enables people to exercise a meaningful part in making the decisions that affect their lives” (ibid.: 281).

Williams supports the work of Cornwall and puts forward a strong argument that participation still holds immense potential in its ability to develop the political capabilities of participants:

“...while participation may indeed be a form of 'subjection', its consequences are not predetermined and its subjects are never completely controlled. Second, it investigates participatory development’s ability to open up new spaces for political action, arguing that celebrations of 'individual liberation' and critiques of 'subjection to the system' both over-simplify participation’s power effects. To re-politicise participation, empowerment must be re-imagined as an open-end and ongoing process of engagement with political struggles at a range of spatial scales” (Williams, 2004: 557).

There is a need to focus on the extent to which participation develops participant’s ability to alter and manipulate rules, develop new rules, influence social preferences and secure resources (Williams, 2004). Such political capabilities would aid in the power shift participation was initially intended for. Given these possibilities, the ability of participation to deepen democracy can be protected.

### 3.3. PARTICIPATION ENTANGLED IN THE PROCESS OF NEOLIBERALISATION

Contemporary discourses on market governance in the global South are marked by contexts of neoliberalisation. In its ideal form, neoliberalism implies "the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represents the optimal mechanism for economic development" (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 351). Neoliberalism, as it has come to be known, entails a variety of processes and forms that have been catalogued, inter alia, as the privatisation of the public service, a breakup of welfare programs, trade deregulation, a quest for cost recovery, emphasis on business principles to manage public assets, intensification of competition and mobilisation of international capital.

Structural Adjustment Programmes were a direct result of neoliberal reforms that originated in the economic and fiscal crises experienced in many developing countries, in particular on the African continent, during the 1970’s (Larbi, 1999). The Structural Adjustment Programme was developed by
the IMF and the World Bank which pressurised the countries to which they provided financial relief into adopting these principles (ibid.). The context in which each country under review implemented these reforms varied. The South African government implemented its Structural Adjustment Programme without much resistance to imposed orthodoxies in the hope of developing the new South Africa as an attractive investment opportunity (Ferguson, 2015). Embedded in the Structural Adjustment Programme, South Africa has been implementing New Public Management principles since the late 1990s- early 2000s. New Public Management is characterised by managing the public sector similarly to a private business with a focus on performance, deliverables and market orientated policies (Larbi, 1999). This section analyses the position of participation given such a market-orientated context.

### 3.3.1. EXPLOITATION VS EMPOWERMENT

The manner in which neoliberalism has been conducive to participation has been much critiqued. Heller (2001) argues that the neoliberal development agenda of South Africa opposes meaningful participation, in that it favours cost-cutting, increased efficiency in management systems and administrative performance: within such a context, participation practices are considered as disordered and undesirable (ibid.). Despite these restrictions, participation is still an integral part of the development agenda. This results in a situation where participation becomes a box-ticking exercise that results in consultation rather than a shift in power.

The entanglements between participation and neoliberalisation are further evident in the critique of "participation as subjection" as identified by Williams (2004: 563). It represents the situation where participation draws citizens into a process that in fact makes them subject to a power structure or instrumental in meeting their objectives. Some authors further view participation as a practise that can be abused to decrease costs and responsibility in line with neoliberal development agendas (Buccus and Hicks, 2011). Based on a case study of three community-based waste collection strategies in Cape Town, Miraftab (2004b) found that participatory discourses were utilised by the state to fill in the resource gaps caused by neo-liberal motivated budget cuts. People were made to believe that they were contributing towards the improvement of themselves and their environment while the authorities were benefiting from their free labour (ibid.). Although it could be argued that increased accountability through participation could have positive results, the vested interests of those in power should always be critically assessed.

Brenner and Theodore (2002), however, confront the manner in which neoliberalism has been considered as a synonym to capital globalisation and is often a target for anti-capitalistic debates.
Neoliberal market-orientated reforms are context-dependent phenomena of which the neoliberal ideology has misrepresented the effects (*ibid.*). They argue that neoliberalisation could lead to “openings for more progressive, radical democratic reappropriations of city space” (*ibid.*: 377). Larbi (1999) is also of the opinion that neoliberalisation should not be disregarded as some of the fundamental principles could hold benefits for selected sectors. The governance of markets located within a context characterised by the process of neoliberalisation should not be disregarded for the participation possibilities it entails. It should rather be acknowledged that there are interlinkages between participation and neoliberal discourses. Participation has the potential to lead to exploitation but also empowerment.

Given these interlinkages, one can argue, furthermore, that the state is central to the manner in which participation and partnership agreements should be realised. It is within this framework that the role of the state has shifted from a monitoring role to a steering position:

“To perform this “steering” role, to synergize the interests of different “rowers,” the state has to be willing as well as able to use its financial, legislative/regulatory, and institutional resources. Weak governments with inadequate will or resources in any of those areas cannot effectively negotiate to lead partnership processes or guide their outcomes. Yet the state’s mediating and redistributive role is necessary to strengthen the capacity of weaker partners and to establish a level playing field... Thus, the strength of grassroots movements is critical not only for shaping partnership strategies but also for ensuring support by the local and central governments, including by their regulatory capacities” (Miraftab, 2004c: 93).

While this may be true, the state faces the following contradiction:

“The contradictory expectations of government to both enable and regulate the market are examined as a factor limiting equality in partnerships” (Miraftab, 2004c: 90).

The research discloses how there is potential for the development of management models based on partnership principles but that these will require rigorous oversight to avoid further entrenching divisions in the markets. This will require a navigation of the state’s position as regulator and enabler. The oversight role grassroots and civil society organisations are further emphasised. Given the cost-cutting objectives faced by many governments, there is a need to provide constant oversight to ensure a particular sector is prioritised. This is especially relevant for the informal sector in which markets is located. In the following chapters, it is disclosed that the markets under review are not operating at a profit. The will to steer its governance in a participatory direction could, therefore, be minimal without external pressure.
3.3.2. GOVERNMENTALITY AND INVENTED SPACES OF PARTICIPATION

One of the platforms through which trader collectives often assert pressure on the authorities is invented spaces of participation. Where invited spaces of participation are intentionally created by authorities for participation, invented spaces represent collective organisations mobilising themselves to confront authorities directly (Miraftab, 2004a). Invented spaces of participation are outside the formal boundaries of invited spaces and would be associated more with antagonistic relationships. Citizens resort to invented spaces of participation in the absence of functional invited spaces. Trader organisations are pivotal in this regard as the literature reveals that there is a direct link between the presence of an active trader organisation and traders’ ability to mobilise themselves (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009).

In her work, Hibou (2004) incorporates the idea of governmentality to not only understand the way in which people act within given political and economic fields but also the way it contributes to subjectification. The neoliberalisation of the state will influence the way in which individuals or groups of people act and understand their given situation. Roy (2009) in turn developed the term "civic governmentality" to describe the way in which civil society organisations can become implementation agents of the state or traders, similarly for the organisations they belong to. Trader collectives could influence traders to be co-opted into decisions that will accommodate their own agendas.

Given the notion of civic governmentality, it has to be considered that invented spaces of participation can also occur between traders and their organisations. There is, however, a linkage to the levels of violence and intimidation present. In the presence of coercion and violence, such as found in La Salada market in Buenos Aires, trader mobilisation was suppressed by the organisations present (Cuvi et al., 2014). Contrarily, in the absence of such high levels of violence, traders in Maputo, could mobilise themselves if and when they feel their needs were not met by their organisations (Lindell, 2008). One can argue that civic governmentality, on the one hand, can take place when traders willingly become implementation agents for organisations. This will be the case if traders have interests in the mobilisation efforts. There could, on the other hand, be a linkage between civic governmentality and the level of coercion in a market. There could be scenarios where traders mobilise for a cause under violent and intimidating circumstances.

As previously indicated, participation is to a large extent a battle for power among different stakeholders operating in a context of neoliberalisation. The following section reveals how, in the case of markets of the Global South, power has a direct linkage to revenue. Whether it is a case of mobilisation, intimidation or governmentality, there is always an element of revenue objectives.
present. As advocated by Brenner and Theodore (2002) it thus becomes a case of navigating these realities towards a process that deepens democracy rather than divides between citizens and the state. Revenue has also motivated traders to make participatory demands which in itself, cannot be discarded for the democratic and participatory dimension of these claims. It can thus even be argued that the inability of neoliberalisation to provide functional invited spaces of participation has led to a situation where invented spaces of participation speak to the process of democratisation. The question is then to which effect invented spaces takes place, if it motivates meaningful participation.

### 3.4. THE GOVERNANCE OF MARKETS, TRADER PARTICIPATION AND A NEED FOR REVENUE

When reviewing the literature on markets in the global South it becomes evident that there is limited information on how markets are in fact governed. This is especially relevant given the working relations between traders, management agents and the state. The literature review, therefore, had to extract information from studies that often had a focus other than market governance. It is thus difficult to have clear information regarding elements such as institutional structures (both state and trader collectives) governing markets. While this may be true, it was possible to detect that revenue plays a central role in the overall functioning and governance of markets in the global South. The purpose is for this body of literature to provide a background against which market governance in Bree and Midrand markets can be assessed. It further provides valuable lessons learned concerning the revenue objectives of the different stakeholders involved.

The first sub-section considers literature on the collectives through which traders participate in market governance in the global South. The different functions fulfilled by the trader collectives are further identified. These functions range from dispute settlements to infrastructure development and administration. The subsequent sub-sections concentrate on literature surrounding funding and revenue in markets. The manner in which trader collectives fund themselves and manage the fees they have control over are deliberated. The literature review then reveals how markets as lucrative spaces open up opportunities for corruption and self-enrichment. The last component reflects on the manner in which the revenue objective of the state influences market governance practices.

#### 3.4.1. TRADER COLLECTIVES AND PRIVATE SERVICE PROVIDERS

Trader collectives play a central role in the overall functioning of markets. There are three types of trader collectives discernible across the literature through which traders participate in market governance. This sub-section introduces the three collectives and clarifies some of the overlapping...
terminology used to describe them. Additional to the state and trader collectives, the literature further identifies private companies as one of the stakeholder active in some markets.

Throughout the literature, trader organisations are often also referred to as an association. An organisation or association represents larger groups of traders within a formal structure and elected leaders or officers tasked with representing the needs of traders. Organisations can operate in a single market or as an umbrella organisation covering several markets. The literature on cities of the South indicates that broader organisations can have numerous benefits for their members. In the Alga ward in Lagos where markets operate under an umbrella organisation, the latter takes on the position of enforcing sanctions on defaulting members (Olukoju, 2015). The organisation will also liaise with the national and local governments on relevant matters (ibid.). Lindell (2008: 1891) explains that “[b]y being a citywide organisation, through which leaders in different markets are in contact with each other, the association has been able to devise concerted strategies and action”. The provision of such services is however not a simple task. Trader organisations in Johannesburg, in particular, are faced with a number of challenges such as competition for membership, legitimisation and financial restraints (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). Trader organisations are often criticised by authorities and various NGOs for “lacking continuity, legitimacy, representativeness and strategic vision” (ibid.: 4). Additional to these critiques, there are also tensions and entrenched divisions between trader organisations in Johannesburg in particular (ibid.). This has far-reaching implications for the ability of traders to develop a unified voice in the city.

The second collective found in markets in the global South are committees which represent smaller, local groupings elected by traders. A committee can function independently or associated with a larger organisation. In Maputo for example, such market committees operate as part of a larger organisation (Lindell, 2008). Across the literature, there sometimes is overlap in the functionality and naming of market organisations and committees. The primary differentiation is that committees are smaller in size and locally-based or even commodity-based. Trader organisations are broader regional structures which provide these committees with assistance through their “political efficiency and strategy” (Jackson et al., 2014: 113).

The third trader collective active in market governance is cooperatives which also operate at the local level. One of the few case studies conducted on cooperative market governance was in the Nakawa market in Kampala, Uganda. In the particular context, privatisation reforms required registered companies to tender for management positions (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). As a result “[t]he emergence of cooperatives could be seen as a way for (a segment of) vendors to adapt to legislation changes and to still participate in the bidding process” (ibid.: 402). The literature reveals that trader
cooperatives are however considered less inclusive than the other two types of collectives, as cooperatives are based on membership fees regarded by many as unaffordable (ibid.).

The remaining governance stakeholder falling outside of what can be considered a trader collective is private service providers. Similar to cooperative market governance there is limited literature available on privatisation reforms that resulted in the employment of private management companies in markets. Part of the reason could be the strong presence of trader organisations in larger markets which would resist private management. Larger markets have much political leverage in their ability to mobilise traders (Clark, 1994). Based on the case study conducted by Lindell and Appelblad (2009), some of the results to which private partnerships are implemented are unpacked further in the chapter.

It can thus be said that additional to the state, across markets in the global South, trader collectives and in some instances, private service providers, are active in their governance. Both Bree and Midrand markets are very dynamic in the sense that all the stakeholders identified are present. The literature further reveals that trader organisations in Johannesburg are central to the way in which the other collectives found in Bree and Midrand markets operate. Their role in supporting and mobilising traders is undeniable. The divisions among these organisations do, however, create a scenario where they compete against each other for membership, funding and legitimacy. Organisations will thus have their own interests in seeing their interventions succeed.

3.4.2. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY THROUGH TRADER COLLECTIVES

Across the literature, negotiation skills and dispute settlement is identified as critical services required from collectives (Clark, 1994; Peña 1999; Olukoju, 2015). Clark (1994: 248) describes how “[t]he loyalty and discipline that give leaders their effective power derives from their presiding role in internal dispute settlement”. Internal dispute settlement is highly regarded but also negotiations and dispute settlements with external bodies. The benefit of leadership with good negotiation skills is that it avoids a loss of valuable trading time (ibid.). In the wholesale areas of Kumasi Central market in Ghana, for example, immediate dispute settlement is of such importance that the leadership is expected to be present in a small office during peak hours (ibid.).

In the case of a dispute, traders will firstly approach a leader. If it is beyond his/her capacity to solve the issue, there will be a local hearing. If such a hearing also does not resolve the issue, it will be taken further to a higher authority such as a market manager (Clark, 1994). There are also markets where guilty parties in a dispute would face punishment such as suspension (Olukoju, 2015). Such measures have economic and other consequences for traders which they want to avoid at all costs (ibid.).
Traders, however, often accept the decision of a leader unwillingly because they cannot afford to spend more time on the issue and lose business in the process (Clark, 1994). They are, furthermore, reluctant to oppose leadership since an uncooperative trader might find him or herself unsupported in the next dispute (ibid.). Peña (1999) alludes to such intimidation in his study on markets in Mexico City. It was found that the leadership of a particular organisation has a very coercive manner of operating and as a result traders have no choice but to accept the judgements in dispute settlements (ibid.). Dispute settlement was also found to be one of the functions fulfilled by the cooperative in Nakawa market (Lindell and Appelblad; 2009). The disadvantage of dispute settlement through a cooperative body is that leadership could advantage members above non-members.

One can say that dispute settlement is reliant on the presence of leadership to resolve issues swiftly and without complications. Mediation by trader leadership rather than by formal market management has the advantage that the former can identify better with a situation because they are also traders. While this may be true, mediation by management could provide a much-needed independent opinion. This is especially evident in the cases of coercion or intimidation identified above. There is, however, no guarantee of an objective and fair opinion from management. Similar to the case of cooperative governance, to avoid any cases of prejudice, carefully structured regulations and procedures will have to be in place.

Additional to dispute settlements, other core functions performed by trader collectives are service and infrastructure delivery. The bulk of the literature regrettably fails to indicate whether or not these collective bodies have been formally appointed to perform such functions. Apart from cooperative management for whom officially appointment structures are stated, the reader gets a sense that trader organisations tend to take over these positions informally, in the absence of the state and out of necessity. In the Agege ward in Lagos, the manner in which market associations took over the provision of services and infrastructure is described as "they fill the void created by the abdication of responsibility by formal state institutions and agencies" (Olukoju, 2015: 174). Trader organisations had to mobilise traders to solve the challenges such as security, accessibility, water provision and electricity supply (ibid.).

La Salada market in Buenos Aires is managed by trader organisations which have developed a coercive management system. These organisations provide all the services, security and infrastructure in the market (Cuvi et al., 2014). The trader organisations have in fact taken up a pseudo-state function through an accumulation of these roles (ibid.). The accumulation led to a bureaucratic system in which power is consolidated in the hands of traders organisations’ businesses (ibid.). On the one hand, many trader collectives taking over management and service or infrastructure delivery functions could be
ascribed to resources shortages. On the other hand, there are also cases where overlapping responsibilities among different government institutions result in implementation voids (ibid.).

Although dispute settlements, services provision and infrastructure development were found to be the primary focus of trader collectives across different markets, their role reaches further than this. Support in case of funerals, emergencies and weddings; allocation of stalls; dissemination of information and business advice as well as price regulating were all reported to be further functions provided (Clark, 1994; Peña, 1999; Solaja, Atolagbe and Soyewo, 2013; Ikioda, 2014; Olukoju, 2015). The role of collectives is also connected to the manner in which markets are physically managed. Markets such as Kumasi Central market in Ghana are managed according to commodities located in certain areas (Clark, 1994). The particular market is the largest market in Ghana with more than 150,000 visitors per day (ibid.). The size of the market allows for it to not only be managed according to commodities but also commercial technique, geographical location, small scale or wholesale as well as imports and exports (ibid.). The dynamics in commodity specific and mixed areas are different as “[t]heir [traders] commercial relations depend on casual, walk-through traffic rather than repeat actions” (Clark, 1994: 280). This has the direct result that traders have more loyalty towards leadership in commodity-specific areas than in mixed areas (ibid.).

There are further cases where associations aim at standardising practices to develop the competitive advantage of traders and limit domineering practices (Ikioda, 2014). Olukoju (2005: 162) views this as a method to safeguard “the interests of consumers by ensuring just pricing and protect those of its members by outlawing underselling”. Although price regulation is reported to be done for the benefit of traders and consumers, this should be approached prudently. Price regulating is a powerful tool if placed in the wrong hands. Although these two authors identify price controlling as a function of the governing collectives they are silent on their relationship to traders and if there was any coercion, violence or intimidation at play. Similarly to service provision, price regulation can be considered as a function that would normally have been performed by the state. In the absence of such, traders have developed their own procedures. Such procedures do perform a required function but lack an often much needed oversight role. As the following sections further elucidate, one of the main shortcomings of the literature is the limited information available on the internal composition of the state apparatus governing markets and also how these relate to the other stakeholders.

3.4.3. A NEED FOR FUNDING

To perform the functions described above, the collectives identified are reliant on funding. Within the literature, there are often information gaps when unpacking funding or revenue streams. Firstly, the
structure of organisational membership fees and municipal fees differ between markets, but these are not always transparent. Some authors will report on fees charged in markets without indicating whether there are additional levies charged by the authorities. Such an example is found in the Agege ward in Lagos:

“The funding of the market associations is dependent on levies on members. Such levies are collected by executive members of each association for remittance to the coffers of the central body. Part of the proceeds of such collections is devoted to paying the wages of security guards and cleaners engaged to get rid of waste after the mandatory sanitation exercises in the markets; payment of electricity bills; and support for members in case of emergencies such as untimely death and accidents or on the celebration of weddings and other social ceremonies” (Olukoju, 2015: 162).

It is clear that within the particular markets, the market associations are responsible for the overall management of the market which would not be possible without the collection of levies. As discussed, the author neglects to specify whether the local authorities require additional fees and how these are managed. This could be because municipal fees are a given and that authors, therefore, do not make direct reference to such. Or perhaps, the organisation, after having collected fees from traders, pays a portion of the funding collected to the municipality.

The second gap that links to the example provided above is an indication of which portion of the fees collected, if any, is in fact channelled towards the leadership as individuals. The reality is that leadership positions take up a lot of time and effort which prohibits leaders, who are also traders, to dedicate time to their businesses. Unless these individuals can afford employees to run their businesses, they would rely on organisational coffers for their income or to pay for such employees.

The third issue is traders’ opinion on the different fees they are charged as well as membership structures imposed on them. Ikioda (2014) for example, indicates that association membership in the Alaba-Suru Market in Lagos is compulsory, accompanied by a mandatory membership fee. The author neglects to disclose how traders react to such compulsory measures, and what is the level of the membership fee (in proportion of trading income for instance). It is also not always clear whether organisational membership is, in fact, compulsory. What one does have to be reminded is that many markets in the global South are lucrative trading spaces which make the aforementioned fees affordable relative to traders’ income. Within one of the grocery markets in Nigeria for example, a trader explained that what he earns daily in the market is more than some people can make in a month (Solaja, Atolagbe and Soyewo, 2013). Taking these gaps into consideration the sub-section provides examples of different models through which trader collectives fund themselves and where applicable, their activities.
The first model is found in Maputo where markets traders have to pay both association membership and municipal fees (Lindell, 2008). This model has shown to cause conflict between authorities and traders. Lindell (2008: 1891) describes how the state “dislikes the fact that the association collects its own fees in the markets and blames it for the low revenues returned by the municipal fee collectors”. There is a constant battle between the two parties over who has the right to charge fees (ibid.). Subsequently, the authorities try to undermine the work and position of organisations despite their legal recognised status (ibid.). The organisations, on the other hand, encourage trader to pay daily fees to the municipality to avoid giving them any reason to harass or disturb them (ibid.). A better possible approach would be for the fees to be collected through one source but given the antagonistic relationship between authorities and the relevant associations, there is no guarantee that such a system could work.

In Owino market in Kampala, Uganda, measures were taken to collect fees from one source. Gombay (1994) writes how upon a request of traders, an investigation was launched by authorities which found that management was not looking after the market. In response, one of the recommendations made was "that a percentage of the money collected from markets should be deposited in a separate account over which both the KCC [Kampala City Council] and market vendors would have authority to pay for maintenance and improvements" (ibid.: 90). A model such as this holds the potential to remove the uncertainties regarding which party is in a position to collect funds as found in Maputo. Authorities will, however, be in charge of the budget allocations which will require careful negotiations to ensure a fair portion is dedicated towards maintenance and service provision. The involvement of authorities can also be regarded as a manner to oversee the way in which the committees manage their budget to avoid corrupt or self-enriching activities. This is of course under the assumption that the relevant authorities themselves would not look to benefit from such arrangements. As discussed further on, the party responsible for collecting the market fees will also bear much pressure and this function could, therefore, be better suited in the hands of the authorities.

Alternative methods of fees collection were also developed based on trader organisations’ sensitivity towards ethnic discrimination and in another case through a cultural tradition. The first example is Sasa market in Lagos. The market with nearly nine hundred traders can be considered one of the smaller markets under review. Operating on a smaller scale makes it possible to give more attention to issues such as ethnic discrimination (Solaja et al., 2013). A system was developed where rates are calculated according to the goods traders are selling to avoid any discrimination (ibid.). Such a funding model would rely on a well-functioning registration and monitoring system which could be considered more practical in smaller markets.
The second example of alternative methods of fee collections is located in Mile 12 market in Lagos. Based on a cultural tradition, a levy was implemented which charges an individual rate to a customer buying a particular product in bulk (ibid.). This levy is agreed upon based on the fact that the purchase will bring profit to the client. The levy does not have a high cost and contributes to the maintenance of the market (ibid.). In this particular market traders also pay dues to the local authorities in the section in which they are registered (ibid.). Such a model could be beneficial but relies on the buy-in of the customer which in this particular case is grounded in a cultural tradition. It would not necessarily be possible to convince buyers in a different context. An advantage of the two alternative models described is that they could accommodate traders operating in less lucrative environments. Smaller markets are not always as profitable as larger ones and charging all traders a set fee could be regarded as unfair. Another factor that should also be taken into consideration is the actual location of a particular stall in the market.

3.4.4. LUCRATIVE SPACES AS OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION

As in other areas, exposure to revenue streams and profit opens a window for manipulation, corruption and violence. As previously discussed, La Salada market, located in Buenos Aires is a market governed through organisations in a coercive and violent manner (Cuvi et al., 2014). The market is the largest in South America and contains lucrative business opportunities with approximately 500,000 visitors per day (ibid.). From the 1990s onwards, profit-seeking trader organisations developed a coercive governance system in the market (ibid.). The level of violence and intimidation applied by these organisations makes them comparable to mafia-run businesses (ibid.). It is interesting to learn that the coercive measures of tax collection have in turn strengthened and solidified an administrative apparatus for the organisations (ibid.). Cuvi et al. (2014: unpaginated) explain how “[t]ax extraction is also an integral force behind the emergence of the monopoly of violence and consequent territorial pacification”.

Clark acknowledges the possibility of manipulation in markets but is rather positive over the level to which it takes place:

“As leaders of those groups, they can call on the collective support of their members but are sometimes accused of manipulating member’s loyalty for personal financial gain at their expense. Since their authority turns out to be based on rendering services in dispute settlement and negotiations, services that can only be effective in full support of the member’s interest and with substantial consensus, a strong argument can be made that this exploitative potential either does not exist or has not been realized” (Clark, 1994: 248).
This statement is made in a market where stringent checks and balances are still in place, in particular through the oversight role of the elderly. The elders in the market elect the leaders according to the commodities in which they trade as well as criteria such as age, familiarity with market procedures, influential connections and wealth guiding selections (Clark, 1994). Leaders can also be dismissed by the elders (ibid.). Although such a system is open for abuse, there is no mention of such. It is rather reported that because elected leaders have to consult with elders over dispute and policy issues, discriminatory, irregular and opportunistic behaviour are curtailed. This example once again highlights the importance of a functional oversight role in markets.

Profit-seeking behaviour is by no means limited to leadership positions. Rent trafficking is an example where traders themselves can share in the high profits available in markets. Rent trafficking takes place when traders, in light of a shortage of rentable spaces, sublet their trading spaces for between ten to fifteen times the original price (Fourchard, 2011). High profit levels, furthermore, attract the attention of external parties. Once management functions are allocated to committees, it has been noted that other parties such as neighbouring councils feel they have a stake to claim (Gombay, 1994). This creates tensions and prohibits the committees from reaching the objectives they set out for traders (ibid.).

Given the prospect of revenue or profits, market governance will always be at a risk of undemocratic practices unless carefully regulated. Income generated in markets needs to be applied to develop administrative and oversight systems that could kerb corrupt and opportunistic behaviours. While this may be true, the La Salada market case study should be taken as a caution as to what such bureaucratic systems can lead to under coercive governance. The review next turns to the market governance objectives of the state as one of the primary regulators in markets.

**3.4.5. MARKET REVENUE CONTRIBUTING TO MUNICIPAL COFFERS**

Where fees collection enables trader collectives to sustain their collectives, build bureaucratic systems and provide services and infrastructure, government, on the other hand, has its own revenue objectives. Across the global South, markets provide authorities with high levels of revenue (Solaja *et al*., 2013; Clark, 1994). Gombay (1994) for example, explains that Owino market in Kampala, Uganda is the highest source of employment in the city with approximately 30,000 traders. The scope of such a market makes it a large source of income for local authorities. In Lagos, Nigeria, there has been a move from market ownership by private landlords and communities to state ownership to enhance its revenue streams (Fourchard, 2011). Combined with car park rentals, market revenues account for local government’s primary source of income in Lagos (ibid.). As indicated in the previous section, it is
not always transparent in which manner trader collectives are in fact responsible for the collection of the fees owed to the local authorities. There have, however, been cases where traders stepped into co-management positions to assist authorities with, among others, revenue collection.

The case study identified above on Owino market in Kampala provides valuable insights into how revenue collection can dominate practices within Structural Adjustment Programmes. Under deteriorating relationships with the relevant market association and under demands for co-management, the local council requested the establishment of a market management committee (Gombay, 1994). The case study shows that the authorities’ central conviction to give into traders’ participatory demands was the hope of increased revenue collection (ibid.). Such objectives dominated management processes to such an extent that measures were taken to replace the committee when these were not achieved:

"The KCC [Kampala City Council] was left between a rock and a hard place. Revenues were dwindling and attempt to meet vendors’ demands for participation in administering Owino had failed. On 15 May 1992, the Town Clerk moved to limit vendors’ participation in market administration further. He issued a circular in which he called for fresh elections to be held for the MMCs [Market Management Committees]. Under the original terms of reference for MMCs, elections were supposed to be held on an annual basis, and so there was nothing untoward about dissolving the existing MMCs. However, the circular included two new conditions under which elections for vendor positions on the MMC were to be filled. First, vendors on the MMC could no longer hold positions with other associations in the market. Second, in a move designed to ensure that MMCs would present little opposition, there was a blanket clause added to the statutes giving the Town Clerk the power to ‘terminate membership of any MMC or any of the other individuals once he is convinced that either of them is not serving the interests of the vendors or Council’ (Town Clerk, 1992 cited in Gombay, 1994: 93).

The strategies imposed by the City Council would mean that the elected committee could be removed at any time. Association membership provides traders as well as committee members with much-needed guidance and support when confronting authorities. As previously mentioned, in the absence of such support, trader mobilisation weakens. Other than a failure to collect revenues, the author does not elaborate as to why the administrative participation attempts failed. This is quite disappointing taking into consideration that the committee’s assigned functions also included "formulate policy for markets, organise and control groups in the markets, allocate stalls, fight illegal markets, mobilise vendors..." (Gombay, 1994: 90). This reveals the extent to which the objective of revenue generation can dominate governance practices.

The Structural Adjustment Programme was for the first time implemented in Uganda in 1987 and privatisation reforms from the mid-1990s onwards. The case study on Owino market in Kampala
described above was prior to the implementation of privatisation reforms. Another case study conducted in Kampala, in 2009, sees private companies and trader cooperatives appointed into market management positions as part of the privatisation reforms. Parkyard and Nakawa are examples of such markets where the first resulted in the appointment of a private company and the second in cooperative governance. Lindell and Appelblad (2009: 399) explain that “a major reason for privatising ‘management’ was letting other entities collect the levies that would increase the revenues of the City Council”. While it was not clear what profit, the private company made, they succeeded in increasing revenue collection. Their management position did, furthermore, raise questions regarding the level of democratic governance in the market. The relationship between the management company and traders was mainly focused on fees collection which resulted in an overall disconnection with the interests and knowledge of the latter. Traders also complained of illegal taxes, violence and intimidation. Despite these disadvantages, it was beneficial for the government to keep the private company to meet its revenue objectives. It is important to note that the increased revenues were not only through better efficiency but also through measures such as overcrowding to collect more rent per available area. The company also did not deliver on the infrastructure and service delivery they were intended to. The management cooperative appointed in Nakawa market was also successful in terms of revenue collection while also succeeded in improving the overall management. The cooperative consisted of active traders and therefore had a better understanding of the needs and demands in the market. The cooperative charged all traders a fee for service and infrastructure provision which enabled it to expand the market facilities. There were complaints of high rents under the cooperative governance, but these rents enabled the collective to improve the overall functioning of the market (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). It is paramount to locate trader cooperatives and private companies within such revenue objectives as both were present in the case studies on Bree and Midrand markets.

The discourses around funding and revenue in markets are ambiguous and contentious. Traders collectives participating in market governance, whether formally appointed or not, rely on funding to maintain markets, sustain their institutional structures, develop a supportive administrative system and often to fund their own livelihoods. The state also has its own revenue objectives as markets are often the key fiscal revenue for local authorities. What complicates this is that the state is also intended to regulate other participating stakeholders. The literature reviewed elucidates how the revenue objectives of the state could be prioritised above their regulatory role. The research reveals that similar dynamics are present in Bree and Midrand markets and should be cautioned against going forward.
3.5. CONCLUSION

The literature review analysed three theoretical threads central to the research presented in the following chapters. The first thread analysed participation and its potential to deepen democracy through active and informed citizenry. The ability of participatory practices to meet this objective has, however, been subject to much critique. Participation holds the risk to minimise empowerment to a mere economic and individual gain. The literature review, therefore, emphasises the need to analyse the manner in which participation leads to political empowerment. Empowerment needs to be seen as an ongoing process engaged in broader political processes.

The second literature thread analysed the entanglements between participation and the process of neoliberalisation. Where the first thread illustrated that the democratisation potential of participation should not be disregarded, the second argues that it needs to be located in the process of neoliberalisation. The blurred lines between these two concepts are central to contextualising market governance. Where participation requires partnership development; the investment of time and resources; as well as an oversight role of civil society; there are elements of neoliberalism which contradict such objectives. Such neoliberal objectives are market-driven with a focus on revenue and the reduction of costs. It can, however, be said that although neoliberalisation can render participation inefficient, it still has the potential to meet the objective of deepening democracy. Given such a perspective the oversight role of the state becomes fundamental.

An overview of market governance based on available literature is the focus of the third thread. Trader collectives have been involved in formal and informal ways in the management of markets for many years if not decades – sometimes compensating for state incapacity to efficiently raise levies, tax or rents. The review identified that although the state is one of the primary governance stakeholders, there is limited information available on the internal composition of the state apparatus governing markets and also how these relate to the other stakeholders. The literature, furthermore, locates the battle for power in markets within revenue objectives. The review has shown that in the hands of trader collectives, governance can become coercive and a form of self-enrichment. Revenue objectives of authorities, on the other hand, could dominate discourses to the detriment of other market functions.

At this point, the review reaches a complete cycle. It commenced by analysing the entanglement of participation within the process of neoliberalisation. It concluded by proving how these synergies are manifested in markets. Under revenue motivated practices, lines between participation and neoliberalisation often become blurry. These place the state in a central position. It is repeatedly
stressed that the state needs to play a regulatory role in market governance. The question that remains is could the state balance its role as an enabler as well as regulator and allow for the political empowerment of traders. The ability of neoliberalisation to lead to a deepening of democracy is located in this answer.
CHAPTER FOUR
MARKET GOVERNANCE: A MULTITUDE OF STAKEHOLDERS AND DISCOURSES

“Despite being a vibrant component of urban life, detailed accounts of who sells what, what types and number of marketplaces there are, how marketplaces are governed are still needed to fill the gap in the sparse and severely underexplored subject matter” (Ikioda, 2013: 524).

4.1. INTRODUCTION

As mentioned earlier, there are different collectives, similar to those formally identified in other cities of the South, through which traders participate. The cases of Bree and Midrand markets are especially interesting since trader organisations, market committees and cooperatives are all present and active in the markets. There is also an additional collective, unique to these two markets, in the form of volunteering groups. Each of these collectives has its own institutional structures and discourses which this chapter unpacks as the first step towards analysing trader participation in market governance. This chapter focuses on the trader collectives discussed above before reflecting on the private and public sector stakeholders involved in market governance. The fourth subsection describes how some of the basic market functions are governed to illustrate the role of the relevant stakeholders and how they relate to each other. Although descriptive in nature, this chapter provides a sound foundation for the conceptual analysis found in the following two chapters.
4.2. TRADER COLLECTIVES ENABLING PARTICIPATION IN MARKET GOVERNANCE

Trader organisations, market committees, volunteer groups and cooperatives constitute the four collectives through which traders participate in market governance. Diagram 4.1 provides a depiction of the internal structure of each these collectives.

Diagram 4.1: Trader collectives active in the governance of Bree and Midrand markets
Daniel (2017), based on JPC1&2 (interviews 2016); MCM7 (interview 2016); SAITF1 (interview 2016)

As illustrated in Diagram 4.1, both markets are represented by a regional organisation with membership in multiple markets (and beyond) in Johannesburg. The remaining three collectives all operate at a local level with considerable overlap in membership. Among these collectives, the market committee is central to relationships between the different collectives and also the authorities. The following sub-sections firstly explore the market committee as representative collective before unpacking the trader cooperatives, volunteering groups and regional organisations present.
4.2.1. ESTABLISHING MARKET COMMITTEES: AN ATTEMPT AT DEPOLITICISING MARKET GOVERNANCE

To contextualise the formation of market committees in Bree and Midrand markets, it is necessary to reflect on the initial establishment of these markets. Both markets were established in areas formerly characterised by street trading. The market establishment required negotiations between the existing street traders and the relevant management agent, the MTC. Different regional trader organisations represented traders in these negotiations. The MTC realised the demands from the organisations were substantial but that there were challenges in negotiating with a regional organisation rather than a market specific representative body (MCM2, interview 2016). Given this context, the former MTC CEO, explains their motivations for the establishment of market committees:

“It depends on the configurations; however, it is much easier to manage if involvement is limited only to in-house committees rather than outside associations. For simple reasons, management has nothing to do with politics of the day, but to ensure that services are delivered in a cost-effective manner without compromising on quality and turnaround times. It is my view that the moment all the above-mentioned stakeholders are involved, much time is spent on meeting rather than on actual work, hence MTC focused management issues on residents’ facilities users without involving their parent associations” (MTC1, interview 2016).

The establishment of the market committees thus became a way of “depoliticising” and grounding market governance. It did not necessarily exclude trader organisation members from the market committees, as many of the existing committee members in Bree and Midrand markets were, in fact, active members of the organisations that formed part of the initial negotiations (Bree committee, interview 2016; MCM1,2&5, interviews 2016). Their active role in the negotiation process established their legitimacy among traders who then elected them as committee members.

A. HOUSE RULES: THE OFFICIAL FUNCTION OF THE MARKET COMMITTEES

The current position and role description of the market committee are found in the Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules (undated). Since both Bree and Midrand markets are also public transport facilities, these house rules were developed for both trader and public transport operators’ committees. The document oversees issues such as rentals, trader identification, dispute resolution, the role of the trading manager and trader and public transport operator committees.

The committees are described as follows:

“14.1. A Traders and/or a Public Transport Operators Committee is to be established at the facility to ensure that communication between The Company and tenants is at all times effective and that
operations at the facility runs smoothly. The Traders Committee will also provide the forum through
which ideas, solution to problems, and issues of concern can be raised with the Company by its tenants.
The Traders Committee will have its own terms of reference to guide its activities which will include:

- providing a fast and effective means of communications;
- providing advice and suggestions on the promotion of the facility;
- supporting business development programmes;
- providing a forum for amicable resolution of problems that may arise from time to time;
- generally promoting an atmosphere of shared responsibility for the success of the facility.

14.2. All tenants will be eligible to participate in the Traders Committee and/or Public Transport Operators committee through representatives nominated to the Committees through an agreed process” (Johannesburg Property Company, undated: 11).

Market committees are evidently intended to serve as an extension of the facility management team while at the same time representing the needs of the traders. The former MTC CEO explained that the market committees carry the responsibility of keeping both officials and traders accountable (MTC1, interview 2016). Despite such an indication the notion of accountability is not stated in the house rules. There is furthermore no indication of any decision-making power allocated to the committees. The committees become a tool towards problem solution rather than a partner. Their suggestions and ideas could influence decision-making but they are not directly involved.

No terms of reference for the individual committees were obtained during the fieldwork. Information on election procedures, institutional structures and the functions of the committees were rather obtained through primary research. Despite such limitations, the research reveals that the role of the market committees reaches far beyond the initial intent described in this section. Regional organisations are also still active, in the markets under review, through strong affiliations with the market committees.

**B. MARKET COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP**

The research established that the official procedure for the election of market trader members is through formal elections administered by an external company (SAITF1, interview 2016). These procedures are, however, not stated in the house rules discussed above and were informed through the primary research. The responsibility of conducting these elections lies with the DED (JPC1, interview 2016). Upon nomination, any trader can participate in the elections which entail a campaigning process prior to the actual elections (SAITF1, interview 2016). A number of stakeholders indicated that elections are meant to take place every two or three years and that on the day of
elections, the markets are shut to ensure all traders participate (JPC1&2, interviews 2016; MCM3, interview 2016). The SAITF General Secretary stated the following regarding the different positions:

“Positions in the committees are awarded according to the number of votes received by each candidate. The key positions in order of importance are chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary and deputy secretary” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

Further members of the committees include a treasurer and additional members. The treasurer of a committee is not officially recognised by the JPC: the JPC is of the opinion that as representatives, the committee must not oversee any financial matters that would require a treasurer (MCM7, interview 2016). Despite such restrictions and as is discussed in the following subsection, the committees do oversee financial processes that require the appointment of a treasurer. The treasurer is, as a result, instead appointed by the committee chairperson (ibid.). In both markets, committee members indicated that the committees further include three additional members to make them a total of eight members (MCM1&3, interviews 2016).

While this may be true, the research found that the actual election procedures and total number of members within each committee are rather ambiguous. Among others, elections have not been taking place on regular intervals and committee members are appointed outside of official procedures (JPC2, interview 2016; MCM4&6, interviews 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). Chapter five reveals how these deviations question the appropriateness of elections as an invited space of participation.

C. OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING

Among committee members, individual functions overlap considerably. In both Bree and Midrand markets, committee members other than the chairperson and secretary explained that they do a bit of everything ranging from organising traders, dispute settlement to maintenance (MCM2,5&6 interviews 2016). A committee member described this overlap as follows:

“A member will be treasurer with budgetary responsibilities while also being an organiser. An organiser is someone who has to organise people to attend meetings” (MCM2, interview 2016).

The role of the secretary in one of the markets encapsulated communications, managing volunteers and providing business advice such as information on tendering processes (MCM3, interview 2016).

Among these overlapping functions, one of the central functions performed by market committee members is dispute settlement and managing traders’ complaints. To perform such functions, committee members are spread out across the markets to be accessible to all traders (MCM7,
A trader in Midrand market explained the manner in which the committee will assist them as follows:

“The committee solves problems. The committee will solve disputes traders have between each other. An example is when your neighbour places her box in your area. You will ask her one time to move it, and the next time it will be a fight. The committee will then come to solve the fight. They will call both traders because they have to listen to both. They will then come to an agreement. If it is only a light problem, it will not be necessary to call the manager” (MT4, interview 2016).

Similarly, to the case studies identified in the literature review, dispute settlement is pivotal to traders. Disputes settlements have a direct bearing on trader’s ability to conduct their business and need to be resolved as quick as possible.

During the research, there was no suggestion of any form of price regulation in either of the markets. There are however functions such as funeral support provided by the Midrand market committee. If a family member or loved one should pass away the committee will go around and collect donations for the relevant trader (MCM7, interview 2016). The committee is likewise meant to donate R 50-00 (ibid.). This function has, however, dissolved in Bree market (MT2, interview 2016). The reason for the dissolution was not provided.

Initially, the market committees were intended to operate on a voluntary basis without any funding or financial benefits (DED1, interview 2016; MCM7, interview 2016). The main motivation provided by different committee members for taking up their positions voluntarily is to assist traders (MCM2, 4&6, interviews 2016). Two committee members described this as follows:

“I am happy to do my job because I want to help the people, the people are suffering” (MCM6, interview 2016).

“I wanted to become a committee member because of my own suffering when the municipality will just come and take your stuff. I do not want to see this happening to other traders” (MCM2, interview 2016).

Contrarily, the role of the committees has moved beyond its initial intention to include service delivery. The delivery of such services comes at a cost which requires funding. In both markets, the main source of income covering these costs has been a R 2-00 usage fee charged for the use of ablation facilities (MCM1&3, interviews 2016). Users of the facilities (commuters), taxi operators and traders are charged this fee. A committee member explained that the money is used to perform the following functions:
“The money is used to pay those working in the facilities, do some maintenance functions and buy cleaning products and toilet paper ... if there is money left over in a month it will sometimes be used to pay the volunteers something” (MCM3, interview 2016).

This funding allocation was reiterated in the other market (MCM1&7, interviews 2016). On one occasion, a committee member alluded to payments of R 500-00 per volunteer (MCM7, interview 2016). A JPC official explained that they have no control over how the revenue streams collected in the markets are spent (JPC1, interview 2016). Another JPC official narrated his observations regarding the money collected:

"Where the toilet money is going is a good question. The committee goes and collects the money hourly from 7:00 in the morning. It should be around R 5 000-00 a week. There are about 18 000 commuters coming through the market in a week. They charge them R 2-00 and if they cannot pay they chase them away. These people then have to use the ranks ... I know that they buy some cleaning stuff and toilet paper, but there are no records of this” (JPC2, interview 2016).

If the official was correct in his estimations, it does indicate towards a substantial amount of funding being collected in the market. While this may be true, there was no indication, in either markets, that any of these funds are allocated towards the committee members. The various committee members insisted that they are operating on a voluntary basis (MCM3&7, interviews 2016). The only indication of money spent towards them was on costs such as travelling to attend meetings (ibid.). This was resonated in Bree market where the committee had an additional source of income through storage provision as described below:

“Bree market has formal storage facilities available for traders on the third floor at a fee of R 20-00 a week. MTC use to be responsible for the collection of the storage fees. We [the market committee] then officially requested from MTC if we could take over this function. Our motivation was that we do a lot to solve problems in the market for which the money could be used. It could also assist us with transport money. The MTC agreed to this and handed over the storage function” (MCM3, interview 2016).

In Bree market, the funding streams identified have, however, attracted interests from stakeholders outside of the committees. As a result, the toilet facility management has been taken over by a group of traders together with queue marshals:

“In 2015, previous toilet cleaners have gone around the market and got random people to form a group that has now taken over the toilet cleaning. Queue marshals [working for taxi operators] also for the first time are interested in this because they heard that there is money to be made. The JPC encouraged these traders to form this group with the taxi industry because they know these people are intimidating. We [existing committee] believe they are sharing the money they collect with the JPC... This group is not a
committee but just a random group of people. They do not meet with management regularly. The only times they talk to them is when they hear rumours that JPC wants to take the toilets back... We [committee] would spend some of the toilet revenue on buying bulbs and stuff. We [committee] recorded the money they made from the toilets and put it back into the market. Nobody knows what the new group uses the money for” (MCM3, interview 2016).

This move could be seen a tactic from JPC officials to ensure that the market committees receive opposition in their attempt to formally take over management functions. Authorities have been known to resort to such tactics. In markets in Maputo for example, the authorities lost their legitimacy through not providing traders with the services they are entitled to (Lindell, 2008). The authorities, in turn, became hostile towards traders who were challenging them (ibid.). Officials then resorted to causing conflict between the different organisations, divert their attention from their objectives and weaken them (ibid.). The fact that these functions are performed without any formal agreement makes it possible for an opposing group to take over. Further information regarding this new grouping and how they were able to take over these functions could not be obtained due to the limitations in Bree market. In Midrand market, the only income stream is through the ablution facilities and the committee was still responsible for the collection. There were no fees collected through storage provision in Midrand market.

It can thus be concluded that there are income streams in markets and that traders have moved beyond the functions they were initially intended to perform. They have taken over certain maintenance and service provision functions that require additional funding. Performing these functions justifies the collection of fees in the markets. While this may be true, it is difficult to ascertain to which extent committee members are in fact receiving personal financial compensation, let alone have a sense of the budget collected and spent.

Regarding price regulations and standardising of practices, the literature review illustrated that trader organisations implementing such measures could be to the benefit of traders (Ikioda, 2014; Olukoju, 2015). It has the potential to not only protect the customer but also remove underselling (Olukoju, 2015). During the fieldwork, traders on various occasions indicated that they are suffering and I also observed this in the limited stock found in many stalls. It could, therefore, be argued that there is a dire need for more business development involvement from either the relevant market committees, SAITF or authorities.
The third trader collective operating in the markets is a group of volunteers. This collective is referred to as unofficial since it originated in invented spaces of participation through traders’ demands for management functions. In contrast to the other collectives it is not officially recognised by the authorities. Many of these volunteers are volunteering their time in the hope of receiving employment positions or financial benefits once cleaning and security tenders are awarded to the relevant trader cooperatives.

A group of volunteers explained that they have a meeting every two weeks where they report back to the market committee (BV1, interview 2016). Neither a cooperative or volunteer meeting was, however, attended during the research. In Midrand market, there are 24 traders who have been volunteering for both cleaning and security since 2014 (MCM5, interview 2016). A committee member said that this was not always the case:

“All the traders in the market were meant to volunteer. As they realised they are not going to make any money from it, they slowly lost interest and numbers went down to 24” (MCM7, interview 2016).

In Bree market, cleaning functions have been taken over by volunteers since 2014 but security functions only since 2016. The market has 60 traders volunteering on a full-time basis (BV1, interview 2016). The volunteering system in Bree market differs considerably from Midrand market with regards to full-time and part-time employment. The volunteers in Midrand market are not conducting the duties on a full-time basis but rather in between their trading responsibilities on a rotating schedule (MCM7, interview 2016). The traders volunteering on a full-time basis in Bree market are reliant on others to run their stalls in their absence. They rotate weekly where one team do day shifts and the other night shift (BV1, interview 2016).

There were contradicting testimonies regarding actual volunteer membership. A volunteer and committee member in Midrand market argued that:

“The current volunteers have been working hard for three years, and not anyone can walk in and just join” (MCM5, interview 2016).

In Bree market, the volunteers, contrastingly said that any registered trader could become a volunteer at any time (BV1, interview 2016). If registered traders cannot take on the task, they are also allowed to hand the opportunity over to a family member (MCM3, interview 2016).

In Midrand market, a number of volunteers’ form part of the cooperatives formed to tender for management functions. Should the management functions be awarded to these cooperatives, the
participation of the volunteers could be formalised through employment contracts. This would also be applicable to volunteers that do not form part of any cooperative. The awarding of cleaning and security tenders in future could thus see volunteers gain official recognition.

4.2.3. TRADER COOPERATIVES: AN ATTEMPT AT MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

The cooperatives active in the markets can be grouped according to two categories. The first category represents cooperatives established with the objective of improving enterprise development and trader business skills. The second category developed under market traders’ recent demands for management positions. These cooperatives enable traders to tender for management functions. The focus of the research is on the second category as these cooperatives are currently active in the overall governance of markets. An overview of both categories is, nonetheless, provided to create a better understanding of cooperatives operating in the markets.

With regards to cooperative development, the City of Johannesburg (2008) identified the following as one of its strategic objectives in its Economic Development Policy and Strategic Framework:

“The cooperative is an enterprise model that, through the aggregation of member resources, enables the establishment of enterprises and capital formation that could not be undertaken by the individual members themselves. The City supports the broader use of the cooperative model as a way for people previously excluded from the economy to participate in the economy. The challenge of unemployment has forced a large number of residents on to the streets to seek a living in informal trading” (City of Johannesburg, 2008: 60).

The former MTC CEO explained that the Research and Development Department of MTC assisted traders and taxi operators in establishing cooperatives:

“This rule applied to MTC as an entity of government. The Research and Development Department conducted research that revealed lack of spending or buying goods and services from facilities users because they were not properly registered. With the help of Research and Development Department traders were registered, hence MTC was able to do business with them. As a result, they have benefited a great deal” (MTC1, interview 2016).

There are several cooperatives across the markets that developed as part of the first category and with the enterprise development objective described above. One trader explained that she had been part of many cooperatives such as catering jobs in particular for events at stadiums (MT2, interview 2016). Another example of a cooperative system was in Bree market where four cooperatives were formed to start operating as bulk stock suppliers to other traders in the markets (SAITF1, interview...
Despite the positive effects reported by the MTC above, government support and training have been identified as lacking and obstacles to the development of the relevant cooperatives (MCM3, interview 2016; MT2, interview 2016).

The second category of cooperatives found in markets represents traders formalising themselves to tender for management functions in markets since 2014. There is a great deal of overlap between membership of the market committee and these cooperatives. The cooperatives are generally inactive as a committee member explained that “they [cooperatives] do not do anything; they are only for the tendering process” (MCM7, interview 2016). Due to this inoperative nature of some of the cooperatives, limited information regarding their overall functioning was obtainable. Meeting procedures, for example, were found to be mostly integrated with the weekly committee meetings (MCM5, interview 2016).

There were furthermore a number of ambiguities regarding their composition and possible critical discourses from other traders. In the case study conducted by Lindell and Appelblad (2009) on cooperative governance in Nakawa market in Kampala, the size of the market allowed for the appointment of a manager, cashier and general clerk, board of directors and sub-committees. Approximately 10 000 traders are operating in Nakawa market of which a tenth hold cooperative membership (ibid.). Bree and Midrand markets, however, do not operate at similar scales. In Midrand market, in particular, four cooperatives were established in 2014 to tender for management functions (MCM1, interview 2016). Although the precise number of cooperative members were not always transparent, it can be said that each cooperative consists of between nine and fifteen members. Similar to the market committee, each cooperative had a chairperson, secretary and treasurer (MCM5, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). A committee member explained that:

“These [chairperson, secretary and treasurer] are selected based on numbers, on trust and how long they have been in the market. Three of the four cooperatives have one committee member as chairperson, and the rest of the members are volunteers. The fourth cooperative has only committee members and is referred to as the mother cooperative” (MCM5, interview 2016).

The General Secretary of SAITF explained that the tension between the members in this market was of such a nature that he advised them to develop their management cooperatives separately (SAITF1, interview 2016). Regarding the opinion of traders excluded from the cooperatives, a committee member stated that “the other traders did not interfere in the cooperative establishment, so they must be happy with it all” (MCM5, interview 2016).
In Bree market, one cooperative, consisting of nine members who are mainly committee members, was formed to tender for management positions (Bree committee, interview 2016). Membership costs were reported as R 100-00 to obtain the official certificate and thereafter it requires transport cost or other relevant expenditures (MCM2, interview 2016). The weekly cost for cooperative membership was estimated at R 20-00 (SAITF1, interview 2016). Training was also identified as a major obstacle for these cooperatives. The Bree committee explained that:

“The people sent by the government to do cooperative training were not efficient. They viewed those who wanted to tender as greedy and wanting to make money. They were not in support of cooperative formulations. Traders often didn’t even know that they had someone allocated to assist them. They do not want cooperatives” (Bree committee, interview 2016).

SAITF is to a large extent the driving force behind cooperative establishment in the markets. SAITF as the fourth trader collective through which traders participate in market governance is subsequently discussed.

4.2.4. TRADER ORGANISATIONS: THE PRESENCE OF SAITF

There are different trader organisations present in markets and traders move between them. One trader indicated that she previously was a member of the Gauteng Hawkers Association, then the South African National Traders Retail Association (SANTRA) and now SAITF (MT2, interview 2016). At the time of the research, SAITF was identified as the dominant organisation in both Bree and Midrand markets. SAITF represents both street and market traders. Informal trading management in both streets and markets is in fact one of the key areas SAITF is engaging with (Jackson et al., 2014). SAITF is further one of the organisations that successfully took the CoJ to Constitutional Court after Operation Clean Sweep in which thousands of traders got evicted from the CBD unlawfully (ibid.). Given the dominance of SAITF within the markets the research focused on the entity as the relevant organisation.

Similar to other trader organisations in Johannesburg, SAITF operates on a regional scale with members dispersed across the city (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). The organisation currently has membership in 35 markets across the metropole (SAITF1, interview 2016). Both the Bree and Midrand market committees are affiliated with SAITF and consult the General Secretary, on day to day issues within the markets (Bree committee, interview 2016; MCM1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). Different testimonies were given as to whether traders within the markets are in fact SAITF members. Both market committees and the SAITF General Secretary are of the opinion that all the traders in the markets are SAITF members (ibid.). The SAITF General Secretary explains SAITF structure as follows:
“As a forum, SAITF operates differently to a normal organisation. We only accept groups with a minimum of five members and no individual members. The joining fee for the entire group is R 200, and then there is a membership fee of R 10 a month per person” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

In the work of Jackson et al. (2014) it is reported that the R 10 can be on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis depending on the capability of a trader. The committees in the markets pay the joining fee which then enables all traders to turn to SAITF for assistance (MCM5, interview 2016). Clarity could however not be found regarding the payment of the additional monthly fees. In both Midrand and Bree market traders indicated that there is a once-off membership fee but no mention of additional costs was made (BV1, interview 2016; MT6, interview 2016). This raises the question of whether the committee might be paying the further membership costs of traders from the funding streams they have available.

Despite the insistence that all market traders were SAITF members, there was evidence pointing towards the opposite. A JPC official in one of the markets stated the following:

“Only a small number of traders are part of SAITF, and if you ask most traders, they will not know what they stand for. The committee is there for using the traders as a force; they do not belong to any organisation ... I know little about them [SAITF] but I know they give false information, make promises they cannot keep and make the JPC’s life difficult” (JPC2, interview 2016).

It has to be acknowledged that the manner in which SAITF is structured as a forum and their willingness to assist non-members, allows the collective to claim all traders in a market where the committee is affiliated to the organisation as members. Such a tactic is in line with Bénit-Gbaffou (2016: 21) who identifies the need of trader organisations to “brand a space of authority and unify membership”.

There are weekly engagements between SAITF and the market committees. These differ between physical meetings and telephone conversations to discuss problems as and when necessary (MCM1, interview 2016). The secretary of each committee is at times expected to submit reports to SAITF (MCM5, interview 2016). SAITF also has a general meeting once a year where they invite all their members to explain to them what they do (SAITF1, interview 2016). From an upward institutional perspective, the JPC explained that it is mostly the DED that deals with the relevant organisations (JPC1, interview 2016). When questioned on their views of trader organisations in markets, a DED official stated the following:

“Our view is that we do not mind any representatives, any associations, we respect them, we acknowledge them, but legally speaking our relationship is between the users of the facilities and the actual traders themselves in our database” (DED1, interview 2016).
This view reflects the initial motivation for the establishment of trader management committees in the markets.

Other functions fulfilled by SAITF includes conducting discussions with institutions such as the JPC and Johannesburg Metropolitan Police (JPMPD) on behalf of the traders, training, workshops and the provision of supporting material such as booklets (MCM1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). There is a lot of internal conflict in markets, and one of SAITF’s objectives is to train traders on how to work together peacefully and what it can achieve (SAITF1, interview 2016). The main objective of SAITF for markets is however to empower traders and create “one annual millionaire per region” (ibid.).

What makes SAITF of particular importance to the research is that the General Secretary was to a large extent the driving force behind the demands for management functions within both markets. In the following chapters, the research considers the manner in which this drive dominates existing governance processes within the markets.

4.3. BROADER INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

The broader institutional framework governing markets has been subject to the New Public Management principles implemented since the late 1990s- early 2000s. This has resulted in the externalisation of management functions to MoEs across the City of Johannesburg. In its 2002 Annual Report the City of Johannesburg refers to such entities as “corporatised entities” (City of Johannesburg, 2002). These entities are established independently with their own managers and boards while being fully owned by the municipality. The relevant corporatised entities, in turn, have to support the revenue objectives of the parent department and will appoint service providers as and when necessary. The following sub-sections uncover the structures of these governing entities as well as their supporting policy framework.

4.3.1. PARENT MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT: THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

During the interview with the DED Deputy Director of Informal Trading, information regarding the vision and objectives for markets could be obtained. Questions regarding the personal roles of different DED officials relevant to market management were, however, not approved. It was also indicated that the institutional structure of the DED could be found on the DED website. The broader institutional structure could, therefore, be sourced, but limited information on the internal structure and personal roles of those responsible for the regulation of markets were retrievable. The Deputy Director described the role of the DED with regards to markets as follows:
“We are a policy department that guides the SMME development and informal economic activities. We are not the management of the facilities. DED does a policy overview of small business activities both informal and micro, semi-micro business. We also give the policy on the infrastructure development for the informal sector that includes market stalls etc. So, that is our overarching responsibility in relation to the market. In that arrangement, you have two departments that are interdependent to the model. You have transport that regulates public transport activity which is taxi ranks and minibuses. Then you also have economic development that regulates SMME activities that include informal trade. JPC manages the facility, they will treat the users of the facility which are traders and taxi operators as tenants to those facilities. There is no staff within DED that works within markets. It is JPC staff that are employed to manage the users of the facility. We oversee the operational implementation of activities within those facilities, we resolve issues, when there are challenges” (DED1, interview 2016).

The interview with the Deputy Director was conducted at a time when the department was in the process of redefining their approach and model to market management. The main challenge with regards to markets was identified as the City’s broad objective that facilities must be self-sustainable structures of the city (DED1, interview 2016). As a result, future management models could see traders stepping into management models as a form of empowerment and to increase their sense of ownership in the markets. Chapter six provides a detailed analysis of these proposed models. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge at this stage that such reforms are on the table. What was, furthermore, repeatedly emphasised during the interview is that the DED is regulated by the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) No. 56 of 2003, City of Johannesburg Supply Chain Policy and the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 (DED1, interview 2016). There is no compromise for any agreement to fall outside of the legislative framework the DED is subject to (ibid.). The sections below further describe the manner in which the DED and JPC work together.

4.3.2. POLICY FRAMEWORK AND HOUSE RULES

The main documentation available on markets are the Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules (undated), Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2007), the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Informal Trading By-laws (2009) and the newly drafted Inner City Informal Trading Draft Plan (2016). With exception to the Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules, the other three documents encapsulate informal trading across the city and do not focus on markets in particular. The Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2007) and the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality Informal Trading By-laws (2009) focus on linear markets, periodic markets and infrastructure development in markets rather than public transport markets such as Bree and Midrand markets. The Inner City Informal Trading Draft Plan (2016) which is still in draft
format and intended at replacing the Informal Trading Policy for the City of Johannesburg (2007) provides the following vision for informal trading in the city:

- “Well managed informal sector providing diverse retail offerings in the inner city
- Informal trading to be included in land use planning and economic development strategies
- Informal trading is limited to markets, linear markets and designated streets that are to be clearly demarcated and integrated with transportation and movement plans
- Needs of traders balanced vs. needs of other stakeholders for space to walk, safety, etc.
- To ensure that we rid the city of crime and grime and to promote the informal economy ensuring the promotion and creation of jobs
- To facilitate development of informal trading and migration from informal to formal economy” (The Inner City Informal Trading Draft Plan, 2016, emphasis mine).

It becomes evident that the role of market spaces in the city will be accelerated in future. This will require clear policy guidelines on the management of these spaces across the city. The Inner City Informal Trading Draft Plan (2016) further states that ten buildings across the city have been identified for market development (DED, 2016). There is also mention of developing an iconic market in the central CBD to which comparisons were drawn to markets such as the Rotterdam Market Hall (ibid.).

Until an interview with the DED towards the end of the fieldwork, a copy of the Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules of the Johannesburg Property Company (undated) could not be obtained. A JPC official explained that when the MTC joined the JPC, the house rules had to be amended and that the draft format could not yet be made available (JPC1, interview 2016). A market manager indicated that his copy of the house rules got stolen and that they have their own approach to resolving issues, as “the house rules are just something on paper and that it is better for two persons to sit down and resolve an issue, I do not want to have to suspend a trader” (JPC2, interview 2016).

When engaging with traders, it became evident that they are aware of what they are allowed to do and what was prohibited without any officially documented house rules. A JPC official explained this process as follows:

“New house rules are implemented as and when needed through consultation between management and the committees. The traders will be satisfied with new regulations since these rules will be based on their suggestions or grievances... An example of a house rule is no fighting over customers.” (JPC2, Interview 2016).

These examples illustrate the informal manner in which market governance is taking place. There is no doubt that a lack of sufficient policy documentation aimed specifically at the management of markets has contributed to such forms of governance. It is, however, within such informal governance
approaches that irregularities, opportunity for corrupt activities and also domineering practices can enter.

### 4.3.3. THE ROLE OF MUNICIPAL OWNED ENTITIES AS MANAGEMENT AGENTS

Municipality owned Entities (MoEs) are established to function as efficient service delivery vehicle, governed in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) No. 56 of 2003 (MTC1, interview 2016). The objective set out for MoEs such as the MTC is to sustain themselves in terms of revenue streams and reduce their dependency burden on the City of Johannesburg (*ibid.*). The functioning of MTC and JPC as the two MoEs responsible for market management to date are described below.

#### A. METROPOLITAN TRADING COMPANY

The MTC (later subsumed under JPC) was created in 1999 as a standalone entity to deal specifically with informal trading, including market management, in the City of Johannesburg (DED1, interview 2016). One of the key factors influencing the manner in which this entity operated was described as follows:

> “Even though the municipal entity annual budget is subsidised, approximately 50%, it should collect from defined revenue streams (defined in terms of Memorandum of Incorporation and Service Delivery Agreement (SDA))” (MTC1, interview 2016).

The revenue streams available to the MTC were rentals from formal traders, informal traders, taxi operators, independent bus operators and office space; the sale of water and electricity; indoor and outdoor advertising; and other sources such as gas sales (MTC1, interview 2016). Markets as facilities managed by the MTC, however, received subsidy allocation higher than 50%:

> “The rental collected per facility is insufficient to cover the operational costs or what we call OPEX. It should be borne in mind that these facilities are subsidised to the tune of 70% by the City. This stems from the fact that rental charged are closed to 80% below market rental for same space outside informal traders market. Although all entities of the CoJ are required to have a separate bank account, however, the City reserve the right to sweep all deposits made to such accounts. The CoJ sweeps all entities account on a daily basis. As a result, MTC was unable to ring-fence revenue collected for a specific facility. Besides, not all facilities are generating enough revenue to be sustainable. Without CoJ subsidy some of the facilities will collapse. In short, revenue collected are far below the required investment ratios to reinvest in that facility. These facilities are not at the same level like your commercial malls that generate enough revenue and healthy return on investment for the investors” (MTC1, interview 2016).
Upon further enquiry, the former CEO confirmed that Midrand and Bree markets were two facilities operating at a deficit (MTC1, interview 2016). Although the revenue of each market could not be ring-fenced, each MTC facility did receive its own allocated budget:

“During my tenure, MTC had 28 facilities in its books, but in total there were close to 50 facilities that were not allocated any budget by the CoJ. The company, therefore, had its own budget vote with specific budget allocation. The budget was allocated according to each facility... What it implies is that once the CoJ allocates a budget to a specific facility, it cannot be moved or used for others expenditure without proper authorization by CoJ. It should be taken into consideration that CoJ uses zero budgeting system, meaning all budget appropriated cannot be carried over if not spent. A multiyear planning or what is called Medium-Term Expenditure Framework ensures that enough resources are planned for (whether such requests are received is another issue) for each facility; if such requests are approved by CoJ, then that specific allocation will solely be used for that a specific facility” (MTC1, 2016).

These agreements were dependent on the available budget from the CoJ. It was not disclosed whether there were instances when the DED did not provide the allocated budget for facilities such as Bree and Midrand market. Similar figures and budgetary information were not obtained from the JPC. Statements such as these have implications should the overall financial management of Midrand and Bree market ever be handed over to traders. It could require a system where budgets are ring-fenced for each particular market. What the MTC approach does thus alert the researcher to is that if traders were awarded the overall management of markets, it would have implications for the broader funding model of facilities.

**B. BRICK AND MORTAR VS. MANAGEMENT OF TRADERS**

The system described above resulted in insufficient funding across the MTC, and lack of transparency over markets’ individual financial balance. The former CEO explained that combined with the growing mandate of the MTC, revenue collection objectives could not be met (MTC1, interview 2016). The DED Deputy Director of the Informal Trading described the subsequent move from the MTC to the JPC as follows:

“It was also felt that entities such as MTC were meant to sustain themselves without depending on subsidies of the municipality. From its inception, due to the fact that the model did not work, MTC could not sustain themselves through revenue generated from neither advertisement or the rental payments. It was then felt that JPC as a property portfolio company that manages these facilities is strategically a better entity to integrate the management functions” (DED1, interview 2016).

There are mixed views on the integration of MTC into the JPC as described by the former MTC CEO:
“JPC is a property management of the City, as a result its mandate is brick and mortar management; whereas MTC was responsible for both brick and mortar, including the economic development of informal trades or facilities’ users in general. MTC’s role did not fit or was incongruent with that of JPC. JPC has a very limited view as far as the management of informal economy is concerned. In fact, its management has no clue of informal economy and its management. It was more of political than functional integration” (MTC1, interview 2016).

Bénit-Gbaffou (2017) reiterates the view that the integration of the MTC to the JPC reaffirms the focus on asset management above that of street trading within public spaces, and sees this as part of the “manufacture of ungovernability” of informal trading in Johannesburg. The justification of this integration is beyond the scope of the research, but it is worth noting that similar complaints of mismanagement by the JPC were heard during the fieldwork.
C. THE JOHANNESBURG PROPERTY COMPANY

Since 2013, the management of both markets under review has been the responsibility of the JPC. The market management function within the JPC is located in the Property Portfolio Office which in turn consists of four departments; asset management; facility management; property management and property development (JPC1, interview 2016). The internal structure of the JPC, as well as its location within the broader governance framework, is illustrated in Diagram 4.2.

**Diagram 4.2: The position of the JPC as management agent within the broader governance framework**

*Daniel (2017) based on City of Johannesburg (2016); Johannesburg Property Company (2015b); Jackson et al. (2014) JPC1&2 (Interviews 2016)*

Different staff members across the Property Portfolio Office have market management incorporated into their portfolio including a facilities manager and cleaning and security manager (JPC1, interview...
2016). The office is responsible for demarcation of stalls, stall allocation to traders, cleaning, security, maintenance of the facilities and the collection of rentals (ibid.).

During the interview with both the DED and JPC, clarity could not be provided as to the exact number of markets currently being managed by the entities. A senior JPC official, nonetheless, indicated that there are four market managers across the city, which the Property Portfolio Office oversees (JPC1, interview 2016). These managers each have more than one market in which they are responsible for basic property management (ibid.). One manager, for example, is responsible for the whole of whole Region A which covers three markets. The managers’ report to their line manager and executive manager within the JPC and also their regional manager within the DED (JPC2, interview 2016).

The Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules describes the role of the facility managers as follows:

“The Facility Manager is responsible, on behalf of The Company, for the effective and efficient management and functioning of the facility. If a tenant has any problems related to the facility or their businesses, they are expected to raise it with the Facility Manager or the employee of The Company identified by the Facility Manager from time to time to deal with specific issues or areas of the facility” (Johannesburg Property Company, undated: 11).

One of the market managers active since 2011 explained that his responsibilities include maintenance and building conditions, management of cleaning and security, handling of complaints, monitoring of traders and engagements with the taxi associations from time to time. The latter is on a minimal basis since the taxi operators within the relevant market mostly manage themselves. It is further on revealed that rental collections use to be conducted by the manager but that these are now the responsibility of each trader. Market managers further have two operational staff members known as property specialists working underneath them (JPC1, interview 2016). During the fieldwork in Midrand market, no mention was, however, made of such property specialists.

A JPC official indicated the following regarding the appointment of external service providers:

“We use our own staff to manage the markets, sometimes we use internal staff to do maintenance, we have an internal maintenance depot. Whatever we could not do we outsourced from our supply chain process” (JPC1, interview 2016).

The MTC Board initially approved the outsourcing of such non-core functions (MTC1, interview 2016). A DED official attributed that such appointments are not necessarily a case of privatisation:
"JPC would go on tender to appoint the cleaning and security for services. Obviously, you wouldn't have officials of the JPC doing this; you would outsource the services through a tender process" (DED1, interview 2016).

The appointment of such private external companies has to a large extent contributed to the recent mobilisation of traders and subsequent reforms.

As a MoE under New Public Management principles, the JPC is subject to Key Performance Indicators. The City of Johannesburg Property Company Business Plan for 2015 identifies the new reforms on market management as one of the KPIs for the entity:


At the time of the research, towards the end of 2016, the partnership model referred to was still in the development phase.

This section provided an overview of the entities responsible for oversight of Bree and Midrand markets. It is evident that MoEs as management agents operate in a context which limits the interventions possible in a particular facility. Even if a market were to operate at a profit, this profit would have been absorbed into the City’s overall budget. This could result in a situation where there is little incentive for traders to contribute to the revenue of the management agent. Given such a context there is scope for more personalised and localised budgets - and even management. Traders are business people who would most likely take up an opportunity for profit if they were to benefit from it. The following section explores some of the main governance functions in the markets to illustrate how the relations between the different stakeholders are materialised.

4.4. THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC MARKET FUNCTIONS

The research found that various market functions are managed according to informally adapted approaches rather than official procedures. This can in part be due to the lack of formal documentation and oversight that allow for informal adaptations. Given this reality, this section provides an overview of how some of the main functions in the market are governed among the different stakeholders. The first factor under consideration is whether the markets are in fact managed according to different commodities or locations. The research then divulges the blurred lines between what is considered formal and informal within the markets. Trading licences, rental calculations and stall allocations are subsequently discussed.
4.4.1. ATTEMPTS AT AREA-BASED MANAGEMENT

The research found that the markets under review had the intention of operating as commodity based facilities but that these did not necessarily materialise as such. Baragwanath market in Johannesburg is an example of a market where area based management according to products succeeded. The Baragwanath market management committee consists of twelve committee members according to the different products on offer (SAITF1, interview 2016). The market is further physically arranged around these. Initially, the intention in Bree and Midrand markets was for them also to be managed on a product and area-based approach. According to one of the committee members, Midrand market is still divided corresponding to four product areas (MCM1, interview 2016). There are also dedicated committee members for each area (ibid.). The areas are cooking; fruit and vegetables; bags and cell phones; and cosmetics and clothes. A JPC official explained that the area allocations did not work out as initially intended. According to him, traders argue that business is better in some areas and therefore locate where they want to, rather than in their product dedicated areas (JPC2, interview 2016). Despite some mixed products, distinct areas were still observable as illustrated in Maps 4.1 to 4.3.
Midrand market is spread across three levels each of varying sizes. The first level constitutes a large covered rank area for long distance commuting as well as a sheltered temporary parking area for local trips. The latter is located outside of the main ranking area. The majority of the trading activities are located on this level. Most stalls are concentrated around the temporary parking area as this is where the majority of pedestrian flow can be found. There are pedestrian and taxi entrances on both sides of this section. The majority of the cooking stalls are located in the uncovered cooking area. Cooking stalls within the long distance rank section do not have the same pedestrian flow than those located outside. There are, therefore, less cooking stalls located in this section compared to outside. The cosmetics and clothes area is also located next to the main stream of pedestrian flow. Fruit and vegetables are available between the temporary taxi parking bays. These three trading areas located on level one are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Uncovered cooking area, bags and cosmetics section as well as fruit and veg stalls in Midrand markets
© Daniel (2016)
The figures above also shows that the majority of the stalls located in this area have basic shelters and not physical brick structures as found on level three below. Informal stalls can range from permanent lockable brick structures, shelters (as illustrated above), or mobile stalls. There are two ablution facilities located in the market. The one is located in the temporary rank section while the second is on level two as illustrated in Map 4.2.

Map 4.2: Midrand market layout Level II

Level two of Midrand market is where the majority of administration and supporting facilities are located. This level does not have any outward facing stalls or facilities. The whole section comprises of a covered rank area. There are a few cooking stalls located on this level to cater for the commuters using this section. The JPC manager’s office is situated on this level as well as a large and smaller boardroom. These boardrooms are at the disposal of the market manager as well as market committees to conduct meetings. The third level of the market illustrated in Map 4.3 consists mostly of unusable space bordered by stalls.
Map 4.3: Midrand market layout Level III

Similar to the rest of the market, this area was designated for bags and cell phones, but mixed products can also be found. The stalls found on this level are all permanent lockable stalls. The one formal stall situated in the market is likewise located on level three. All of the stalls found on level three face outward and rely on pedestrian flows from the surrounding streets. A depiction of these stalls is provided in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Bags and cell phone area in Midrand market
© Daniel (2016)
Compared to Midrand market, Bree market is much more mixed in nature. The only recognisable areas were the cooking areas and formal shops. Committee members in Bree market explained that there are two main reasons behind the mixed nature. The first reason is a lack of control from management. During the initial registration process traders have to indicate the product they intend on selling to be placed on the JPC records (JPC2, interview 2016). The official procedure for the changing of products after that is that traders have to write to the JPC indicating their intentions and to request approval (Johannesburg Property Company, undated). The main motivation for such adjustments is that the product is no longer profitable (MCM7, interview 2016). A committee member said that the JPC normally does not refuse such applications (ibid.). In spite of these procedures, two market stakeholders, however, reported that there is a lack of oversight from the JPC that results in traders selling what they want (MCM3&7, interviews 2016).

The second reason for the mixed nature of the markets was the influence of new traders entering the market with new products (MCM3, interview 2016). This necessitates existing traders to diversify their products to compete with the new traders. One of the main negative connotations associated with new traders entering was suggestions that Nigerian traders in Bree market conduct drug trade (MCM3, interview 2016). Despite such accusations, there was no mention made of tension in this regard.

It becomes apparent that trading within markets takes place across a wide range of products, but that these are not necessarily area based as originally intended. The diversification is the result of internal procedures not being implemented as they should, traders seeking the most viable location and an influx of new products through new traders. This sub-section now turns to the formal, informal classification of stalls.

4.4.2. BLURRED LINES BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL

Neither Midrand or Bree market are generally referred to as ‘informal markets’. Despite this, there are official distinctions between formal and informal traders in both markets. The main distinction is that formal stalls are much bigger than informal stalls, have permanent built structures and are located on the outskirts of the markets (MCM3, interview 2016). Formal stalls are, furthermore, charged a higher rent and must have their tax clearance and a bank account in place (JPC2, interview 2016). A JPC official explained the following regarding registration for informal stalls:

"For informal traders, the only documentation required for registration is a South African Identity Document or in the case of foreigners, a passport and work permit. The work permit has to be valid for three years based on the fact that the trader will sign a contract for 36 months... Informal food stalls are
also subject to certification from the Department of Health who visits the market from time to time to check if these documentations are in place” (JPC2, interview 2016).

In Bree market, the stalls located on the outside of the market apart from Sauer Street are all formal stalls. Midrand market has only one formal stall; a hair salon located on the third level.

Within the informal classification there are three types of stalls, mobile stalls, basic shelters and built structures. Of the three, the built structure is the most expensive and has lockable rolling shutters as illustrated in Figure 4.3.

![Figure 4.3: An informal stall in Bree market with lockable rolling shutter doors © Daniel (2016)](image)

The remaining two, stalls with basic shelter and mobile stalls require safe storage at night time. The research previously indicated that Bree market has formal storage facilities available on the third floor of the market. In Midrand market, there is no official provision made for the storage of traders’ goods. A JPC official said the reason for this is to avoid rodents and cockroaches entering the market (JPC2, interview 2016). The chairperson of the committee, nonetheless, explained the following:

“Since the traders have taken over the security of the market they have been storing their stuff within the market at night. Traders could not do this before because the contracted security guards would steal their stuff. They use to pay the surrounding shops to store their goods there at night” (MCM7, interview 2016).

Despite the official distinction between formal and informal stalls, informal traders do view their location in the market as a form of formalisation:

“Bree market is a mall, and we want to attract customers like in other malls” (MCM3, interview 2016).
“I thought that we were informal before moving into the market and that we are now formal traders” (MT2, interview 2016).

One can understand that there are administrative reasons for the binary approach to formal and informal traders in the markets. While this may be true, the manner in which a three-year lease agreement is considered informal is debatable. The fact that traders themselves do however consider themselves as formal should also be taken into consideration. Schindler argues that:

“The definition of ‘formality’ is not an objective classification, but rather it is produced in the course of negotiations and struggles among multiple interest groups. While the boundary between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ remains in a state of flux and is often blurry, the contestations over the definitions and delineation of these terms can have severe consequences as regulatory regimes can be (re)envisioned and enforced” (Schindler, 2014: 2609).

There was no indication of discrimination towards informal traders in the market, but it does provide a tool with which regulatory divisions can be implemented. The research did not explore the dynamics between formal and informal traders especially given that there was only one formal trader present in Midrand market. There is, however, scope to explore this topic further in a space such as Bree market where there are more formal traders located on the outskirts of the market. What would be of particular interest is to understand what steps, if any, are being taken to formalise traders considered as informal and to what extent formal traders are active in informal practices.

4.4.3. TRADING LICENCES AND RENTAL CALCULATIONS

Upon the establishment of the markets, preference in stall allocations was given to those already trading in the area (MCM1, interview 2016). These allocations and rental agreements were subject to negotiations between traders and the MTC. The negotiations were conducted by numerous street trading organisations as representatives of traders in both areas. A committee member in Bree market explained the process as follows:

“We argued that we did not pay any rent before moving into the market and that we need the payments to be low. We do not earn a lot of money. At first, the MTC wanted to charge us up to R900-00 per month. Through the negotiations, we were able to reduce the highest rent to R 600-00... Part of this agreement was that no trading would take place in the areas around the markets. They [the MTC and then JPC] did not keep to this part of the agreement, so we have stopped paying rent” (MCM3, interview 2016).

There are thus various contestations regarding the rental payments. The Public Transport Informal Traders House Rules state the following regarding the calculation of rentals:
“The rental amounts (including user fees by PTO’s [Public Transport Operators]) will be determined, after consultation with tenants from time to time by The Company. The Company must protect its (and its shareholder’s) legitimate business interests and therefore the final determination of rental rests with The Company. However, this will also take into account the emerging nature of the business of informal traders in the facilities” (Johannesburg Property Company, undated: 5).

In this regard, it is necessary to remember the previous comments by the former MTC CEO in which he indicated that the markets are subsidised. The statement above confirms that it is not possible to charge traders market-related prices.

The rent in both markets used to be collected by the JPC manager, but a new procedure is that traders have to go to the banks personally to deposit the money (JPC2, interview 2016; MT2, interview 2016). The JPC have developed posters to assist traders with the payment procedures. These posters were observed around the office of one of the managers (Figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: JPC posters indicating rental payment instructions to traders
© Daniel (2016)
With regards to the posters the JPC (2016: 125) stated in their mid-year report:

“They were designed in various languages to educate our external stakeholders about JPC processes as a means to eradicate fraudulent activities and to educate them on how to make deposits at a bank”.

Payments have therefore moved to a system where the market manager is no longer directly involved in the collection of rentals. The manager has the responsibility of following up with traders if and when they are not paying their rentals (as informed by the JPC). A market manager indicated these dynamics as follows:

“While I was collecting the money to deposit on behalf of traders, false accusations were made. Since I do not do this favour for them anymore, payments have become a mess. Traders will often put wrong reference numbers that will make the money go into suspense” (JPC2, interview 2016).

Such accusations regarding rental collections are not unknown. Gombay (1994) who wrote on Owino market in Uganda, Kampala (in which approximately 30 000 traders operate), describes instances where the authorities responsible for fees and rental collection have also been subject to much critique of fraudulent rent collections. Handing out of false receipts and paying money into the pockets of senior officials were part of the overall system (ibid.).

Regarding the actual amounts paid by traders, a trader in Bree market reported:

“Traders pay between R 90-00 and R 450-00 for different stalls. The most expensive of the rentals are the kitchen areas. But I do not want to talk about this because we are not paying rent.” (MT2, interview 2016).

In Midrand market, the chairperson of the market committee indicated that traders were still paying rent ranging from R 40-00 for a mobile stall to R 70-00 for a shelter and R 250 for a stall (MCM7, interview 2016). Despite this, a JPC official revealed that all but four traders, of which one is the formal stall owner, were in fact in arrears with their payments. A trader with a monthly rent of R 250-00 was as much as R 15 000-00 in arrears, and another with a monthly payment of R 40-00 was R 2 000-00 indebted (JPC2, interview 2016). The official procedure for when traders are in arrears was described as follows:

“The first step is to consult a councillor and agree on a new amount to be paid by the trader. This amount will cover the debt over time. If the traders do not keep to the agreement, they will be given three warnings before the JPC can evict them. To date, no traders have been evicted despite large arrears in payments. It is not easy to evict someone who does not earn a lot of money” (JPC2, interview 2016).

Rental agreements are also meant to increase each year, but this has not been implemented (JPC2, interview 2016). The statement above could be seen as illustrating a sensitivity towards traders’ level
of affordability. While this may be true, it could also show that the JPC is limited in the action they can take against traders as it could lead to protest action.

4.4.4. STALL_ALLOCATIONS

Since the establishment of the markets, the procedure for stall allocations has become quite ambiguous. After the initial allocation of stalls, a waiting list system was implemented (JPC2, interview 2016). In Midrand market, a committee member reported that traders are currently waiting for the JPC to allocate 40 vacant stalls (MCM5, interview 2016). A JPC official indicated that the waiting list has been on hold since 2014 as a result of a number of disputes taking place within the market (JPC2, interview 2016). While the waiting list is on hold, the JPC is not allowed to allow new or evict old traders (ibid.). I also observed several vacant stalls in the market. A committee member stated the following:

“A lot of the empty stalls are from traders who cannot afford to come to the market anymore. They are not making enough money, and illegal traders are stealing their business” (MCM7, interview 2016).

In Bree market, registered traders face the same financial challenges but with different outcomes. Instead of vacating their stalls, traders in Bree market sell or rent out their stalls (MCM3, interview 2016). These dynamics were described as follows:

“Traders rent out their stalls out of survival when they cannot afford to travel to the market or run their stalls. Even when traders know that the price they are getting will only feed them for six months, they will still sell their stall... Stall allocations is not done through a waiting list but by who has the money to buy out stall owners” (MCM3, interview 2016).

Subletting was also identified by the JPC as a major issue as described below:

"It [subletting] is a big problem, but there are property specialists who work under the managers. They go every day and check the stalls. Almost once a week in every market. They make sure that the person is there. If they find someone else is there, they will call the person whos stall it is, the owner and warn them that they know how it works and that there are house rules that they all know" (JPC1, interview 2016).

Despite this insistence of the JPC, a trader in Bree market indicated that the JPC does not control who is operating in the market and traders can, therefore, sublet their stalls (MCM3, interview 2016). I have also not witnessed anything of the sort, nor heard traders mention these inspections rounds. This system of unofficial occupation does, however, have negative consequences in the long run. Apart from traders on the waiting list losing out on their opportunity within the market, unregistered traders cannot participate in formal procedures such as elections. It could furthermore be argued that the
survivalist nature of markets is an overall indication of a lack of success. Traders are not earning enough to sustain, never mind expand their businesses.

4.5. CONCLUSION

Governance in both Midrand and Bree market have undergone similar developmental phases since their establishment. In the initial phases, market committees were established to represent the needs of traders and as an attempt to depoliticise market governance. Despite these attempts, trader organisations still play an influential role in the two markets under review. The market committees are both affiliated to SAITF and rely on their assistance and guidance. The market committee is, however, the officially recognised representative body with which authorities are willing to engage. Accordingly, it can be concluded that among the four participatory trader collectives, the market committee plays a central role with strong support from SAITF as a regional organisation. The management cooperatives serve, to a large extent, as the formalisation of the market committees to enable them to tender for management functions. Volunteers, on the other hand, are traders who give their time with the hope of receiving formal employment or financial compensation should management tenders be awarded to the cooperatives.

Across all three official collectives, membership was found to be quite ambiguous. SAITF as a regional organisation have claimed both Bree and Midrand market as affiliates. Their membership structure and the fact that the market committees are affiliated to them allow them to claim the market as an affiliate regardless of whether or not all traders support them. As described in this chapter and further elaborated in chapter five, some of the market committees’ members have been in place since the establishment of the collective. Additional members are irregular and not always elected according to official procedures. Cooperatives consist of either committee members or in the case of Midrand, volunteers. For a general trader to enter the governance structure, they would thus first have to operate as a volunteer to be able to enter one of the management cooperatives. Cooperative membership also carries a cost which could exclude many traders on the basis of affordability.

With regards to the broader institutional framework in which market governance is located, it becomes evident that although there is a set objective of improving the businesses and livelihoods of traders, it competes heavily with the authorities need to manage markets as self-sustaining facilities. Existing management models have proved to be unsustainable because of a lack of rental payments and arrears in markets. Management models are as a result currently being revisited to consider a partnership approach with traders to meet the set objectives. Although in a development phase,
chapter six discloses how different stakeholders envisage such a model and how it will lead to the empowerment of traders.

The section on general market governance illustrates that a general lack of oversight has led to informal methods of governing as well as issues of mismanagement. Traders as business people have utilised this negligence to arrange the market to best meet their own needs. As a result, the manner in which market committees participate in market governance has expanded beyond what was formally identified or which they were invited to do. Chapter five explores both the invited and invented spaces through which the different collectives participate in the governance of Midrand and Bree markets. Although descriptive, what is pivotal to take from this chapter is that a lack of adequate oversight could see markets derail from their initial intent. If formal agreements and even partnerships were to be considered in markets, oversight would be essential to ensure they do not result in opportunistic, self-enriching or even corrupt scenarios.
CHAPTER 5
POSSIBLE REFORMS IN MARKET GOVERNANCE THROUGH INVENTED SPACES OF PARTICIPATION

"The popularity of invited participation may have created many more seats at many more tables, but along with all the other costs that those who fill those seats have to pay, this may have further costs to democratic vitality. The challenge for community development is to be able to both enable those who take up these seats to exercise voice and influence and help provide whatever support is needed – material, moral and political – to popular mobilization that seeks to influence policy through advocacy rather than negotiation" (Cornwall, 2008: 282).

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Invited spaces of participation are the recognised platforms through which participation is intended to take place. From a normative perspective, these spaces should enable engagements beyond mere consultation, in which participants can meaningfully influence decision-making (Arnstein, 1969). While this may be true, such normative assertions are not necessarily shared by all. As a result, invited spaces of participation are often rendered dysfunctional. In the absence of an ability to influence decision-making through invited spaces, traders in Bree and Midrand markets have resorted to “invent” their own spaces of participation. Market committees and traders have mobilised to the effect that they have prohibited authorities from meeting their management objectives. This chapter analyses these events through the interests of those involved. Both the trader organisation and authorities have the potential to promote their own interests or that of traders. It is argued that the question rather becomes to which extent trader participation leads to mere market-driven dynamics.
The chapter is structured to first deliberate on the effectiveness of invited spaces of participation and factors influencing their functioning. It becomes apparent that relations between traders and the JPC are antagonistic which has a direct impact on the effectiveness of invited platforms. The context in which traders resorted to invented spaces of participation is then narrated. Section three reveals that trader mobilisation has had far-reaching consequences for the City’s approach to market governance (although much of this is still in process). This section further analyses the pivotal role SAITF as a regional organisation played in mobilising traders. It reveals how given a lack of confidence and the promise of empowerment, trader mobilisation has led to a strong case of “civic” and “neoliberal” governmentality across both markets. Before concluding the chapter, section four shows how domineering practices, the ability of the committees to confront authorities and a lack of oversight have led to attempts to replace or re-elect the committees under new, revisited regulatory frameworks.

5.2. INVITED SPACES OF PARTICIPATION

Traders currently participate in market governance mostly through the market committees and formal platforms such as general meetings. The official recognition of the market committees justifies them as an invited space of participation. The first subsection, therefore, provides an overview of trader participation in the election of these committees. The second sub-section turns to the efficiency of general meetings as one of the main invited platforms of participation utilised by the committees. It is within this context that the antagonistic relations that lead to a breakdown in invited communication channels are analysed.

5.2.1. TRADER PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTION OF MARKET COMMITTEES

The market committees were at the time of the research the collective intended to operate as representatives of traders, in their relationships with JPC. It can be regarded as one of the main participatory structures found in the markets. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse the manner in which traders participate in the election of the committees and their legitimacy among traders. Chapter four disclosed that some the existing committee members were elected based on their positions in the organisations that conducted the negotiations for the establishment of the markets. These members were thus elected according to their existing legitimacy among traders.

The normal procedures for the appointment of committee members are still through formal elections. Despite suggestions that elections are meant to take place every two or three years, this has not been the case. The last elections reported in both markets were in 2010 (SAITF1, interview 2016). Before these elections, the intervals for new elections were five years (MCM4&6, interviews 2016). The JPC
partly attributed the lack of elections to their merger with the MTC, which disrupted normal operations (JPC1, interview 2016). On the other hand, traders often indicate that they are happy with the existing committee and do not want to vote again (*ibid.*). When the responsible institution, the DED, was questioned regarding these irregularities, the following was communicated:

“There was no policy defined position that says the term of the committee should be two years or one year. The managers, as and when they felt necessary, or as and when the traders in the market would require it, would facilitate traders to elect themselves” (DED1, interview 2016).

The informal nature of these elections was justified on the basis that the committee membership is voluntary (DED1, interview 2016). It is, nonetheless, revealed further on in the chapter that the lack of oversight from the JPC and DED created the basis for various forms of contestation.

A committee member additionally reported that only three of the existing committee members in one of the markets were officially elected according to the JPC records (JPC2, interview 2016). A JPC official explained that when there are benefits connected to serving on the committee, numbers will straight away increase without official elections (JPC1, interview 2016). This was confirmed by a committee member in Bree market:

“The committee numbers have decreased from 22 to 7. Many of the earlier members thought there would be financial benefits for serving on the committee but gave up when they realised there are none” (MCM4, interview 2016).

The previous chapter similarly described such inconsistencies in numbers based on financial benefits within the volunteer groups. The former MTC CEO, in fact, attributed the irregularities in elections as something brought forward by the committees and not the MTC or DED:

“At first the elections were postponed by ambitious leadership, in order to serve their interest rather than that of their constituency. However, through robust engagement, there was a change of attitude to allow for greater democracy. It should be noted that this was a point of contentions with the traders’ associations. They wanted to influence the process so that it has their endorsements. In my view, this was a politicisation of management function and as a result it lost its intended purpose. Because of this political interference, the recycling of the same leaders became the order of the day.... There were those first committees that were elected when MTC was still new, these saw themselves as the “old guards” and were resistant to be removed. Their popular tactics were to bring in the associations to fight for them. As a result, they would divert attention from themselves and use a trivial matter as a big stumbling block. For instance, the Bree Metro Mall Committee, even the Midrand Committee have used any trick available to them to object to fresh elections being conducted. For instance, one of their favourite tactics is to claim
corruption by the official in charge of the facility without producing evidence to their claims” (MTC1, interview 2016).

At several instances during the research, counter accusations of corrupt activities by market committees and managers were heard. These allegations should nonetheless be approached with caution. I was in fact warned by one committee that the market manager would contradict everything they tell me. Upon meeting the market manager, he gave me the same warning about the committee. In Bree market, there were accusations that the committee is, in fact, working together with the market manager in such activities:

“Because the JPC offices are located in the market, the committee meets officials on a daily basis that allows opportunity for bad business. The committee often meets with the management and tells them everything they discuss in meetings with SAITF. The officials keep the committee in the loop regarding tenders. There used to be corruption in the allocation of stalls where the committee will get kickbacks. I [SAITF General Secretary] have asked them to stop this” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

In Bree market, there were also suggestions that drugs were being sold in the one section of the market (MCM3, interview 2016). For these drug traders to operate in the market, there is no doubt that market management and committee would be involved, at least for their tolerance of these activities. As the committees are not intended to receive any financial benefits for their positions, the possible financial kickbacks from such activities could to a certain extent explain why committee members would want to hold on to their positions.

The opinion of traders regarding the accusations described above could not be obtained during the fieldwork. It is consequently difficult to assess whether the dominant and manipulative behaviour identified really exists. The majority of traders interviewed in Midrand market did not voice any grievances with the market committee, as described in Box 5.1.

**Box 5.1: Observations made while interviewing traders in Midrand market**

On the day scheduled to interview traders in Midrand market, the fieldwork assistant was not available. The decision was made to continue with the interviews as this was an opportunity I could not miss. Throughout the day, I was accompanied by the committee chairperson and another committee member. They indicated that they would accompany me in the absence of the fieldwork assistant. I was not sure if this was really the reason or if they preferred being present. Their presence also made it possible for them to identify the traders I was to engage with. I had to be very careful not to offend them. I could converse with most interviewees in English. Although the two committee members would from time to time walk away, it never gave me sufficient time to ask traders questions relating to the committee. If I asked such questions in the presence of the committee, traders straight away indicated that they were happy with the committee.

To what extent these dynamics influenced the outcomes cannot be said. During the interviews, traders were, however, very positive about the committee and mostly spoke to me about their complaints being storage
As described in chapter two, the interviews in Midrand market did not take place in an ideal context. It is also not known if traders would have responded differently had the committee not been present. It is further unknown what the opinion of other traders might be.

In Bree market, limited interaction with traders took place, but one trader described the committee as follows:

“The last election was in 2007. The people on the committee are like Mugabe; they do not want to step down. Traders feel that they do not have a committee anymore” (MT2, interview 2016).

Based on these limitations the research is not in a position to make any statement on manipulative behaviour or abuse of power. The research does nonetheless want to use this example to illustrate that what is regarded as official representation in the markets have not been subject to formal democratic procedures, and this might be the basis for various contestations, from management or from discontent traders in particular. However, despite the accusations of dominance and manipulation, there is a real possibility that the current committees could once again be endorsed by traders. These dynamics are analysed further in the chapter.

5.2.2. ANTAGONISTIC RELATIONS AFFECTING FORMAL COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES

With regards to meetings as an invited space of participation, general meetings, in particular, are the communication platform through which traders are given an opportunity to participate directly in market governance. It is a platform where feedback is provided on issues raised at previous meetings and traders are provided with an opportunity to provide new inputs (JPC2, interview 2016). A JPC official provided the following details regarding these procedures:

“The general meetings are intended to take place every fortnight. The market committee and I (JPC official) would normally meet before a general meeting to discuss the issues raised at the previous meeting as well as the response of the JPC. I am at all times to work through the market committee as representatives of the traders. Flyers would then be sent out to announce the meeting. Issues such as rental agreements, illegal traders and fighting can often be found on these meeting agenda” (JPC2, interview 2016).

These general meetings procedures, in Midrand market, were found to be subject to the context and politics of the market. A committee member described the arrangements of these meetings as follows:
“The market is so small that there is no need to arrange meetings in advance. When problems arise, the committee will first meet internally to see if it is possible to resolve the issue. If this is not possible, they will go around the market inviting registered traders to attend a general meeting” (MCM7, interview 2016).

Another committee member indicated that meetings could take place two to three times a week or none for a whole month (MCM2, interview 2016). Two committee members described trader attendance to general meetings as follows:

“Sometimes there [at a general meeting] will be many traders, sometimes there won’t. The main reason is that traders cannot leave their stalls unattended” (MCM2, interview 2016).

"Traders want money and can’t look after their business when in meetings” (MCM6, interview 2016).

Some traders confirmed that they would get someone to look after their stalls to attend meetings (MT6,8&11 interviews 2016). A JPC official gave the following opinion regarding meeting procedures:

"General meetings are not structured and too long. They [market committee] need to keep it short. Traders will leave after an hour – they cannot leave their stalls... Sometimes only ten people will show up at the meetings” (JPC2, interview 2016).

At various points during the fieldwork, I requested to attend the general meetings in both markets. After several cancellations, upon a visit to Midrand market the committee chairperson invited me to a meeting scheduled for that day. The meeting was arranged the previous day to make the necessary arrangements for a trader that passed away suddenly. My observations during the particular meeting are described in Box 5.2.

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**Box 5.2: Observations of general meeting procedures**

The meeting was held in the larger of the two boardrooms located on the second level of the market. There was a table at the front of the room around which committee members sat. Other traders brought in chairs on which they sat or took a place on the floor. The meeting was held on a day when I was not accompanied by the fieldwork assistant. It was too short notice to invite him in time. Despite this limitation, I still attended the meeting. I could, as a result, make some broad observations that were limited to understanding the context of the discussions. The chairperson only translated the main topics of discussion to me.

The meeting was chaired by the market committee chairperson and consisted of three parts. The first component was a meeting with all the traders that lasted for approximately 45 minutes. At the beginning of this meeting, there were roughly 17 traders – a number that increased to 30 as the meeting progressed. The main point on the agenda during this part was the funeral arrangements of the trader that passed away. The second leg of the meeting was between the committee and volunteers which lasted for an hour. Approximately 15 of the traders who were present in the first meeting remained as volunteers. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss a sit-in they were planning at the JPC the following day. The JPC had indicated that they would start paying volunteers for the services they have provided, but had not delivered on this. SAITF, committee members and three volunteers from different markets were, therefore, planning a sit-in at the JPC offices. It was necessary to identify three volunteers during this meeting to accommodate the
committee. The final leg of the meeting was between committee members only. The market manager was not present at any time.

As the meeting reduced in size, more dissatisfaction was revealed. At the beginning when all the traders were present there were barely any objections. The atmosphere was quite formal. From there it was a meeting between the committee and the volunteers. Here two volunteers voiced their objections at length. Another trader indicated to me that the main objective was that the volunteers want to know what will happen to them if security shows up at the JPC. During the last stage of the meeting, when it was only the committee a full-blown argument between the members took place. They were not holding back in my presence and were even screaming at a point. They were also not concerned that traders walking past could probably hear them. After approximately 30 minutes, I was dismissed from the meeting although they still continued afterwards.

During the first two parts of the meeting, there was a definite meeting structure in place and people were respectful of each other. This could be due to my presence as I have previously been informed that traders are very vocal in the general meetings. An attendance register was sent around for all the traders to sign. The secretary read the meeting agenda to all traders at the beginning of the meeting which included the funeral discussions, the sit-in they were planning at the JPC and also general matters. There was a copy of the minutes of the previous meeting with DED which the chairperson made reference to. No minutes were taken during the particular meeting. During this week alone the committee had three meetings to attend of which two required them to travel to the Johannesburg CBD. The general meeting in itself took up nearly half of a day.

(Notes from fieldwork taken at a General Meeting on 28 September 2016)

It is evident that there are formal meeting structures in place despite the irregularity of general meetings. I was informed later that the planned sit-in did not take place (MCM7, interview 2016). What was, however, interesting is the overlap between what is considered invited and invented in this instance. The market committee utilises meeting procedures approved and supported by the JPC and DED to mobilise traders. The absence of the market manager makes this a possibility. The committee itself also becomes a form of invented spaces of participation.

The conflict between the committee members could not be explored in detail. The scenario that played out at the meeting described above was, nonetheless, particularly interesting as not long before that I was told by the chairperson that there were no tensions among the committee members (MCM7, interview 2016).

The absence of the market manager is a matter of concern. It became apparent that there is a general breakdown in communication between the market committees and the managers in both markets. Committee members reported that managers feel threatened that the committees might take over their positions (Bree committee, interview 2016; JPC2, interview 2016). As a result, they are suspected of spreading false rumours in an attempt to dissolve the committees (ibid.). In contrast to this, the one manager argued:

“I refrain from engaging the market committees or general meetings because I have to protect myself and my family. I do not know what the committee members are capable of” (JPC2, interview 2016).
The research further found that there is a general disinterest from the JPC towards one market manager as he communicated in the following narrative:

"I found that a mother and her two-year-old sons were sleeping in the market. I considered calling social workers but realised they would only take the son away, and I will be made out to be a bad person. I reported the case to the JPC, but they have not given me any feedback. The boy has spent the whole winter in this cold market... The JPC head office only communicates to me via email and could take up to three months to respond on urgent matters... They sometimes neglect to inform and include me in meetings between the JPC, DED and traders in the market. I am also not informed on budgetary issues that create a gap in my knowledge of what is being managed... We [managers] are the soldiers on the ground; I do not understand why management does not talk to us first to get what is happening in the market" (JPC2, interview 2016).

In a discussion with one of the JPC officials in head office, it was indicated they do meet with managers on a regular basis but that these processes have been subject to a process of realigning and restructuring over the last eight months (JPC1, interview 2016). This has prohibited normal procedures from taking place and issues that may arise are thus rather addressed on a case by case basis (ibid.). The market managers themselves consequently have limited capability to contribute meaningfully to market governance or promote trader participation.

Although intermittent, meetings between traders and the broader JPC and DED are another important invited space of participation. These meetings only take place when issues cannot be resolved within markets as was the case with traders’ demands for management positions. During the fieldwork, it became apparent that the JPC does not communicate such meetings clearly in advance. In Midrand market, the market committee chairperson was constantly seeking the guidance of SAITF as to if and when meetings are taking place. Meetings would continually get postponed or cancelled at the last minute. This, in turn, had a direct impact on internal meetings in the markets as these had to be postponed or cancelled to accompany the broader meetings. I attended one broader meeting which is described in Box 5.3. This is the same meeting described in chapter two from which I was dismissed.

**Box 5.3: Observations of procedures at a meeting between traders and the DED**

The procedures I had time to observe before being asked by the Deputy Director to leave the room were, unfortunately, minimal. Upon my arrival, I did observe an endorsement letter being sent around stating “Formalisation of Market Committee”. It was also clear that the market was open and operating during the meeting.

(Notes from fieldwork taken at a meeting between the DED, JPC and Bree market traders on 14 September 2016)
Having the market open at the time of the meeting would mean that all the traders could not attend. Similar to general meetings there are improvements with regards to attendance, the length of meetings and regularity that can be made to recover the efficiency of these invited spaces of participation. One should nonetheless not be too normative when assessing meeting structures. It could be that traders do not want to be subject to regular meetings given the nature of their businesses. Committee members are positioned across the markets with whom traders can engage without sacrificing time in a meeting. Meetings are however the only platform through which traders can communicate with different state structures. Whether such participation, in fact, leads to any substantial change is the next issue that needs to be assessed.

5.2.3. A CORRELATION BETWEEN UNRESPONSIVENESS AND TRADER MOBILISATION

Traders have for a long time been voicing their complaints through invited spaces such as meetings and market committee members. It is necessary to reflect on some of the main complaints of traders and what steps have been taken to address these. It becomes discernible that invited spaces of participation do not serve the normative purpose they are intended for.

During a number of interviews with traders in Midrand market, the main complaint raised was a lack of adequate shelter that exposes them to natural elements such as sun and rain (MCM1,2,5,6&7, interviews 2016; MT6,7,8,11,12,13 interviews 2016). Drainage, water provision and storage were further reported as significant challenges but to a lesser extent than the lack of adequate shelter (MCM1, interview 2016; MT7,8&11 interviews 2016). On a typical working day, a cooking lady explained that she has the following expenditures:

“I have to pay for gas which gives me a bad cough because of bad circulation. I have to buy ice blocks because we have no fridges. I have to pay for shelter (canvas sheets, tents or gazebos). Then I have to pay for workers to assist with putting up the shelter and to fetch water. I have to pay rent for storage outside of the market and someone to deliver and fetch my stuff with a trolley every day. I also have to pay for transport. Then on top of these, we are expected to pay rent to the JPC. So, we might have a lot of money in the morning, but by the afternoon all our costs have taken most of it. I often go home with only R 100-00 or R 200-00” (MT6, interview 2016).

Figure 5.1 provides two examples of stalls in the cooking area where traders have to construct their protective shelter around the existing infrastructure.
Traders in Bree market are located within the rank building and therefore enjoy better protection. Poor visibility, however, impacts negatively on many businesses (MT2, interview 2016). Figure 5.2 provides an example of the Bree market structure.
Figure 5.2: Bree market viewed from the outside
© Daniel (2016)

It can be seen that the stalls located on the outside of the market are the only visible stalls. Stalls located on the inside of the market on level one and two, have no visibility to outside pedestrian and traffic flow. On the inside of the market, visibility is also restricted to commuters using the rank. These physical differences contribute to the main complaint of traders in Bree market rather being around what traders refer to as “illegal traders” taking their businesses (Bree committee, 2016; MT1, interview 2016). The Bree market committee (interview 2016) argued that since the municipality did not keep to the agreement that no street trading will take place in the area surrounding the market, illegal street traders who enjoy better visibility are stealing the business of those located inside the market. They are also said to not only be selling in the vicinity but also coming into the market offering cheap but poor quality products to take customers (ibid.). A cooking lady in Bree market describes the situation as follows:

“Conducting business in the market is not lucrative anymore. It has become a hand to mouth situation. At times, I cannot even anymore afford to pay the rent where I am living. I think a contributing factor is outside people who are also trying to make a living... There is just generally a struggle to survive” (MT2, interview 2016).

Such complaints were resonated in Midrand market but were not the main complaint of the traders (MCM1, interview 2016). In stark contrast to the manner in which traders view the issue, a JPC official claimed that the market committee is, in fact, responsible for the illegal trading:
“When I confront illegal traders, they state that they have paid money to the market committee to operate in the market” (JPC2, interview 2016).

Such opposing views between the market committee and management were frequently heard.

With regards to solving complaints such as these, a committee member explained that despite having complaint procedures in place, the market committee has limited power (MCM5, interview 2016). In Midrand market in particular complaints regarding the drains, shelter and outside traders have been raised to the JPC multiple times without any response (MCM1&6, interviews 2016). Another committee member communicated that due to the lack of response from the JPC they do not consult them anymore; they rather solve problems themselves (MCM2, interview 2016).

Concerning the link between funding and the lack of basic service provision in Midrand market, a JPC official gave the following response:

“I told them that there is no budget. Traders are not paying their fees, so there is no budget. I told them that they could have had solutions long ago if they would pay their rent” (JPC2, interview 2016).

When the same question was posed to a higher level JPC official he indicated that although the blame cannot completely be placed on traders, there are funding issues:

“We [the JPC] provide water, electricity (in some instances) and public toilet facilities that we maintain. This is a costly process. Traders do not really keep the facilities in the state that they should. The JPC cannot really hold them responsible or shift the blame onto them. The current collective system is not very effective; they do not collect 100% of what they should every month. You cannot really say that the income of what is collected should be used to fix the facilities because this is not feasible. Collections are not taking place as they should. Even when they do collect, the repairs costs are enormous, broken taps, blocked toilets, etc. It is something that cannot really be controlled” (JPC1, interview 2016).

Within both these statements, it becomes perceptible that the JPC views the lack of service provision as an issue of funding from traders. This argument is, however, interesting when taking into consideration that the MTC model (prior to the JPC) was not based on ring-fenced revenue for each market. Chapter four described how rentals are charged 80% below market value (MTC1, interview 2016). The sustainable management of markets are therefore dependent on the incoming revenue stream (rentals), subsidies and also on the budget allocated to each facility according to the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. In support of the statement above the former MTC CEO stated the following:
“It goes without saying that rental received from traders is woefully inadequate... Moreover, both facilities (Bree and Midrand markets) owed the CoJ millions of Rands in outstanding rentals” (MTC1, interview 2016).

A big contribution to this backlog seems to be, however, the taxi industry:

“The biggest problem with CoJ facilities is lack of commitment to pay. The two main users of these facilities are taxi operators and informal traders. The debate over payment by taxi operators has failed dismally. Taxi associations are refusing to pay for using the facilities. The CoJ leadership was not prepared to support MTC on its quest to engage the national department of transport to subsidise the taxi industry. Until today that topic is taboo to mention” (MTC1, interview 2016).

These statements prove the failures of the current funding model in markets. It is difficult to determine whether it was the JPC not delivering services that resulted in traders abstaining from paying their fees or the opposite. In both instances, a lack of rental payments and service delivery has become a way to evade responsibility by traders and the JPC. This, in turn, has contributed to the inefficiency of invited spaces of participation. As a result, traders have no choice but to resort to invented spaces of participation.

5.3. INVENTED SPACES OF PARTICIPATION AND CASES OF GOVERNMENTALITY

Invented spaces of participation allow traders to mobilise and confront authorities directly. This section investigates two significant forms of mobilisation that took place in the markets. One took place since the early establishment of the markets and the other since 2014. The mobilisation that took place can to a large extent be attributed to the strong presence of a regional organisation. This section reflects on these dynamics as well as the possible interests a trader organisation could have in such mobilisation efforts. An argument for a case of civic governmentality between SAITF and traders is made.

5.3.1. TRADER MOBILISATION PLACING NEW MANAGEMENT MODELS ON THE TABLE

The first form of mobilisation that altered market governance discourses was the decision by traders to desist from paying rent in the markets. Such mobilisation took place soon after the establishment of both markets. The original objective was to force the JPC to come to the party regarding service and infrastructure delivery as well as the removal of illegal street traders. This decision coincided with similar mobilisation efforts from the taxi industry which as a result had far-reaching consequences beyond the initial intent (MTC1, interview 2016). The mobilisation contributed to a failure in the funding model of both the MTC and JPC as management agents.
The second form of mobilisation that had extensive consequences for market governance is the blocking of service providers in both markets. Traders resorted to such tactics in 2014 under the guidance of SAITF (MCM3, interview 2016). The main motivation for these demands was that traders are in a better position to fulfil such functions (SAITF1, interview 2016). The final decision to mobilise was described as follows:

“They knew that in June 2014 the current contracts of service providers were running out so in May 2014 they approached the JPC with their proposal to take over functions in the market. They then started volunteering in the markets and blocked service providers from entering. They knew there was budget because the JPC was going to appoint new service providers” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

When questioned on how traders succeeded in blocking the service providers a committee member responded “I am not scared; I literally chased them away” (MCM2, interview 2016). Limited detail could be obtained regarding the actual steps taken to prevent service providers from entering as most respondents only stated that they physically “blocked” the service providers from entering (MCM3&7, interviews 2016). In May 2016, another opportunity opened for trader cooperatives or other companies to tender for cleaning and security functions within both markets (MCM3, interview 2016). Traders were under the impression that the positions would be awarded to them, only to learn in July 2016 that the tenders were once again awarded to external private companies (MCM3&7, interviews 2016). They once more blocked the service providers from entering the markets.

A JPC official also narrated how the market committees and SAITF would similarly confront the JPC directly at their offices:

"It is going to be frustrating for the traders and JPC for a while. Traders will feel that they are not getting what they bargained for and we need to get this done as soon as possible. Almost every week they are here. Twenty or thirty of them walking into the offices wanting to have meetings. We are not in a position where we like what we are doing, but we have to do it to get the best results” (JPC1, interview 2016).

The process referred to is the developing of the new management model by the DED and JPC. The sensitive nature of developing the proposed models requires time and consideration. It is this timeous process that the JPC official feels traders would not necessarily have patience with.

When asked how the JPC respond to such measures taken by traders the following was said:

“There is nothing you can do when traders block markets or refuse to pay rent. You do not want it to turn violent... We want the best for the traders. It is their facility at the end of the day. If they damage it or they block people from going in there, they are actually stopping their businesses. There is not much you can do. You can’t enforce the law as such. It is a different game” (JPC1, interview 2016).
Mobilisation against rental payments and the blockage of service providers did, however, succeed in pressurising authorities to bring new management models into consideration. As senior JPC official explained: “this [blockage of service providers] is what propelled them to start looking at a partnership model” (JPC1, interview 2016). The DED Deputy Director for Informal Trading further explained this decision as follows:

“The users of the facilities are meant to pay rental according to the model. Users of the facilities are so poor; they are not paying rentals to the municipality. They are arguing that the services offered by the municipalities are not up to standard, they would want to conduct the services themselves, they want to be involved in the management models of the future. Hence, we are receptive to the call, but we are trying to work out a fifty-fifty model that would also not compromise the municipality because overall the municipality is still responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the facilities. We have to bring the users to the party. We are working on that model” (DED1, interview 2016).

This statement, to a certain extent, elucidates the entanglement between neoliberalisation and participation. Although neoliberalisation promulgates participation, the latter has been minimal until traders pressurised authorities through invented spaces of participation outside of the normative assertions of invited spaces. As chapter six further deliberates, the authorities are in part receptive to this call in the manner that it could contribute to self-sustaining facilities. The JPC and DED’s cost-cutting objectives could thus lead to enhanced participation practices. As a result, the proposed new management approach could be an attempt to recreate a functional invited space of participation. This supports the work of Brenner and Theodore (2002) who argue for neoliberalisation as an ongoing process. The process has the inherent potential to deepen democracy across the city space.

In the absence of these invented spaces of participation, authorities could have continued appointing private companies to perform these services. A case study of Parkyard market in Kampala showed that the state is in a position to pressurise private companies to prioritise revenue objectives above others (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). The authorities in Kampala were able to succeed in such tactics in the absence of a strong organisational presence in Parkyard market (ibid.). This could, in turn, lead to the other possibility Brenner and Theodore (2002:377) identifies for neoliberalisation in that it could lead to the “crystallization of still leaner and meaner urban geographies in which cities engage aggressively in mutually destructive place-marketing policies... and in which the power of urban citizens to influence the basic conditions of their everyday lives is increasingly undermined”. Trader organisations, therefore, play a fundamental role in democratising neoliberalisation. Whether the management models they are demanding will lead to enhanced participatory practices remains to be seen, but their fundamental role in the process cannot be denied.
5.3.2. A SUPPORTING TRADER ORGANISATION AND THEIR OWN INTERESTS

The main objective of SAITF for markets is “to empower traders and create one millionaire per region” (SAITF1, interview 2016). SAITF does, however, have other interests in seeing traders’ mobilisation for management positions succeed. The formalisation of the committees and their appointment as service providers is something SAITF has been working towards for a long time. Bénit-Gbaffou provides an overview of what is at stake for trader organisations if such models should be implemented:

“This [attempts of self-management models] reflects a desire to better respond to traders’ needs, and possibly a way of claiming citizenship, or a ‘right to the city’ – both in terms of place, recognition and legitimation as traders, and in terms of collective appropriation of space and claimed entitlement to decide on the local governance rules in ways that could reflect what Castells has framed, for other types of movements, as struggles for collective consumption and political self-determination. It is also a practical way to brand a space of authority and unify membership in that specific trading space, a means of raising organisational funding through a levy that a formal partnership or a delegation by the City would render compulsory” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016: 21).

It becomes apparent that “self-management” could address some of the challenges trader organisations are faced with. It could among others cancel out the political and membership competition in a given area, aid in financial difficulties and provide an opportunity to establish their legitimacy among outside parties. With regards to the levy Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) refers to, chapter six reveals that there is no guarantee of such. The main reason for this is that any formal arrangement will be between the DED and traders in the markets (DED1, interview 2016). This could be through their committees or cooperatives but not the broader organisations. Funding towards SAITF will consequently have to be based on an agreement between them and the appointed entity as one committee member explained:

“We have not sat down yet and talked about what SAITF will get from the tenders. But we must think to ourselves he does this and this, he works hard, let’s give him something” (MCM5, interview 2016).

Taken in the context of this research, the concept of “self-management” should be approached with caution. Chapter six explains that SAITF does not want traders to take over the overall management of the markets. They rather want access to certain revenue streams through the provision of services (SAITF1, interview 2017). There was limited mention towards such approaches as partnership management although this is what it could entail (rather than self-management per se). Both the authorities and SAITF referred to the new models being created as a “management models” (DED1, interview 2016; MTC1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). Such simplified references could avoid any preconceived ideas of what the final model could represent.
Returning to the analysis of trader organisation’s interests in management models, the SAITF General Secretary indicated the following:

“Coming from an outside sector I have found that the leadership in the [informal] sector is very lazy and it is often only about money. I saw that something that was lacking is programmes that SAITF pushes. There are a lot of organisations but very little programmes to support traders. The DED and other departments all have programmes for small businesses that traders should be able to tap in. I saw a loophole with this. I have told the SAITF leadership that NGOs like Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa (SERI) can get outside sponsors because they have programmes. I am pushing hard for programmes, and SAITF has told me to run with the market programme” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

If SAITF could secure outside sponsors through such programmes, it would provide them with financial security. There is thus no doubt that SAITF has its own interests in seeing the effort succeed. This is without implying in any sense that such a self-interest is detrimental to traders. Organisations should have goals and ambitions especially in a competitive environment such as Johannesburg. The question rather becomes: to what extent will these interests meet those of traders?

5.3.3. ORGANISATIONAL SUPPORT LOCATED IN GOVERNMENTALITY

Governmentality is the process in which power structures and their rhetoric become internalised. Certain norms are not questioned anymore and accepted as natural. Roy (2009) applies the notion of governmentality to the role of civil organisations in formulating her theory on civic governmentality. Civil organisations take on a dual role in which they balance the development agendas of government against the needs of the people they represent (ibid.). They are the mediator or broker between the two groupings and therefore situated to develop a form of “civic governmentality”. Organisations can, on the one hand, be at the receiving end of governmentality from the state. They can, on the other hand, be the power structure shaping the conduct of the civil society they represent. The latter case was found to hold more relevance in the markets under review. This subsection describes how civic governmentality between SAITF and the market committees and also between the committees and traders were evident.

To elucidate the case of civic governmentality towards traders, the observations made during a meeting between SAITF and different market committees are first provided (Box 5.4).

**Box 5.4: Observations at a meeting between SAITF and market committees**
The meeting was held at SERI’s offices in Braamfontein. The SAITF General Secretary chaired the meeting and apologised profoundly for starting late. He clearly stated that he did not want to waste traders’ time and that the meeting will be adjourned by 13:00. An attendance register was circulated, and a SAITF member who arrived later took minutes during the meeting.
The purpose of the meeting and main issue on the agenda was for the market committees from Midrand, Bree, Baragwanath and Yeoville markets (Bree market committee did not attend the meeting although they were invited) to report back to the SAITF General Secretary on what transcended in meetings held with a DED official during his absence the previous week. These meetings had special reference to the ongoing formalisation process of committees. Each committee had to submit a report to SAITF General Secretary indicating any issues that accrued at these meetings. The SAITF General Secretary wanted to follow up on these reports, since none of them indicated any issues, and he considered this impossible. During the meeting, the manner in which the SAITF leader spoke to the committee members was a bit disturbing. If traders deviated from the main topic, he would interrupt them abruptly, ignoring everything they have said and repeat the question if they were happy with what the DED official did. The traders clearly had many grievances, but the SAITF leader ignored these and said some of them are personal matters that will still be resolved at another time. Due to language barriers, I could not understand what the particular issues raised were. He indicated that he was only there to understand what the DED official did. The manner in which this meeting was conducted could also be because the General Secretary did not want to waste time on issues not relevant to the immediate problem and that he knows committee members can deviate from the point. It is often necessary to differentiate between strategic and non-strategic issues.

When asked during the meeting if the committee members were happy with DED official’s conduct, they agreed that they were. The General Secretary then brought forward a certain incident he heard occurred during the meeting to illustrate that the official’s conduct was not acceptable. The JPC official was asking the committee members for information he should be obtaining from the JPC. The General Secretary said that he is doing this to prolong other ongoing processes. After providing this example, he pushed traders to admit that the conduct of the JPC official was not acceptable.

(Notes from fieldwork taken at a meeting between the SAITF and market committees on 21 September 2016)

Despite the authoritative manner in which the General Secretary conducted the meeting described above, it also came across as a way for him to contribute to traders’ political learning. During an interview with the General Secretary, it was confirmed that part of his objective is to train traders in meeting procedures (SAITF1, interview 2016). The manner in which he influenced their view of the DED official’s conduct, however, needs to be analysed. On the one hand, it could stem from his belief that they lack the necessary confidence as described below:

“For a long time, these traders have just been made to believe they are nobody without any voice. It is difficult to get them to believe in themselves and give them confidence” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

Traders could, therefore be too intimidated or lack the necessary knowledge to know when an official’s conduct is not acceptable. Assisting traders to develop confidence in such situations could be directly linked to what Williams (2004) identifies as the development of political capabilities. These capabilities should enable traders to confront the authorities directly to among others, secure resources and change the rules of the game. While this may be true, the confrontational approach of SAITF is in many instances legitimised by the misconduct of authorities. They, therefore, need to identify such conduct and have traders support them. If traders were to be pleased with the conduct of the DED, SAITF would not have leverage to pressurise the institution with.
During this particular meeting, a striking remark was made by the General Secretary of SAITF which illustrates the manner in which he is shaping their conduct:

“You [committee members] must only observe at meetings and not give any reaction. I had reports back from Bree market that the Yeoville and Midrand market committees spoke up at the formalisation meetings. People were saying that SAITF is not doing this or that. I do not want committee members commenting. You are meant to be quiet at these meetings and only observe. Other things can be discussed outside of public meetings.... If committee members go “YES” or “NO” at these meetings, it could be taken the wrong way. You should rather be quiet because it could also intimidate other traders” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

This statement once again opens different lines of analysis. On the one hand, it could be argued that SAITF is dominating the conduct of the committees. On the other, it can be reasoned that SAITF is aware of the authority’s ability to use divide and rule tactics. SAITF therefore wants to educate traders on such tactics and ensure they present a unified front at meetings. There is, perhaps, a need for SAITF to dedicate more time to build unity among traders before such meetings. SAITF has the potential to develop the political capabilities of traders but taking the example of the meeting described above there is a need to be more pro-active. The particular meeting, furthermore, took place at a time when SAITF was convinced that the formalisation and appointment of trader cooperatives would take place soon. It can be reasoned that it was subsequently crucial for market committees to work according to SAITF’s instructions and ensure the appointment is not jeopardised.

Taking the meeting as an example of how discourses and norms are communicated to traders, the following comment illuminates the manner in which traders have internalised SAITF’s approach to market management:

“All must benefit if we get the tender. The General Secretary of SAITF will come up with a model of how to do this. We need to, therefore, tell him everything that is going on in the market. Who is doing what, complaints, etc. He also comes to meet with all the traders. The committee will talk to the traders, and then he [SAITF General Secretary] will come and iron everything out, the creases. We will rather talk through him as a person, SAITF is the umbrella. We have a lot of respect for him. He is a very intelligent person. He is pushing us very hard” (MCM7, interview 2016).

The market committees rely significantly on the support of the SAITF General Secretary for guidance. The committees have become implementation agents of SAITF under the promise that what they are mobilising for would lead to the empowerment of traders. A committee member indicated that:

“I am getting tired but hopeful things will get better soon” (MCM4, interview 2016).
Committee members also stand to gain financially if positions should be awarded to them. In this regard, the governmentality materialising within these relations also becomes a form of neoliberal governmentality.

Neoliberal governmentality reflects a scenario in which traders will accept themselves as economic agents with the objective of maximising profit. An example of neoliberal governance in partnership schemes is described by Miraftab:

“The partnership scheme legitimizes and enforces the larger exploitative systems of capitalism and patriarchy by internalizing them at the local level. It celebrates local entrepreneurs’ ability to multiply their earnings as their “developed sense of business”, but that “business sense” consists of internalizing the exploitative relations of capitalism to keep wages low and reduce what the workers take home—e.g. by deducting from workers’ monthly pay their purchase of on-site cooked meals or by imposing fines for being late or absent” (Miraftab 2004b: 250).

In the particular case study, the efforts of volunteer waste collectors were abused by the authorities to meet their own cost-cutting objectives (Miraftab, 2004b). The following statements from the SAITF General Secretary elucidate the manner in which he is shaping traders as economic agents:

“I told traders that they will not earn money straight away and that this is part of the struggle. I used Mandela as an example who had to go to jail for 27 years as part of the struggle” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

“Some even wanted to stop trading and go sit in an office [when awarded management positions]. I told them you are not security guards; you are business people. There is not a thing of just having one job. You cannot make money just selling a tomato. You need to take this, and in five years’ time, you can register a company and bid for tenders” (SAITF1, interview 2017).

The research thus far has shown that there are affordability issues across both markets. In such a context, the ambition of SAITF is much needed and could lead to an improvement in trader’s lives. At the same time, there is a risk that these business sentiments could be at the expense of others. If it should lead to higher rent or elitist structures, many traders could be disadvantaged. The following chapter provides more details on how the management model proposed by SAITF is aimed at maximising profit.

Where the committees can be considered as the inner circle within which these forms of governmentality are perceptible, traders and volunteers represent an additional outer circle. The levels of governmentality transpiring in the markets similarly exist between the market committees and traders, particularly those volunteering. The volunteers have been co-opted into the vision the market committees have accepted for management in the markets. In both markets, it was
communicated that volunteers are happy to give their time knowing that if the tenders were awarded, they would benefit from it (BV1, 2016; MCM3, 4&5 interviews 2016; MT11, interview 2016). Accounts such as the following were given in support:

“They are not currently getting any compensation for this. If they should be awarded the tender, this will change” (MCM5, interview 2016).

“Do it freely, one day rewarded” (MCM3, interview 2016).

“Volunteering is a full-time job. There are two teams of volunteers working from seven to five or eight till six at night. The deal is that if the tender should be awarded to the committee, these volunteers will receive first preference to be appointed” (BV1, 2016).

“I have been here since I was young and now I am old. It is time they pay us. This is our rank; we have to keep it safe and clean. We have to look after our stuff and our customers” (MT11, interview 2016).

There is, however, no guarantee that volunteers would, in fact, receive any benefits for their efforts. The new management model could be structured in such a manner that not only those who have volunteered their time will benefit as one committee member explains:

“The new approach is not fair since we have been volunteering for two years to get the positions and now anyone from the outside can come in and take over” (MCM1, interview 2016).

The case of governmentality found in the markets has created a scenario where traders are dedicating their time in the hope of being empowered. In this regard, the scenario could play out similar to that of Miraftab (2004b). The cases of Midrand and Bree markets are different in that it was not the authorities but the market committees, with the support of SAITF, who initiated the volunteering system. While this may be true, it was not the intent of the market committees or SAITF to abuse the efforts of the volunteers. They have too much at stake in seeing the mobilisation succeed. They are, nonetheless, allowing traders to volunteer at a risk in the absence of any guarantee.

5.3.4. GOVERNMENTALITY REACHING BEYOND MARKET-DRIVEN OBJECTIVES

Roy (2009) poses the question: how does the practice of participation produce a civic governmentality? This previous section revealed how traders’ lack of confidence, the hope of better prospects and rigid guidance from a supporting organisation allow for the construction of a civic governmentality. To subsequently assess whether this form of governmentality can be considered as positive or negative is a complex task. The work of Williams does, however, provide valuable guidelines:
“To blame development professionals within these and other projects for not truly taking on board participatory values - or locally powerful figures for acting in self-interested ways - may protect the purity of a mythic participatory ideal. It does little, however, to enlighten us as to the potential and limitations of participation in changing development practice” (Williams, 2004: 569).

Williams (2004) advocates for the development of political capabilities through participation. There are strong indications towards political learning in the approach manner in which SAITF guides traders. For this educational process, to succeed, it is necessary to organise trader participation in the market management in such a manner that is does not become captured by mere market dynamics. In this regard, it has to be cautioned that SAITF does have a strong business sentiment in the manner in which they are influencing traders.

The following chapter reveals how the management model developed by SAITF has a strong market-driven objective and traders were not part of the formulation thereof. Within such a context it is difficult to see the political capabilities of traders develop beyond a point where they require the assistance of SAITF. Given such a reality, if SAITF’s interests focus is on the enrichment of traders rather than defending their interests, the form of governmentality has potential to be labelled as negative. It would not lead to a situation where traders are capable of manipulating rules, developing new rules, influencing social preferences and securing resources independently. Chapter six builds on this argument though evaluating how empowerment is envisioned and if it could lead to building political capabilities. It is, however, first necessary to reflect on the manner in which the mobilisation described in this chapter did also have implications for the position of committee members.

5.4. REPLACING THE MARKET COMMITTEES: A RESPONSE TO MOBILISATION OR PROTECTING TRADERS

This chapter has revealed that there have been irregularities in the election of committee members and that this could become a basis for contestations from other stakeholders. Until the notion of possible partnership models entered discourses, little attention was, in fact, given to these irregularities. During the fieldwork, however, rumours were starting to circulate that the market committees would be replaced. The DED Deputy Director for Informal Trading explained that:

“But now because we are discussing a new model we want to be ascertained of the legitimacy of the people. So, in this new arrangement, we will define the conditions of the new committees. The term of committees will be clearly defined. There will be provision made for how people vote in or vote out committees” (DED1, interview 2016).
There are three possible reasons for the re-election of the committees. The first reason can be ascribed to the lack of past oversight that has raised issues of legitimacy. New elections will create an opportunity to establish a new committee under firmer regulations as described below:

“Election of the committee does not translate into anything. It translates into a confirmation that you are legitimate representatives of that group. We have our mechanisms in place this time that how you report back to the traders, how you manage, we will also put those conditions to say the committees will not work as they please now. They will have a reporting mechanism that will be supported by us that communicate an information flow between the city and the actual users. We don’t want to create people that are actually now going to make themselves something else” (DED1, interview 2016).

The advantage of improved oversight from the JPC and DED is that it could protect traders from domineering practices. It could, however, denote increased management control over the conduct of the committees. Where it is made out that these checks and balances are for traders they could, in fact, be to curtail mobilisation efforts in future.

Such restrictions link to the second reason for replacing the committees which is their presumed dominance in the markets and ability to pressurise the authorities. The issue of replacing the committee was for the first time raised in July 2016. This was right after the committees once again succeeded in blocking the newly appointed cleaning and security providers. A market manager indicated that:

“The JPC is starting to think of replacing the market committee. They have been in place for more than fifteen years and are starting to dominate the trading space” (JPC2, interview 2016).

This decision has two sides to it. The first is that it could indeed be that the committees are dominating market practices to suit their needs. There is albeit furthermore the possibility that given the mobilisations of traders through the committee, the JPC and DED want to remove them. The same market manager stated the following that supports such a notion:

“If a new committee is elected the old members cannot show up at the JPC anymore and make their demands. The JPC only works with committee members. Using the voting path cancels out any accusations and will protect them all” (JPC2, interview 2016).

There are similarities between this process and the reason why the market committees were established in the first place, to depoliticise the markets through removing the regional organisations. Removing the current committee would once again remove a collective who have succeeded in pressurising the broader governance structure to adhere to the needs of traders.
The third motivation provided for the replacement of the committees is that they are tendering for management positions through the cooperatives they established. The vision the DED has of representation is as described below:

“Those who have the mindset that they want to be on a committee with access to resources. Guess what will happen, they will have issues with the people that they claim to represent... We are clear about distinctions around being a service provider and being a committee member... Whether the committees decided to create their own little entities is something else. My responsibility is to say, these are the traders in these markets, and their interests are being taken care of. The model for me is that whoever becomes a representative, that the rights of those that remain as traders and the rights of those that represent them must clearly be defined and protected. Those who are in a position of wanting to be leaders, the committee, they want to be committee on this side and service providers on the other side” (DED1, interview 2016).

The conflict of interest identified above was similarly found in case studies conducted in Kampala, Uganda. Trader organisations stepping into management positions under pressure to meet the objectives set out by the state could lose contact with those they represent. The following example is provided:

“In the one market that was still being managed by an association, the association appeared to be closer to the City Council and interests within it than to the vendors. In fact, according to some of the key informants, some associations entered into conflicting roles - in similarity to what has happened with the cooperatives. While the associations were initially formed mainly to struggle for the rights of vendors and to channel their views to the City Council, economic interests within the associations have gained importance. In the process, the leadership enters into conflict with the interests of the members and sometimes even disrespects their rights. Associations that did achieve management positions began to collect ‘taxes’ on behalf of the City Council, while they were expected instead to fight against raised dues.” (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009: 402).

SAITF also acknowledges this possible conflict of interest and therefore suggests electing five new representatives once the original committees have stepped into management positions (SAITF1, interview 2016). This will avoid the issues regarding a conflict of interest in managing and representing traders. Such dual governance systems do however carry its own risks as Lindell and Appelblad further explain:

"In some of the markets, associations still co-exist with cooperatives and private companies. In the studied cases, however, associations appear to have changed their roles and often have become little more than a convenient way for the new management bodies to get rid of the daily administrative routines" (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009: 402).
It is difficult to understand why traders would want to take on a representative role voluntary when other traders in the market are being paid for the services they are providing. The revenue collected by the management cooperative could further place them in a position of power that newly elected representatives could find intimidating. In such conflict situations, SAITF will itself be placed in a juxtaposition as to whom it is they are supporting. This will especially be relevant if SAITF is receiving a portion of the revenue generated by the managing cooperatives.

Taking into consideration the DED’s renewed vigour to improve oversight, the research, however, found some contradicting processes taking place. After the announcement that the committees would be replaced, a process was rolled out which was referred to as the “formalisation” or “endorsement” of the committees (MCM3, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). The objective of this process was first to confirm if traders recognise the committees as their representatives. If less than fifty percent of the traders endorsed the committee, a full-fledged election through the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) would have to take place (DED1, interview 2016). The endorsement process the DED rolled out did however not come across as convincingly democratic. At the meeting (which I was dismissed from), I observed that an endorsement form was being sent around and signed by traders. It was revealed afterwards:

“There was no verification process taking place at the meeting. People from the taxi industry and even unregistered Nigerian traders were signing the endorsement form” (MCM7, interview 2016).

It has to be noted that the process was still on-going at the time I concluded my fieldwork and the final process and outcomes are thus not known. It should be cautioned that if the main objective is to confirm the legitimacy of the committees democratically, processes that do not allow for contestation from other stakeholders should be followed.

Despite the motivations provided for the replacement of the market committees, given the democratic nature promulgated for the re-election of the market committees, the final decision lies with traders. When questioned what the position of traders are in this regard, the following was narrated by a DED official:

“What are traders’ response to committees wanting to take over service provision? The traders have a mixed feeling in some instances. There are those who have been mobilised to support the call. They are supportive of that because they have the perception that they would benefit from the arrangement. But of course, they do not know the details of that arrangement. Or they are being informed by whoever is representing them. There are those who are uncomfortable with the existing committees that would prefer the committees to be re-elected. Most of them want to endorse the existing committees to continue” (DED1, interview 2016).
This statement illustrates that the committees are seen as legitimate among traders. In both markets, committee members indicated those opposing the committees were a minority who wanted to benefit from the tendering processes and current revenue streams (MCM4&5, interviews 2016). There is thus a good probability that the market committees would be re-elected.

This section showed that the mobilisation tactics of the market committees have come at a potential risk as suggestions of replacing them emerged. The DED as the regulatory department is in a position to initiate elections and regulate the manner in which a newly elected committee operates. The possible reasons for why the committees should be replaced make it difficult to assess whether the authorities want to promote their own interests or those of traders. On the one hand, there could be a concern that trader representatives want to take over power positions for their own wealth accumulation. Replacing the committees could thus be a step to protect traders. On the other hand, it could be a way of curtailing the power of the committees and SAITF as an opposition. Electing a new committee under such circumstances would be a move to de-politicise market management while authors such as Williams (2004) argues for the re-politicisation of participation. Traders should be empowered to critically question decision-making and procedures as they have been doing under the guidance of SAITF. The research is not in a position to determine which motivations for the replacement of the committees are the most relevant. It could also be a case of a combination of factors. It is, nonetheless, necessary to acknowledge that the intentions of the authorities do not necessarily pursue traders’ interests although it might be portrayed as such.

5.5. CONCLUSION

Traders in markets have been participating in market governance through invited and invented spaces of participation. It is unclear whether the ineffectiveness of the invited spaces first leads to traders resorting to invented spaces or whether traders mobilising themselves, in fact, lead to a breakdown in formal communication structures internally and with authorities. At the time of the research it was clear that regardless of which came first, invited spaces of participation were seen as inefficient. Traders would participate in these spaces with little ability to influence decision-making and change in the markets. As a result, market committees with the guidance of SAITF have resorted to invented spaces of participation to confront the JPC and DED directly.

Trader mobilisation in both Midrand and Bree market has had consequences that contribute to debates on neoliberalisation in urban governance. The literature review alerted the reader to the entanglement between the process of neoliberalisation and participation. Markets in Johannesburg are meant to operate as self-sustainable facilities. While this may be true, trader mobilisation has
contributed to preventing the MTC and then JPC from meeting these objectives, by contributing to a failure in their management model. The extent to which traders were willing to volunteer their time and efforts over a two-year period has brought the DED to realise that they could be utilised to meet their cost recovery objectives. Trader’s mobilisation thus opened an opportunity in which participation and cost recovery objectives could be accommodated. Such an approach further creates the opportunity to re-create a functional invited space of participation. The research was conducted at a time when these approaches were still in the developing phases. It remains to be seen if, within the proposed management models, participation of traders in management would be prioritised to the same extent as cost recovery objectives. If this could be the case, the interlinkages between participation and neoliberalisation would contribute to the democratisation of market governance.

Given the management reforms under consideration this section identified two influential role-players; SAITF and authorities. The actions and discourses of these actors can be understood in two directions: one represents the interests of traders and the other their own concerns. On the one hand, SAITF could be taking a rigid and authoritarian approach to ensure traders succeed in the objectives they set out for market management. These objectives could be to promote the needs of traders or meet SAITF’s own market-driven objectives. On the other hand, the rigid application could also be to develop political learning among traders. The actions and discourses of the authorities similarly have the potential to either protect the interests of traders or that of the state. Trader collectives have succeeded in mobilising traders against the authorities. The latter could therefore have personal agendas in the removal of these entities. While this may be true, an attempt at replacing the committees could be an attempt at protecting traders from domineering and profit seeking practices.

It is not always possible to discern which interests are being represented but it is crucial to understand that the discourses and actions have two potential outcomes. To try and evaluate if the civic governmentality present in markets is positive it is necessary to ask if it could lead to a process where trader participation in market management becomes captured by mere market dynamics? There is no doubt that without the support of SAITF as a regional organisation, traders would not have been able to confront the JPC to the same effect. Their assistance is thus crucial for the democratisation of participation. As indicated, the challenge is rather if these objectives should lead to mere market-driven outcomes. SAITF’s approach does provide a strong business sentiment but the following chapter divulges how this approach, compared to that the DED and JPC, holds the most potential to lead to a shift in power. The authorities also have their own market-driven objectives for considering trader participation in market governance.
The following chapter, thus, further analyses to which extent the proposed management models of these role-players allow for empowerment through the development of political capabilities. The question is asked if the interests identified in this chapter will give way to an elitist market-driven governance structure or if it is feasible to insist on empowerment for all.
CHAPTER SIX
POWER BATTLES AROUND THE MEANINGS OF EMPOWERMENT

“...the more participation there is, the more the power structure of local communities is masked, and the more disempowering the process can be” (Miraftab, 2004b: 242).

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This section reveals how “empowerment” has become a term used by all stakeholders involved in the proposed reforms to market management (DED1, interview 2016; JPC1, interview 2016; MCM3&7, interviews 2016; MTC1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). It further becomes apparent that such “empowerment” for most stakeholders relates to financial or economic empowerment of the traders. The dimensions of empowerment, however, reaches beyond mere economic gains. In the context of participation there is especially a focus on political empowerment as described by Williams (2004). The previous chapters revealed how all the stakeholders involved in market governance are reliant on funding or revenue collected from the markets. This chapter divulges how the term empowerment becomes a rhetoric used to shape and even mask revenue objectives of the stakeholders involved.
The following section analyses how SAITF, the JPC and DED are in the process of developing new management models for Bree and Midrand markets. Chapter five described how both the authorities and SAITF referred to the new models being created as “management models” (DED1, interview 2016; MTC1, interview 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). The research correspondently applies the same term. It becomes discernible that each of these stakeholders foresees trader empowerment differently but that there clearly is a similar revenue objective. These visions are compared to that of the former MTC CEO who during his time in office had first-hand experience with similar models being implemented. This places empowerment and what can be considered as feasible, into perspective. Based on these dynamics, section two analyses the risks and opportunities associated with the different market management models identified. The final section concludes that other dimensions of empowerment might be side-lined as a consequence of the new management models. It is important to note that at the time of the research, the proposed models were still in a developing phase. These sections are to elucidate what the different approaches could entail and be considered as feasible.

6.2. EMPOWERMENT ENVISIONED BY ALL, BUT FOR ALL?

The concept of empowerment is central to all the management models proposed by the stakeholders involved. Roy (2009) poses the question of how there could be a reproduction and strengthening of urban inequalities despite a discourse of empowerment. The answer to such a question is located in how empowerment is envisioned. Miraftab (2004b: 242) alerts the reader that empowerment should address the “structures of oppression”. This requires empowerment beyond individual economic gains. Social, political and collective empowerment is integral to enabling a real shift in power. Within the context of the research, political empowerment is of particular importance as such capabilities could aid traders in formulating demands that could meet their further needs. A measurement of political empowerment becomes a manner to evaluate if the empowerment envisioned is intended to drive radical change, or to sedate citizens to meet authority’s objectives.

Cornwall (2008) argues that within transformative participation for both the implementer and the receiver, empowerment means an ability of the participants to make their own decisions and act accordingly. Central to such a process is the availability of information and for participants to have a clear understanding of the process and procedures of which they form part of. In the absence of information on issues such as budgeting and funding, traders could not contribute meaningfully to decision-making. This section reflects on the different management models that could form part of market governance going forward.
SAITF was the only stakeholder involved in the reform on market management that could provide me with a copy of the management model they are proposing\textsuperscript{2}. The document is in a PowerPoint presentation format and presented as the SAITF Management Model Submission by Bara, Bree, Midrand and Yeoville markets. The PowerPoint is dated 15\textsuperscript{th} September 2014. The presentation consists of a few bullet points under the headings of introduction, proposal, goals, plans, recommendations and conclusions. It is, however, not always clear what the content under each heading implies and how it relates to the broader model. The information presented in this subsection is therefore based on the copy of the SAITF Management Model Submission as well as a number of interviews with the SAITF General Secretary. More information could be obtained from the interview process than from the SAITF Management Model Submission presentation. This sub-section analyses four factors central to the SAITF management’s approach: empowerment through cooperative, rental collections, formal agreements with external parties, and transparency.

### A. EMPOWERMENT THROUGH COOPERATIVES AND ISSUES OF AFFORDABILITY

SAITF, as the driving force behind the mobilisation of traders, views cooperatives as central to the functioning of their management model. The SAITF Management Model Submission described this focus as follows:

“All markets will use a co-op formation to run the facility” (SAITF, 2014: 3).

“All number of co-ops in the markets were formed and are ready to work as soon as the agreement is reached between JPC and committee members” (SAITF, 2014: 6).

Regarding the functions that SAITF wants traders to take over the following is stated:

“\textquote{We propose that management of the facility be given to the above-mentioned market/facility [Bara, Bree, Midrand and Yeoville] - That must include marketing, security, cleaning and maintaining the facility}” (SAITF, 2014: 2).

The SAITF Management Model Submission does not provide an indication of how cooperatives will run the facility nor how such a model will lead to the empowerment of other traders. This is key knowing that cooperatives are limited to those who can afford membership.

\textsuperscript{2} I committed to not circulating nor publishing the full model, but could provide an analysis in the research report.
No further details are provided concerning the management of the individual functions. An interview with the General Secretary prior to obtaining the model provided more detail in the functioning of the proposed model:

“The management functions SAITF wants traders to take over are rental collections, cleaning, security and soft maintenance (changing of globes, etc.). They do not want the responsibility of the overall maintenance... The model is largely based on the existing market committees being formalised into management agents through their cooperative. The model is structured to empower traders through cooperatives... The management agents will serve as a mother cooperative managing and assist the other cooperatives in the markets.”

“SAITF is encouraging all traders to join a cooperative. We will not kick out anyone who is not in a cooperative but try to explain to them the benefits of joining a cooperative. What is important is to have cooperatives for different functions like cooking ladies, vegetables, sweets, etc. They then know how to empower the cooperative. This one knows how to sell fish and can come up with a plan to export the fish. The committee cooperative will be the mother cooperative managing the others” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

The functions identified during this interview includes rental collections but excludes marketing (indicated in the SAITF Management Model Submission). The role of marketing is described in a sub-section below.

Empowerment is further envisioned through investing the profits made by the management cooperatives back into the markets. For example, if an appointed cooperative should receive R 50,000 in payments for services (cleaning, security or soft maintenance), R 30,000 of that should be saved for improvements in the market (SAITF1, interview 2017). These improvements will then contribute to the empowerment of traders. Information on these forms of empowerment are however not encapsulated in the SAITF Management Model Submission and were once again rather obtained through interviews with the General Secretary.

The mother cooperative approach has merit in the manner that it could improve the livelihood of traders beyond the management positions. It could further create a system where traders participate in the decision-making of the mother cooperative. While this may be true, one of the main limitations associated with such an approach is the affordability for traders. The particular SAITF member was found to be very ambitious and even at times oblivious to the trader’s economic constraints. The reason for such an assumption is that the General Secretary is convinced that all traders can afford cooperative membership:
"The cost is R 20-00 a week, and they [traders] make that easy on a day sometimes even in an hour. The R 20-00 is to just cover the general costs” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

It was previously revealed that some traders do not even have the means to cover their daily travelling costs and therefore resort to sub-letting their stalls. This does not build a case that all traders could afford weekly cooperative membership fees. Miraftab warns against such homogenisation in his theory on the disempowering power of empowerment:

“The conflicting interests of the local laborers and the local entrepreneurs and the project’s promotion of inequality within the community are masked by presenting the community as a homogeneous and unified entity, so that the economic gain and self-fulfillment of a few are presented as a benign process benefiting all” (Miraftab, 2004b: 249&250).

This section throughout divulges how cooperative governance could lead to an elitist governance structure if not carefully regulated. The assumption should not be made that empowerment through management functions are desired by all traders. It resonates with the manner in which Cornwall (2008) argues that a withdrawal from the state is not necessarily desired by all citizens.

Both empowerment through cooperatives and the reinvestment of funds has an economic focus. There is a belief that funds filtering into the market will improve trader’s conditions and thus empower them. The structural causes of traders’ reality are not addressed through such an approach as the General Secretary explained the importance of his involvement:

“I have to stay involved. Traders will eat the money and kill each other. I cannot leave them” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

This statement proves that traders have not been politically empowered to improve their own circumstances in the absence of SAITF. If this should be true, empowerment measures will have to be implemented under strict supervision. The temptation of self-enrichment will be great in the absence of a regulatory authority. Given the involvement the cooperatives and SAITF, it is argued that the state is best placed to provide such an oversight role. The regulatory presence of the state could protect the weak and vulnerable in a sector of society that is already classified as such.

**B. RENTAL COLLECTIONS**

The SAITF General Secretary explained that the model would be based on the committee members collecting rentals from traders personally (SAITF1, interview 2017). The rental collections referred to are in contrast to the current procedures identified in chapter four in which each trader is responsible for depositing their own rentals. Once again, more information concerning rental collections could be
obtained through an interview than the SAITF Management Model Submission. The following information was provided regarding the motivation for wanting to take over rental collections and the accompanying procedures:

“Rentals will be better collected by traders. Cooperative members can collect every quarter to make sure a trader has paid by the end of the month. If a trader pays R 200, they can collect R 50 every week... Traders have not been paying because they have not been receiving services... Cooperatives will provide services and traders will pay” (SAITF1, interview 2017).

The SAITF General Secretary clearly stated that they do not want traders to take over the overall financial management of the markets. Rent collected by the traders must still be registered and administrated by the JPC. He is aware of the fact that markets owe the municipalities millions of Rands and they do not want to get involved in those issues. SAITF basically wants income streams channelled towards traders for the functions of cleaning, security, soft maintenance and rental collections (SAITF1, interview 2017). The management cooperative will thus be responsible for only the collection of rentals and the JPC will pay the cooperative for servicing and maintaining the markets.

The following sections reveal that a similar model implemented through the MTC in Diepsloot market did, in fact, lead to better rental collections in the facility (MTC1, interview 2016). It is, however, of particular interest that SAITF would want traders to collect rent as this is known to be a co-opting tactic that forces traders to collect rentals rather than engage in mobilising against rent. Such co-opting practices are analysed in the following section.

To achieve the ambition of “one annual millionaire per region”, there is, however, an additional function that needs to be performed. The following section analyses this function under which marketing can be grouped.

C. FORMAL AGREEMENTS WITH EXTERNAL PARTIES

Despite indicating that it is not their intent to take over the overall management of markets, the General Secretary envisions traders expanding their cooperatives through agreements with formal businesses outside of the markets. Traders in the markets are currently not allowed to step into agreements with external companies such as MTN or Coca-Cola. He wants this to change so that a trader, for example, can approach MTN to buy stock from them in bulk or initiate marketing agreements (SAITF1, interview 2017). In an earlier interview this approach was described as follows:

“There are many companies (Lemon Twist, Coke, MTN, Vodacom etc.) who are currently paying marketing fees to the JPC. These fees account to millions of Rands. The traders have no influence over
We have approached these companies and have mini arrangements in place, but the appointment [of the trader management cooperative] first has to go through” (SAITF1, interview 2016).

The approach described in SAITF Management Model Submission is the following:

“Given 100% share for outdoor advertisement payments.
100% share on promotions in the facility” (SAITF, 2014: 7).

The intent is for traders to take over the profits generated from advertisement and promotions in the markets. This approach is inconsistent with what the General Secretary said when interviewed. During an interview in 2017, he explained that the contract will still be between the JPC and the external company, but the cooperative who was involved in setting up the agreement should then be awarded a percentage of the profit (SAITF1, interview 2017). The SAITF Management Model Submission was developed in 2014, and it becomes evident that there have been adjustments since the initial concept but that these have not necessarily been documented.

Such an approach could have consequences for the ring-fenced budgets discussed in chapter four. The approach described above, in fact, resonates with a statement made by the former MTC CEO:

“Traders and their associations are trying to falsify and glorify the idea that outsourcing services to them as facilities’ users will yield positive results. However, pilots undertaken by JPC at Bara and Bree have proven beyond reasonable doubt that without CoJ subsidies the facilities cannot be financially sustainable. The solution lies in finding alternative revenue streams like advertising and ring-fence those to be used on those facilities. Even advertising is not a panacea as it has been proven at MTC, some facilities simply don’t have enough foot traffic or pedestrian to lure advertisers” (MTC1, interview 2016).

Through not taking over the overall management of markets, SAITF can avoid issues such as the subsidisation of the markets. However, profits that could be made through external agreements might need to be channelled towards the deficit at which markets are operating. This could be the case even if budgets should be ring-fenced.

D. ISSUES OF TRANSPARENCY

The SAITF General Secretary did indicate that traders understand their proposed management model, but I argue that the lack of a comprehensive documented model is a matter of concern. The SAITF Management Model Submission I was provided with is unclear and is not a public document. It cannot be discussed with traders under these conditions. Transparency is absent and traders are, as a result, not always aware of what it is they are participating in.
Trader organisations operate in a context characterised by competition and a lack of trust. Trader organisations are competing for a stake in the city. Other trader organisations could want to use the SAITF Management Model Submission to penetrate markets and get a stake in the proposed reforms. The confidentiality surrounding the provisions of the model clearly illustrates mistrust towards the DED who could use the model for divide and rule tactics among organisations. Such a context is not conducive for substantive negotiation and broad participation. The end result is that the lack of transparency from SAITF shows a lack of political (and possibly technical) confidence that might be detrimental to its ability to negotiate a good deal for traders, and to mobilise them for the model. Although information and transparency is key to participation the research understands that there are sensitive politics involved. However, the current approach could see more being lost through secrecy than an approach that promotes meaningful negotiations by traders.

6.2.2. MANAGEMENT AGENTS IN SUPPORT OF COOPERATIVES BUT RAISING QUESTIONS REGARDING EMPOWERMENT

As management agents, the JPC is working together with the DED in a committee to develop the proposed partnership model, in parallel rather than articulated to SAITF efforts (JPC1, interview 2016). The City of Johannesburg DoT forms part of this process in organising and engaging the taxi associations (DED1, interview 2016). There was no indication of trader representatives forming part of this committee.

The JPC takes on an important role since it is often the point of communication between traders and the DED. The SAITF General Secretary mostly built his approach on information obtained from the JPC, their CEO in particular (SAITF1, interview 2016). Still, the management model development does not seem to occur in direct engagement between local authorities and the trader collectives.

With regards to trader empowerment, a senior JPC official indicated that trader cooperatives could take over the management of certain functions but that this would not lead to the empowerment of all:

“All the traders are not going to benefit. The cooperatives are going to manage the market. The intention is for them to manage the markets with regards to cleaning, security and maintenance. How the traders will benefit is by their children who were unemployed, their husbands who were unemployed or their wives who were unemployed. They could be employed as a cleaner or as a security guard. It is not going to be everybody who is going to benefit. It is going to be certain people who are going to benefit” (JPC1, interview 2016).
This position reflects how one of the committee members in Bree market envisioned empowerment. When questioned how he foresees the empowerment of more than four-hundred traders in the market, he responded:

“It would first be shop owners, then their families, who will be given employment opportunities. This would not be difficult since not everyone is interested in such opportunities” (MCM3, interview 2016).

Despite such ambitions for trader empowerment, the former MTC CEO gave an opposing perspective:

“On the other hand, it [facilities users involved in management] heightens expectations and promises that it cannot fulfil. For instance, it is impossible to involve all the traders in the outsourced services. Once such paradigm is introduced, every facility user expects some benefits, either directly or indirectly. For instance, some would insist that their children be employed or given opportunities. This is impossible to a facility that accommodates more than 500 traders” (MTC1, interview 2016).

During his time at the MTC, he was exposed to the actual implementation of similar partnership models (discussed below). This provides a certain level of legitimacy to his opinion of what can be considered feasible. He, in fact, explained that the real motivation behind such models was to reduce resistance to rental payments and improve the overall collection (MTC1, interview 2016).

The following section elucidates how the empowerment sentiment identified by the former MTC CEO and JPC is in fact not reflected in that of the DED.

6.2.3. THE DED AND EMPOWERMENT OF ALL

From the DED’s perspective, what is central is developing a management model, is that it has to fall within the given regulatory frameworks (DED1, interview 2016). This was similarly reiterated by the former MTC CEO (MTC1, interview 2016). The main regulatory frameworks are the Municipal Finance Management (MFMA) Act No. 56 of 2003, and the City of Johannesburg Supply Chain Policy and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000.

Since the proposed model is still being developed, only certain elements could be extracted through an interview with the DED Deputy Director for Informal Trading. The research found that the approach envisioned by the DED fundamentally differs from the other stakeholders’. The Deputy Director for Informal Trading explained that:

“We are looking at a model saying what are the benefits and incentives that are there that could benefit the group, not one. Whether it is lower rentals or whatever incentives that we want to put. We are looking at what is it that a trader there in Metro Mall will feel the difference... We want to look at the empowerment model that must be done in such a way that it benefits the entire users of the facility, not particular individual groupings. I wouldn’t attest to the motives of those that led the move... If you are
talking about the Yeoville market with 230 people, we are talking about all the traders benefitting from the arrangements. If we are talking about Bara that has 400 people, it is the same; it is not for the committee to benefit” (DED1, interview 2016).

None of the traders engaged or SAITF indicated that the model could entail reduced rentals or similar initiatives. The former MTC CEO also clearly communicated that empowerment through employment to family members of all traders is not feasible. It could, therefore, be argued that if empowerment to all is really the objective, there is little option but to consider incentives such as reduced rentals. While this may be true, how this would materialise was not known at the time of the research.

The main advantage, however, is that all traders could benefit from such an approach and not only those who could afford cooperative membership. In this regard, the DED expressed strong opposition to cooperatives:

"Now, cooperative is a company; the only difference is that it is a form of company that is for a group of people owning it, but is a company. It could be like a Pty. So, I can’t comment if traders are now an entity. The entity belongs to those individuals within the entity. How does it address those traders who are not part of the entity? So, I can’t comment on groupings. I do not even know how they were formed. What informed those individuals in those groupings? How do those groupings relate to a trader who is neutral? I can’t take responsibility. I do not even entertain the committees and how they operate independently it is their right, how they want to form into their companies. That one is separate. If they want to be offered those services in the form of those companies, they will have to follow whatever call is put in place... There is no superiority they will get outside of the regulatory environment... I can’t comment about individuals who now involve themselves into something else. Can my interview really reflect that? Nothing else?” (DED1, interview 2016).

There is a strong sense of distrust from the official towards both the committees and the research. Such distrust could be linked to the manner in which committees have been mobilising traders against the JPC and DED. As described in chapter two, the interview was conducted at a time when the DED was being taken to court by SAITF with the assistance of SERI. There was thus also suspicions that the research could aid SAITF in their cause.

The statement above brings forward a valid point that the politically legitimate cannot be given business contract on the basis that they ‘represent’ traders; they have to apply like any company. Given the issues of affordability evident across the markets it has to be considered to which extent participation in market governance through cooperatives could become an elite affair. The case study of Nakawa market in Kampala in which a trader cooperative was appointed for the management of
the market showed similar complaints of unaffordability (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). While this is true, it was also reported that the overall management of Nakawa market improved:

“[T]he cooperative replaced the association in the provision of basic services and infrastructure in the market, charging the vendors a fee for these services, and also improved and expanded the market facilities, on the basis of vendors’ contributions” (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009: 401).

There were complaints over issues such as high rents, and that general traders do not take part in higher level decision-making (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009). In general, better management was reported since cooperatives consist of traders and could identify with their main challenges (ibid.).

Given such advantages and disadvantages, it becomes a reality that all approaches will have their advantages and shortcomings. Private service providers, for example, do not necessarily prioritise the interests of traders but in which format can management be handed over to traders without creating elitists participatory structures? The General Secretary of SAITF envisions bridging such elitist structures through further cooperatives which in fact could further deepen the divide between those who can and cannot afford membership. In this regard the DED’s approach has potential, but the implementation details and actual feasibility thereof are too hazy. Similar to chapter five, the DED could either be protecting its own interests or those of traders. On the one hand, the opposition to cooperatives could be seen as a way to delegitimise trader leadership who has been formulating their management approach based on such collectives. On the other hand, it could be an indication of concerns as the protector of public interest; that markets are not profit-making facilities.

The approach advocated by the DED links to the question Cornwall (2008) poses with regards to who is participating. On one side, the author identifies the fact that it is not possible for everyone to participate. On the other side, he states that “participatory processes can serve to deepen the exclusion of particular groups unless explicit efforts are made to include them” (Cornwall, 2008: 277). To achieve this is by no mean an easy task and will require careful consideration and conceptualisation. These opposing views are, however, discerning given the manner in which SAITF has been pushing traders to form cooperatives to enter management positions.

6.2.4. EMPOWERMENT THROUGH SELF-MOBILISATION

This section brings forward the distinction between functional and self-mobilisation as typologies of participation developed by Pretty (1995) and analysed in the work of Cornwall (2008). The latter describes self-mobilisation as follows:
“People participate by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Self-mobilization can spread if government and NGOs provide an enabling framework of support. Such self-initiated mobilization may or may not challenge existing distributions of wealth and power” (Cornwall, 2008: 272).

This form of participation is above what is defined as functional participation in which “people participate to meet project objectives more effectively and to reduce costs, after the main decisions have been made by external agents” (Cornwall, 2008: 271). In this regard, the ambitions of SAITF have to be credited as they go beyond functional participation and could entail an actual shift in power. The sourcing of agreements with formal external companies is in line with the self-mobilisation identified above.

While there is such potential in SAITF’s approach, similar to the other stakeholders involved, there is still a strong focus on economic empowerment. Williams (2004: 567) explained that “...an important part of poor people’s political empowerment is thus the degree to which states create and shape opportunities for the poor to engage in government-focused struggles for rights and resources”. There needs to be a caution against traders taking on a position similar to private service providers. If this should be the case, traders will operate as service providers unrelated to the overall management of the markets. This is not by any means to imply that the economic benefits envisioned could not hold benefits for traders. It should rather be said that combining such empowerment with political empowerment would protect traders from becoming co-opted into revenue objectives and becoming mere service providers. Such political empowerment should entail a “longer-term political struggles and reshaped political networks that link themselves to a discourse of rights and a fuller sense of citizenship” (ibid.: 573).

6.3. RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF REFORMS IN MARKET MANAGEMENT

Regarding the possible reform in market management, the DED Deputy Director described this change as “[t]his is huge, it is something big, it is not a minor thing like you might have heard” (DED1, interview 2016). Given the potential of such an approach, all concerned parties want to see the model developed judiciously and with their inputs. This section reflects on the risks and opportunities associated with the different approaches identified in the previous section. It becomes evident that all of the proposed reforms bear certain risks for the different stakeholders.
6.3.1. A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

This chapter has alerted the reader to the lack of transparency concerning the SAITF Management Model Submission document as well as the organisation’s approach. Regarding the JPC and DED, no model could be obtained at the time of the research. The lack of substantial documentation created on overall context that lacked transparency over the details of the possible reforms. There were further discrepancies concerning the tenders that have been released. No copy of the tender documents could be obtained during the fieldwork. All the stakeholders referred to this window that opened as a tender opportunity (Bree Committee, 2016; JPC1, interview 2016; MCM3&7, interviews 2016; SAITF1, interview 2016). The DED, however, indicated that it was not a tender but a call for expression of interest:

“It was not a tender; there was an expression of interest advertised... They interpret it as something else. It was a call for expression of interest for people to submit proposals for if they were given the opportunity to manage, how they would. So JPC issued that and people submitted for us to get their ideas so that we can inform our decision. So, it means nothing. There is not a tender for appointing nobody. A normal process will be for a call for proposals with specifications. You are asking from the street. Go back to the source and ask if you can get a copy” (DED1, interview 2016).

Unfortunately, a copy of the tender or call for expression of interest could not be obtained from the web, traders, SAITF, JPC nor DED. It is further interesting that the DED official argues this way since new service providers have in the past been appointed based on a tendering process. It was exactly for this reason that traders mobilised themselves and blocked them from entering the markets. The advantage of having access to such a copy would have further been that the positions open for traders would have been clearly discernible. The secrecy regarding such procedures is a matter of concern. These are processes that need to be transparent in every aspect if they are to lead to any form of empowerment. Having obscure processes in place prohibits traders from engaging in the process, from debating various management models, as well as their ability to influence decision-making.

Another observable risk identified during the research is the disparities between how traders, SAITF and the DED envision the model. This questions the manner in which traders are in fact participating in the development of these models. It is not known if there are still plans to conduct participatory sessions as the model is developed but during the time of the research, an approach that has to be described as secretive was observed. Trader participation in the development of the models would, however, have implications in terms of resources - something none of the stakeholders is in support of. Secondly, regarding the discrepancies in the proposed models, the SAITF General Secretary said that he did not take notice of the DED since the decision lies with the JPC and the CEO supports him.
(SAITF1, interview 2017). Such dynamics could not be confirmed during the research, but the previous chapters revealed that the formalisation of the model is the shared responsibility of the JPC, DED and DoT. Their respective decision bodies will have to approve the model (DED1, interview 2016).

### 6.3.2. THE TAXI INDUSTRY AS EQUAL STAKEHOLDER

Markets such as Bree and Midrand furthermore have an additional risk element: involving the taxi industry. A DED official explicitly explained that the taxi industry and traders would be equal in any partnership model:

"Our arrangement is that DoT organises taxi operators. If there are different associations, then they form into a committee, a rank committee. We [DED] sort out the traders' committee and then we will create a facilities committee. There is no way that in an event where they are to manage these services one would bully the other. The model must actually benefit all the users. It is not a quick thing. There is a section of the facility where it is ranking, and then there is a section where it is stalls. Management must cut across. Cleaning and security must cover the entire facility... You get markets that are only taxi or stalls. In these markets the arrangements are easy, and you can have a working model around only these users, sign a lease with them and give them conditions" (DED1, interview 2016).

As a result of these dynamics, the partnership model for Bree and Midrand markets will have to be structured differently to a market such as Yeoville where only trading takes place. A JPC official identified this joint venture as one of the threats to the model:

"How the two committees are going to manage to the best of their ability, that is a major risk. JPC wants the committees to maintain the facilities together. This is not something that is going to get rolled out today. They have never worked together. It is a problem; it is a major problem" (JPC1, interview 2016).

What further contributes to the risk associated is that SAITF’s suggested approach to market management and the SAITF Management Model Submission document have so far not taken into account the taxi industry. This once again brings concerns regarding the lack of transparency. Is information purposefully being withheld or is it SAITF deliberately ignoring certain facts?

### 6.3.3. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS MODELS: ISSUES OF REVENUE AND REGULATION

Engaging the former MTC CEO had the advantage of him identifying two former management models implemented in which facility users took on a managerial role. The first represents a formal company, Fleet Africa and the other Diepsloot market which operates similarly to Bree and Midrand markets.

Fleet Africa is a company specialising in fleet management and maintenance solutions (Fleet Africa, 2012). The following details regarding the model were provided:
“In Fleet Africa, the entire management of cleaning, security, and rental collection was outsourced to a company privately owned by facilities users. This model was based on consultation with facilities users in terms of reducing the number of personnel operating within the facility. The model entailed drawing up a service delivery agreement enforceable by financial penalties if the company fails to deliver within the stipulated outcomes. It should be borne in mind that an implementation of such model requires patience and determination from all parties involved. In this case MTC needed to identify skills gaps to be implemented before outsourcing all services completely. It took approximately four years to implement the model and obtain Board approval and buy-in from the CoJ” (MTC1, interview 2016).

In chapter five a senior JPC official indicated that traders and SAITF are impatient in their demands through the manner in which they will show up at the JPC offices (JPC1, interview 2016). From the Fleet Africa model, it can be concluded that the development of such models is a time-consuming process. It will also require engaging the facility users as well as elements of training and skills transfer. The DED Deputy Director did mention that management training would be incorporated into their model but, apart from the formalisation of the committees, no indication was made of trader participation (DED1, interview 2016).

Despite a lack of clarity regarding what the proposed management models will entail, there was a consensus that it could lead to enhanced trader ownership and overall improvements in the functioning of markets (DED1, interview 2016; JPC1, interview 2016; MTC1, interview 2016). One example is that vandalism has been identified as a major obstacle in markets and handing responsibility over to traders could see this decrease (DED1, interview 2016). The former MTC CEO explained that in instances where they did implement partnership models, the participation and buy-in from traders resulted in less operational expenses and improved service delivery (MTC1, interview 2016). The example of such a market in Diepsloot rank was provided to illuminate the opportunities and risks:

“The facility was outsourced to a company owned by both taxi operators and informal traders. They were given the right to clean and secure the facility in return for rental collections, i.e. both taxi operators and informal traders. In this model, MTC paid the facility users for providing cleaning and security services, in return for total rental collected. There were pros and cons as far as this model is concerned. The positive was the rental collection from taxi operators (taxi bosses are refusing to pay for using the facility because they claim other modes of transport are subsidised but only mini bus taxis are not), as this facility proved that through dialogue positive results that both win-win to all role-players are achievable. The downside of this model was its failure to reciprocate the money MTC spent for these services in relation to total revenue collected. In other words, rentals were not market-related and needed to be subsidised for the model to be successful. Others argued in favour of the subsidy in the absence of state subsidy to the taxi operators, especially if compared to other modes of public transport” (MTC1, interview 2016).
One of the main advantages of such models is that government can receive payment for services if facility users are in fact involved in the management. What is, however, concerning is that for facility users to receive their payment there needs to be “total rent collected” (ibid.). This links to the stipulated outcomes the Fleet Africa model was subject to. If traders are co-opted into collecting rentals, this discourages them from engaging in rent boycotts. This will be the case even more so if their own compensation relies on the rental collections or if there are penalties involved. Rental collections become a tool to both impose and remove power. Miraftab emphasises a similar dynamic:

“[i]t shows how community-based participatory projects may decenter certain power relations from their traditional sites, but then engrave them in new forms and sites” (Miraftab, 2004b: 254).

Such a decentring of power would be the case if trader participation in management purely becomes an exercise to collect fees. Empowerment would become depoliticised for economic gains. There is no doubt that rental collection is legitimised if it is affordable and allows for more investment in the markets. It is a form of exchange between authorities and traders. The risk is rather instrumentalising management cooperatives to focus only on rental collections and restricting their mobilisation efforts. There is also a risk of implementing unaffordable rents and forcing the appointed traders to collect these.

The reader has to be reminded that the former MTC CEO indicated that the motivation behind models that include facility users was to improve the overall rental collection (MTC1, interview 2016). There are several similarities with the case study conducted by Gombay (1994) in Owino market in Kampala. The Kampala City Council was willing to give in to traders’ participatory demands in the hope that revenue collection would increase (ibid.). If the appointed committees could not meet this objective, measures were put in place to replace them (ibid.). There are a number of measures or penalties that could be included in service delivery agreements to ensure rental collection is prioritised above other factors. On the one hand, it could be argued that such measures could, in fact, motivate coercive and domineering practices among those traders responsible for rental collection. But it can also be said that such strict regulations are necessary to provide the oversight needed to oppose domineering practices. The research has repeatedly emphasised the importance of regulatory oversight. Any contractual agreements will, therefore, have to be developed and considered with great caution by all stakeholders involved.

6.4. CONCLUSION

Market governance in the two markets under review has reached a juncture point. Future management arrangements could entail an approach that sees traders and taxi operators play a more
active role. While this may be true, the research revealed that details regarding such models are vague, contradicting and even lacking at times. They could have immense potential for traders to participate in improving their livelihood but at the time of the research, they lacked the necessary transparency. In the current development phase, empowerment has, in fact, become a rhetoric used by all the stakeholders with varying meanings. At the beginning of this chapter, a number of questions regarding the level of empowerment envisioned were posed. These questions considered whether empowerment would address the fundamental causes of trader’s circumstances through political capabilities or if it would result in mere financial benefits. In an attempt to answer these questions, the different proposed management models were assessed. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the findings.

Table 6.1: Summary of the proposed market management models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAKEHOLDER</th>
<th>MARKET COMMITTEES*</th>
<th>SAITF</th>
<th>JPC</th>
<th>MTC</th>
<th>DED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED</td>
<td>Cleaning, security and soft maintenance (no mention made of rental collections and marketing)</td>
<td>Rental collections, marketing cleaning, security and soft maintenance</td>
<td>Cleaning, security and maintenance</td>
<td>Two models: i. Outsource cleaning and security ii. Rental collections</td>
<td>Managing of certain services (main concern is to divide functions between taxi operators and traders). It is not yet known who would be responsible for the collection of rentals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADER MANAGEMENT FORMAT</td>
<td>Following SAITF</td>
<td>Mother cooperative comprising of committee members. Elect five new representatives once cooperative is established.</td>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>Cooperative in line with previous models.</td>
<td>Not yet known but opposed to cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVENUE</td>
<td>Not known, will work according to SAITF.</td>
<td>Percentage of income from service provision (paid by JPC) saved and pushed back into markets. Remaining used to pay cooperative members a stipend and pay cleaning and security staff. Approach external private companies which the JPC can step into agreements with. Retrieve a percentage of the profits.</td>
<td>What JPC is currently paying to service providers will be given to traders performing functions.</td>
<td>Markets cannot operate without CoJ subsidies. Need to look at alternative avenues such as advertising and ring-fencing those budgets.</td>
<td>Possibilities: i. Reduced incentives such as rentals ii. If traders decide to tender for positions as cooperatives, it will be within the given regulatory framework (MFMA). Not in support of traders forming their own groupings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAKEHOLDER</td>
<td>MARKET COMMITTEES*</td>
<td>SAITF</td>
<td>JPC</td>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>DED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPOWERMENT ENVISIONED</td>
<td>Not clear: follows SAITF. Reference to employment of family members and provision of infrastructure etc. through reinvesting part of revenue into market</td>
<td>Empowerment through cooperatives and reinvesting part of revenues into markets. Mother cooperative to channel business opportunities to other cooperatives. Has potential to lead to self-mobilisation through seeking contracts with external formal companies.</td>
<td>Not all will benefit, family of those involved in the management will receive employment.</td>
<td>Empowerment to all is not possible. In previous models a company or cooperative consisting of traders took over management.</td>
<td>Empowerment to all. Not yet known how but reduced rentals or similar initiatives are possibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMINANCE OF FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT (above social, political, etc.)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but could lead to a form of self-mobilisation.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGING TAXI INDUSTRY IN MODEL</td>
<td>Following SAITF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL AVAILABLE</td>
<td>Following SAITF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The traders’ take on the model was extracted from previous chapters.*

Whether through cooperatives or incentives such as lower rents, the suggested models all view empowerment as something gained through financial benefits. If such an approach should dominate market management in the future, a situation could unfold where traders take on a role similar to the private companies that provided services prior to them. Nevertheless, coupled with political capabilities, there will be an opportunity for traders to challenge the structural causes of their situation. Within the context of the research, political empowerment is of particular importance as such capabilities could aid traders in formulating demands that could meet their social and physical needs. It will further protect traders from becoming co-opted into revenue objectives and becoming mere service providers. This is not to imply that the economic empowerment envisioned could not hold benefits for traders. Yet, a shift in power requires a move beyond economic advancement.

When considering the political capabilities advocated for in the research, SAITF’s approach shows the most potential in that it could promote a form of self-mobilisation. The establishment of a mother cooperative could also see other cooperatives participating in decision-making processes. These would however be limited to internal processes and not the overall management of the markets. While this may be true, SAITF’s proposed management model is based on the assumption that all traders can afford membership. The model is therefore at the risk of further entrenching divisions among traders.
It is necessary to locate the critique of SAITF’s cooperative management model in a context of limited alternatives. Cooperative governance has the advantage that markets are governed by those who can relate to the needs of their fellow traders. Cooperative management could lead to the overall improvement of markets but will require regulatory oversight to ensure agreements that should lead to the empowerment of others are in fact implemented. If these structures should be in place, there is no doubt that the proposed cooperative management models do hold immense potential to meet some of the needs of traders.

There is, furthermore, an opinion among traders and at the JPC that empowerment will be realised through employment for traders and their families. There is however a strong case made that such aspirations are not feasible. Then, the question needs to be asked if empowerment of all is indeed possible? The DED would argue that it is - through incentives such as lower rentals. In this regard, the DED’s approach sounds promising, but the implementation details and actual feasibility thereof are too hazy. The manner in which the model proposed by SAITF and the DED differ from each other is, furthermore, alarming. Where SAITF has based its whole model on cooperatives, the DED voiced strong opposition to such an approach. It is not known whether the DED does indeed have the interests of traders at heart or if it is a move to delegitimise the existing leadership. Throughout this chapter, the secrecy and lack of transparency is highlighted as a matter of concern. A context characterised by a lack of trust and competition among organisations creates a scenario that is not conducive to meaningful negotiations and broad participation.

Towards the end of the research, mention was made of the trader cooperatives partnering with private companies in Joint Ventures to take over the management positions (SAITF1, interview 2017). These dynamics could not be further explored, but they further emphasise the need for regulatory oversight. SAITF envisages to take on the oversight role in markets. Miraftab (2004c) has however highlighted the central role of the state in levelling out an unequal playing field between civil society and private companies. In this context, the need for state intervention is evident, but a similar oversight role over the state is also called for. Civil society organisations are best placed to achieve this. This once again brings SAITF’s interests in the proposed market reforms into the picture (especially taking into consideration that they are advocating for rental collections). Traders will be reliant on SAITF to keep the state accountable.

The recommendations and arguments formulated in this chapter could be regarded as normative. It is, for example, easy to argue that there is a need for regulatory oversight but seeing it materialise is a different reality. Each of the stakeholders involved has its own interests in mind when formulating the proposed management models. Given the conceptual nature of the models, there is, however, a
need for normative recommendations to illuminate their potential gaps. These gaps once again highlight the entanglement between neoliberalisation and participation. Authorities will develop models in which traders play an active role in the hope of improving overall payments in the markets. Traders will take up these positions given that this is what the process of neoliberalisation entitles them to. While traders may think, this represents an opportunity to participate in the management of their markets; it could be a tool to sedate their mobilisation attempts while making them subject to rigid agreements. Such a scenario will clearly elucidate the potential disempowering power of empowerment. There is, on the other hand, the possibility that the demands of traders have made the authorities receptive to their calls regarding affordability. If this should be the case, the democratic and participatory dimension of this claim within a neoliberal context has to be acknowledged.

The chapters thus far have been building blocks in unpacking and understanding trader participation in the governance of markets in Johannesburg. The following concluding chapter uses the analyses spread over the research to summarise trader participation according to the work of Cornwall (2008). Trader participation is interrogated through asking who is participating, in what and to what effect. Although much of this chapter is based on ideas still in a developing phase, a view into the complexities of participation within a process of neoliberalisation is revealed.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1. INTRODUCTION

Trader participation in the governance of Bree and Midrand markets represents a battle for power. Within this battle, there is, however, a strong emphasis on power through economic gains. Similarly, to other markets in the global South, all the stakeholders involved need to sustain themselves and their institutions through revenues. Given the neoliberal context within which many of these markets are located the need for revenue is even more pronounced. Terms such as participation and empowerment can become a rhetoric used to mask revenue objectives and co-opt traders into meeting these. As a result, the lines between participation and neoliberalisation become entangled and blurry. While neoliberalisation promotes participation, towards decreasing the role of the state, it is also instrumentalised to shift responsibility to participants and meet revenue objectives. The chapter borrows from Cornwall’s (2008: 281) “clarity through specificity” approach to provide a concluding analysis of trader participation in market governance in Johannesburg. The conclusion firstly reflects on who participates and who is excluded; secondly on what traders are participating in; and thirdly the reason for participating.
There are several similarities between Midrand and Bree markets, and markets in the global South. Traders participate in market governance through collectives. Such collectives represent a group of traders who share membership or affiliations to the collective through common interests. Midrand and Bree markets had a very dynamic context with market committees, cooperatives, trader organisations as well as volunteering groups active in their governance. Additional to these collectives, the public entities responsible for markets are the JPC, DED and the DoT.

Since its restructuring along New Public Management principles in the late 1990s- early 2000s, the City of Johannesburg appoints external MoEs for the management of market functions. In 1999, the MTC was established as a MoE for the management of markets in the City of Johannesburg. The MTC failed to meet its mandate as a self-sustainable entity, partly due to a lack of profit (Shisaka Management Development Services 2004 cited in Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). As a result, the governing body was theoretically dissolved and subsumed under the JPC. Since 2014, the JPC is the governing body in charge of the management of markets. Both the JPC and former MTC report directly to the DED, as the department overseeing informal business activity and infrastructure development (DED1, interview 2016). The DED works interdependently with the DoT in the management of the markets as dual function facilities – covering both trade and taxi activities. The JPC has a market manager and in some instances property specialists physically present in the market. In the past, private service providers have been appointed by the JPC to conduct functions such as cleaning and security. Recent management demands from traders (led by trader collectives) across the markets have however placed possible reforms on the table.

The market committee is the officially recognised representative body of traders. It is the key invited space of participation in markets through which communication with the authorities is enabled. The market committee thus plays a pivotal role. The normal procedure is for traders to elect the committee members as their representatives. Such elections have, however, taken on a rather informal approach similar to the governance of other market functions. Among others, a lack of oversight and suggestions of domineering practices have created contestation regarding the legitimacy of the committees. While this may be true, there are new formalisation processes underway that would likely re-establish the committee members.

The market committees rely to a large extent on the support of the second collective, SAITF as a regional organisation. Both market committees are affiliated to SAITF. Membership to SAITF comes at a cost but the organisation supports all traders in the markets regardless of whether they are
members. This approach allows SAITF to claim citizenship in markets. SAITF is further the driving force behind traders’ mobilisation and the recent demands for management positions.

The third collective, volunteers, are traders who give their time with the hope of receiving formal employment or financial compensation should management tenders be awarded to the fourth collective, cooperatives. Trader cooperatives can be considered the least inclusive of the different collectives. They are exclusive to those who can afford membership. This is especially a problem in markets such as Bree and Midrand where low affordability levels are evident.

One of the limitations of the research was that it could not engage with traders sufficiently to determine to what extent they are in fact participating through the collectives. It would have been of value to determine to which degree there is a critical discourse towards these collectives. This is especially relevant, given that the demand for management functions in the markets was initiated by SAITF. One should also take into consideration that traders are business people with limited spare resources. Participating in market governance has time implications that could prohibit them from participating.

To conclude the question on who is participating and who is excluded it can be said that traders participate through collectives that do not necessarily encapsulate all the traders in the market. Some collectives are more inclusive than others but have been subject to irregular procedures. What does, however, make the role of these collectives more prominent is that going forward they could take on a formal position in management models.

7.3. WHAT ARE TRADERS PARTICIPATING IN OR MADE TO BELIEVE THEY DO?

The second question is: what are traders participating in, or rather, what are they made to believe they are participating in? In answering this question there are two central issues. The first is regarding transparency and the rhetoric of “empowerment” used by the various stakeholder. The second involves traders being co-opted into participatory practices to meet revenue objectives.

From the research, it can be concluded that due to a lack of transparency, traders do not know what they are participating in. In the absence of a well formulated, public document on SAITF’s approach to market management, traders rely inordinately on their ad-hoc guidance. There is similarly an absence of clarity from the authorities. Such a lack of transparency is especially evident in the manner in which the different stakeholders envision market management and “empowerment to all”. On one side, SAITF has developed its management model based on cooperatives. A mother cooperative will be appointed through which business opportunities will be made available to other cooperatives
the markets. On the other side, the DED strongly opposes cooperatives and rather foresees empowerment through incentives such as lower rentals. In addition, the former MTC CEO, believes that empowerment of all is not possible. This is with special reference to empowerment through the provision of employment opportunities to the family members of traders. These opposing views distinctly illuminate a context in which information is not shared and negotiated among traders, their representatives and authorities.

To return to the question of what traders are made to believe they are participating in, the issue of co-opting traders into cost-cutting objectives was analysed. Given the entanglements between neoliberalisation and participation, there have been cases where the efforts of participants have been abused. Miraftab (2004b: 239) accordingly developed the concept of "the disempowering work of empowerment". Although neoliberalisation argues for participation, the latter has been minimal until the realisation came that traders’ level of affordability and their subsequent mobilisation is causing the markets to operate at a deficit. Case studies have shown that traders could become more focussed on collecting rentals than mobilising against them. This will especially be the case if there should be clauses connected to their appointment that, for example, forces traders to collect fees in order to retain the appointment. The research divulged that the real motivation behind the proposed management models from CoJ’s perspective is to reduce resistance to rental payments and improve the overall collections. Traders’ insistence on participating in market management creates an opportunity to utilise them towards meeting these objectives.

It can, thus, be concluded that traders do not know what they are participating in given a lack of transparency. Traders could further be made to believe they are participating in something that would improve their situation while being utilised to meet revenue objectives of not only the authorities but also their representative collectives. To locate the representative collectives in this debate it is necessary to reflect on the next question of why traders are participating.

### 7.4. WHY ARE TRADERS PARTICIPATING?

From the findings of the research, it can be concluded that traders are participating in market governance because they have been convinced by other parties that they should. In this regard, the research built a strong case for both civic and neoliberal governmentality. Traders' lack of confidence, the hope of better prospects and rigid guidance from a supporting organisation have created a scenario in which they internalise norms and discourses around issues such as mobilisation and the taking over of management positions. The market committees have, to a certain extent, become
implementation agents for SAITF. Traders are, thus, part of a process in which they become economic agents set on maximising profit.

These forms of governmentality prove that the entanglements between participation and neoliberalisation are not restricted to the practices of the state. All stakeholders involved in market governance have their own interests and traders can be utilised to meet these. To subsequently try and evaluate if the forms of governmentality present in markets are positive it is necessary to ask if it could lead to a process where trader participation in market management becomes captured by mere market dynamics. The research revealed how the role envisioned for traders does have a strong economic focus. SAITF’s approach, however, does hold some potential to lead to a shift in power. The DED’s approach of lower incentives is also a move beyond maximising profit. Given these possibilities and the uncertainty of how things are to unfold, there is potential for trader participation to result in something positive if it is to stimulate a shift in power. The current predominant focus on economic empowerment is, however, a matter of concern.

7.5. GOING FORWARD

Taking the realities of participation in market governance into consideration, the concluding question has to be where does it leave traders going forward? Neoliberalisation is an ongoing process that holds the potential to democratise market governance. Traders had to revert to invented spaces of participation for their voices to be heard and the democratic and participatory dimension of this claim has to be acknowledged. Market governance is as a result facing a possible future reform.

In terms of traders participating in something that could lead to a shift in power, the management model proposed by SAITF showed the most potential. SAITF is pushing for forms of self-mobilisation in their approach. They want traders to start developing business agreements with external companies that could lead to considerable improvement in their own businesses. The mobilisation would still be subject to the JPC’s oversight but given the models provided, it holds the most potential. Traders could further form part of decision-making processes through the proposed mother cooperative approach. These decisions will, however, not stretch beyond their own internal budgeting to include the overall market budget. It is, nonetheless, an improvement on the approach of private service providers in which employees do not participate in decision-making. Additional to their proposed management model, chapter five elucidated the elements of political learning in SAITF’s overall approach. Traders have, among others, been exposed to mobilisation tactics but there is still a heavy reliance on SAITF. There is thus room for improvement within SAITF’s process of political education. On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that the feasibility of SAITF’s proposed management model is not known.
There is a substantial risk of further entrenching divisions among traders. SAITF also has a strong market-driven ambition through which they could want to serve their own financial interests. While this may be true, SAITF’s ambition should also be recognised as a much-needed drive in a sector in which traders are struggling to survive.

Promoting SAITF’s approach to market management is by no means an attempt at delegitimising that of the JPC and DED. At the time of the research limited information regarding their model was available which does not enable a similar analysis. The reality is that all the possible approaches to market management have their opportunities and risks. Private service providers, for example, do not necessarily prioritise the interests of traders but in which format can market management be handed over to traders without creating elitist participatory structures? SAITF envisions bridging such elitist structures through further cooperatives which in fact could further deepen the divide between those who can and cannot afford membership. In that regard, the DED’s approach has potential but the implementation details and actual feasibility thereof were too hazy. Cooperative governance does hold immense potential to improve the overall management of markets. It deserves to be given an opportunity in markets. There is further the need to come up with innovative ways of accommodating traders’ different affordability levels. There are markets in which rates are calculated according to goods sold to avoid discrimination (Solaja et al., 2013). In the model SAITF is proposing, cross-subsidising cooperative membership fees according to the products on offer could be considered. The possibility also has to be considered that in the hope of seeing these models fail, the state could withdraw its presence - but this would be to the disadvantage of all. Authorities could also benefit from the proposed reforms and will hopefully support the call of traders.

Going forward there are two concluding factors that need to be prioritised. The first is the need for regulatory oversight. Government is best placed to perform such an oversight role but has its own contradicting agendas. The state needs to take on a steering role while both enabling and regulating the market (Miraftab, 2004c). This emphasises the need for organisations such as SAITF to remain objective and not connected to any contractual agreements to enable them to keep the state accountable. Traders, through their collectives, need to insist that factors such as skills transfer, business development, inclusion in decision-making and overall transparency are prioritised.

This links to the second factor: transparency is pivotal if any form of political empowerment should be realised. Traders cannot negotiate or meaningfully participate without adequate information. Political empowerment is a process that is reliant on the availability of information to develop the participants’ ability to alter and manipulate rules, develop new rules, influence social preferences and secure resources (Williams, 2004). Within the context of the markets, such political capabilities are of
particular importance they could aid traders in formulating demands that could meet among others their social and physical needs. This is of notable importance given the overwhelming focus on economic empowerment in the proposed new management models. Political capabilities could further protect traders from becoming co-opted into meeting revenue objectives and becoming mere service providers. This is not by any means to imply that the economic benefits envisioned could not hold benefits for traders - but a shift in power requires a move beyond this.

While this might be true, the recommendations regarding regulatory oversight and transparency could be regarded as normative. It is, for example, easy to argue that there is a need for regulatory oversight but seeing it materialise is a different reality. Transparency has its own challenges as the reforms processes are located in a context characterised by competition and a lack of trust. Creating unity amongst trader organisations in Johannesburg and overcoming a lack of trust between authorities and traders’ collectives are not simple tasks. The research nonetheless values such normative recommendations as there is much to be gained for both traders and the authorities through trader participation in the management of markets.

Since the research was conducted at a time when the proposed management model was still in a developing phase, further research is suggested to analyse the effect to which it will be implemented. Such research will provide insights into whether the process of neoliberalisation could, in fact, succeed in deepening democracy instead of enhancing divisions among traders. The research revealed how SAITF and the authorities, in particular, could be presenting the needs of traders or their own. It could also be a combination of the two. Only with time, as one of the proposed management models are implemented, will the true motives of these stakeholders become apparent. Given that the research was conducted with limited inputs from traders, there is furthermore an opportunity to deepen the analysis of their participation through further engagements.
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ANNEXURE I: PUBLIC TRANSPORT
INFORMAL TRADERS MARKET HOUSE
RULES